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ABSTRACT
The biography of the Prophet, Muhammad, is now a well trodden
path and a great deal of information is available to the modern
reader. This thesis is the result of a new look at the extant
sources with a view to exploring afresh some of the factors which
underlie the military successes of the Prophet. Above all, an
attempt has been made to establish the fact that espionage played
a considerable part in the achievement of his goal.
The first chapter of this thesis deals with the Arabic terms
used in the sources for espionage activities in the pre-Islamic
and early Islamic periods, whilst the second chapter is devoted
to a discussion of the espionage practices adopted by the Arabs
in the Jahiliyya period. The third chapter is an attempt to
establish the need on the part of the Prophet for intelligence
and it contains discussion about the situation in which the
Prophet found himself at the start of his military career. The
enemy groups and the reasons for their enmity are treated in
detail.
The fourth chapter begins with an account of the sources
of intelligence available to the Prophet in the fight against
his enemies. A brief account of his intelligence activities
during the hi.jra which enabled him to start his career at Medina
then follows. Discussion of the career of the Prophet is divided
into two sections: the external and internal fronts. On the
external front, particular attention is paid to the Prophet's
victory at Badr and to the decisive role played by espionage in
this event. An account of the Prophet's achievements immediately
before and after the battle of Uhud is also given. An attempt
is then made to establish the fact that Medina could have been
defended in the battle of al-Khandia only by means of espionage.
Thereafter, the events leading up to al-Hudaybiyya are analysed
and it is argued here that the Meccans were forced to come to the
negotiating table as the result of a successful intelligence
mission. The conquest of Mecca which followed is seen here as
the height of the Prophet's career in the field of intelligence
and it is suggested that espionage played a major role in forcing
the Meccans to accept the supremacy of the Prophet. Finally,
on the internal front, it is argued that espionage played no minor
role in subjugating the Prophet's overt and hidden enemies.
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INTRODUCTION
Prom Ibn Ishaq to the present day the Prophet of Islam,
Muhammad,^^^ has been a subject of countless works. Almost every
writer on the Prophet has written about his life or a certain as¬
pect of his life from a different point of view and therefore
thousands of justifications have been ascribed to these works.
In this situation it seems very difficult to find any justification
for yet another work based on the same existing material but
luckily we have found one. According to the information available
to the present author,no previous scholar, Muslim or non-Muslim,
has attempted so far to illuminate the intelligence aspect of
the Prophet's struggle against his enemies during his Medinan
career. Although it is mentioned in all the early available
sources such as the Sira of Ibn Ishaq and the Kitab al-Maghazi
of al-Waqidi ana in later biographies such as Muir's The Life of
(2) (3)
Mohammad, Margoliouth's Mohammed and the Rise of Islam.
(4)
and Watt's Muhammad at Medina and Muhammad: Prophet and
1 . This writer is accustomed to pronouncing with the Prophet
the formula 'peace be upon him' and with his companions
the formula 'God be pleased with them'. It is extremely
cumbersome to include these formulae in the text because
they would have sometimes occurred several times on a single
page. They may, therefore, be considered as understood.
2. Edinburgh, 1912 .
3. New York, 1905 .
4. Oxford, 1956 .
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(1)
Statesman and others that the Prophet on many occasions sent
spies against the enemy, no scholar has attempted to create an
independent work concerning his intelligence activities. Since
a mere few lines and clues cannot possibly reflect the restless¬
ness and watchfulness of a man whose life and mission was
constantly in danger both from inside and outside his communityj
this study has been undertaken.
The most authentic source for the life of Muhammad is
(2)
al-Qur'an. Poster produced "An Autobiography of Mohammed"
based on the material found in al-Qur'an about Muhammad and the
events of his life but it is fragmentary as it must inevitably
bejbecause most of the expeditions undertaken by the Prophet are
not mentioned in al-Qur'an. Therefore we have to search for
other sources to provide information on the life of Muhammad.
The earliest followers of the Prophet like the first four caliphs
who had taken part in most of the events which took place during
his career as a prophet did not write the biography of their
leaderjbecause after his death they were engaged, as Tor Andrae
writes, as responsible leaders in the military state and there¬
fore had other things to do rather than relating the stories
concerning the activities of Muhammad.These followers were
•
the most appropriate persons to write an honest biography of
1. Oxford, 1978 .
2. MW,XXVI (1936)f pp.130-52. See also R. Blachere, Le Probleme
de Mahomet (Paris, 1952).
3. Tor Andrae, Muhammad'• the Man and his Paith. tr. Theoohil
Menzel (London, 1936), pp.27-8.
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their leader because they, in spite of.their firm belief in his
prophethood, had witnessed his drawbacks as a human being and
his limits concerning his relationship to God.^ A biography
of Muhammad written by any one of them would have been the
biography of a man who possessed the gift of prophethood rather
(2)
than a study of hero worship. It is a pity that these
followers neither themselves wrote a biography of the Prophet
nor encouraged or appointed someone from the junior companions
of the Prophet to work on this project under their supervision.
The lack of such an attempt had serious consequences.
The vacuum, however, did not last very long and as Use
Lichtenstadler asserts,
'at a comparatively early time the need was
felt for collecting every bit of information
about the Prophet
The people began to collect and relate the stories of the wars
and raids of the Prophet in the style in which they told the
stories of the wars and raids of the pre-Islamic Arabs which are
1. As Buhl writes,
"His (the Prophet's) real personality was
revealed quite openly with its limitations;
his strength and his knowledge were limited".
EI2, III, p.656;
'and apart from the revelation with which he
was favoured, he was a man like any other and
several times refers to the fact that he will
die.'
Ibid. , III, p.657.
2. There are many examples in the sources of close associates
of the Prophet criticising his actions^as 'Umar is said to
have criticised the truce of al-Hudaybiyya in 6 A.H.
- f
called Ayyam al-'Arab. Although we do not fully agree with Arthur
Jeffery^1^ that the aim of the generation that worked at the
biography of the Prophet was to construct the picture as it ought
to have been rather than to know the past as it was, it does not
require much mental effort to conclude that when a serious topic
on the wars and raids of the Prophet became the object of the
story tellers what sort of material would have been produced.
It is a fact that many qasas crept in and a tendency from simple
and factual data towards glorification manifested itself. Efforts
were made to glorify the first decade of Islam and colours were
added to make the picture more beautiful than the human greatness
(2)
of the Prophet. In this way the picture of the Prophet was so
distorted that the responsible members of the Muslim community
became worried at the situation and 'Urwa b. al-Zubayr (23-94 A.H.)>
(I. Hisham, II, pp.215-6) and the Prophet's taking part in
the funeral service of 'Abdallah b. Ubayy in 9 A.H. (Waqidi,
III, pp.1057-8).
2. "Arabic and Islamic Historiography", MW, XXXV (1945), p.128.
1. "The Quest of Historical Muhammad", MW, XVI (1926), pp.340-1.
2. See al-Nowaihi, "Towards a Re-Evaluation of Muhammad:
Prophet and Man", MW^LX (1 970)_, pp .300-31 3 who writes,
"Alien those scholars (non-Muslims) differ with us,
it is not always they who are in the wrong and who
have to change their view. Eor just as we fabri¬
cated those fables about the birth of our Prophet,
we have indulged in certain exaggerations and
outright inventions regarding his qualities. We
have claimed for him a perfection which is not
given to any human, not even the prophets. If we
ever aspire to have a saner and truer estimation
of him, one that is capable of discovering his
real and demonstrable virtues, our point of depart¬
ure must be the realization that neither he himself
claimed perfection, nor did the Qur'an claim it for
him". P.310.
- o -
who was a cousin of the Prophet, stepped into the field and wrote
down his information on the career of the Prophet and hence became
(1 )
the pioneer of the literature concerning the life of the Prophet.
Although his notes are the earliest documents on Islamic history
that have come down to us through later sources, these are
(2)
anecdotal, fragmentary and with hardly any framework. Later
sources have preserved for us some traditions from 'Urwa and
Mustafa al-A'zaml has now compiled them in a book called Maghazl
Rasul Allah which is one of our sources. A later scholar, Ibn
Shihab al-Zuhrl (d. 124 A.H.) set the lines of the historical
studies giving the first definite framework of the Sira, as
Duri asserts, to be elaborated later in details onlyj and there
(3)
is little attempt at glorification.
The work of these two scholars and of others of their
(4)
contemporaries, mentioned by Guillaume, such as Shurahbil
b. Sa'd, 'Asim b. 'Umar b. Qatada (d.c. 120 A.H.), 'Abdallah b.
Abl Bakr b. Muhammad (d. 130 or 135 A.H.) Muhammad b. *Abd
• •
al-Rahman b. Nawfal (d. 131 or 137 A.H.) did not survive independ¬
ently. But fragments of the works of Wahb b. Munabbih (34-110
A.H.) (written on papyri in 228 A.H.) and Musa b. 'Uqba (d. 141
A.H.) have survived but are practically of no use to the present
1. Hajji Khalifa, Kashf al-Zunun (Istanbul, 1360-2 A.H.),
p.1747.
2. For details see A.A. Duri, "Al-Zuhrl" BSOAS^XIX (1957), pp.1-12.
3. Ibid., p.8.
4. A. Guillaume, The Life of Muhammad: A Translation of
Ishaq's Sirat Rasul Allah (Lahore, 1955), pp.XIV-XVl.
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study. Our main sources, therefore, are the works of later
scholars such as Muhammad b. Ishaq (d. 151 A.H.) and Muhammad
• • •
b. 'Umar al-Waqidl (d. 207 A.H.) etc. Ibn Ishaq's work Sirat
Rasul Allah has come down to us in the revision of $Abd al-Malik
b. Hisham (d. 218 A.H.) and is the first coherent biography of
the Prophet. He compiled his work from the material which was
in circulation in his lifetime and tried to distinguish facts
from fiction. In spite of his valiant attempt, as Tor Andrae
asserts, he did not entirely succeed in carrying out his critical
sifting of the material.^^^ Our other main sources like
al-Waqidi's Kitab al-Maghazi (book of wars), Muhammad b. Sa'd's
(d. 230 A.H.) book al-Tabaoat al-Kubra (the great
classes) and Muhammad b. Jarir al-Tabarl's (d. 310 A.H.)
• •
Tarikh al-Rusul wa'l-Muluk (the history of the prophets and kings)
have their merits and demerits as does the work of Ibn Ishaq
but they share one common characteristic; amongst the various
heroes whom they praise individually they all share in the
(2)
glorification of the Prophet.
Many Western scholars have criticized the material on the
Prophet's life included in the above mentioned works and conclude
1. Guillaume, o£. cit., p.58.
2. For further information on the above mentioned works see
Bayard Dodge, "The Subjects and Titles of Books Written in
the First Four Centuries of Islam", Islamic Culture. XXVII,
pp.525-40; Ignaz Goldziher, "Characteristics of Arabic
Literature from the Beginning to the End of Umayyad period",
trans. Joseph Somogyi, Islamic Culture'. XXXI, pp. 1-16,
178-90 and by the same author "Arabic Literature during the
that it is unreliable for constructing a reliable biography of
the Prophet. Schacht writes,
"A considerable part of the standard biography
of the Prophet in Medina, as it appeared in
the second half of the second century A.H. was
of very recent origin and is therefore without
independent historical value.
On the other hand, some scholars like Watt have adopted a positive
view and accept the traditional historical material as true^with
the exception that where there is internal contradiction it is
to be rejected and where tendential shaping is suspected it is
(2)
as far as possible to be corrected. Por the sake of the
present study we have no alternative but to accept the latter
point of view because otherwise it would come to a standstill
right at the beginning. If we look at the sources from this
stance we find, as Wendell writes, that
'the biography of the Prophet Muhammad is
reasonably well documented from the hijra
of 622 A.D. until his death,
a period which is the field of the present study.
'Abbasid Period", trans. Joseph Somogyi, Islamic Culture.
XXXI, pp.292-313; Joseph Somogyi, "The Development of
Arabic Historiography", Journal of Semitic Studies. Ill,
pp.373-87; Francesco Gabrieli, "Arabic Historiography",
trans. M.S. Khan, Islamic Studies. XVIII, pp.81-95.
1. Joseph Schacht, "A Revaluation of Islamic Tradition3")
RAS (1949) , p.151 .
2. W.M. Watt, Muhammad at Mecca (Oxford, 1953), p.XIV;
Wa11, Medina, p.336.
3. G. Wendell, "The Pre-Islamic Period of Sirat al-Nabi",




After these brief remarks about the justification of the
present study and some introductory notes let us move forward.
Our concern in this chapter is to look into early Arabic sources
with a view to finding out the terms used for spies and scouts
in the pre-Islamic and early Islamic periods. These terms are
tall* a . sarivva. rabi *a3 sabaaa . shavvifa. * ayn. .iasus . and nadhir
or mundhir.
The sources which use these terms were compiled, except for
al-Qur'an, in the second, third or even later centuries of the
Islamic era. It is,therefore,difficult to decide whether these
terms were actually used in the periods in question or whether
they were imposed back into the past by our historians.^^
Because we have no way out of this difficult situation we have,
therefore,to depend on the available material in the present
study.
Tall*a
According to Nihay.aal-Qastallani , Lisan, ^^ Ibn Abi'l
1. Except for rabi'a. *ayn, jasus and nadhir or mundhir which
are used in the pre-Islamic and the early Islamic poetry or
in al-Qur'an as will be shown later.
2. Ill, p.46.
3. Irshad, V, p.67.
4. VIII, p.237.
-Padid.^ al-Bahranl. ^Maqayis al-Lugha, Muhit^ and
• • w
- (51
Wasit , a man or a party of men sent out to obtain secret
information about the enemy is called a tall*a. Lane defines
this term in some detail as follows,
"Tali*a of an army (a scout; and a party of
scouts;) a man or a party of men, that is sent,
and goes forth to obtain knowledge of the state,
or case, or tidings, or of the secret, or of
the inward, or intrinsic, or secret, state,
or circumstances, of the enemy like the ,jasus;
a man or a party of men sent before any other
party to acquaint himself, or themselves,
with the tidings, or state, or case of the
enemy".^
Lane further says that this term is applied to a single
man or a number of men when they are together but limits the
numbers to three and four because Imam Muhammad al-Shaybanl has
(7)done so.
On another occasion Lane says that three and four and the
- (8}
like are termed tali*a.
T
These definitions are similar except the numbers to which
this term can be applied. Lane tries to limit the numbers of
1. Sharh Nah.i al-Balagha. ed. Muhammad Abu '1-Fadl Ibrahim
(Cairo, 1387/1978), XV, p.90.
2. Sharh Nah.i al-Balagha (Tehran, 1378-84 A.H.), IV, p.378.
3. Ahmad b. Paris b. Zakariyya, Mu'.iam Maoavis al-Lugha. ed.





8. Ibid. , p.1356.
such a party to three and four while the rest of the authorities
quoted above do not mention such limits. If we examine the
sources we find that the authorities other than Lane have the
support of those who apply this term to more than four persons.
Here are a few examples of this sort.
Before the battle of Uhud in 3 A.H. a Muslim named Salma
b. Salama went out of Medina and came across a tall*a of the
4. O)
Meccans comprising ten horsemen.
During the siege of Medina in 5 A.H., Usayd b. Hudayr of
the Ansar was once on duty to guard the trench, which had been
dug around Medina as a defensive measure, when he saw a tali'a
of the enemy consisting of one hundred soldiers under the command
- (2)
of *Amr b. al-'As.
•
When the Prophet set out towards Mecca to perform the
lesser pilgrimage in 6 A.H., but he could not enter Mecca and
returned after concluding a treaty with the Quraysh known as the
treaty of al-Hudaybiyya,he sent 'Ubad b. Bashr in advance as
tali1 a which consisted of twenty horsemen.
During the same expedition when the Quraysh resolved not
to let the Prophet enter Mecca_jthey sent Khalid b. al-Walid to
al-Ghamim with other horsemen. According to Abu Yusuf,when
Muhammad advanced from 'Usfan he met Khalid who was there as a
-. (4) _ _
tali a of the Quraysh. Al-Bukhari records that the Prophet
1. Waqidi, I, p. 208; Maqrizi, p. 115. ^
2. Waqidi, II, pp. 464-5. ^ 0 ^ u-?L_> o l_5 'i-i-L r~»'' ' i L
3. Ibid., II, p. 574. . I , i_.A. J> L» I ^
—
_ ... ' <u u ^
4. Abu Yusuf, Kitab al-Khara.i (Bulaq, 1302 A.H.) p. 128.
- n -
told his companions that Khalid along with other horsemen was
- - ( 1 ) —
at al-Ghamlm as the tall*a of the Quraysh. Waqidi mentions
that Khalid was accompanied by two hundred horsemen while he was
- (2)
at al-Ghamim J which means that such a large party was termed
- -(3) -
tali'a by the Prophet. Al-Bukhari and al-Zamakhshari tell us
that when the Prophet reached al-Hudaybiyya by dodging Khalid
the latter went to Mecca with this news and warned them about the
forthcoming danger.
These examples clearly indicate that a party of any number
can be termed tali*a and it is appropriate not to limit the use
of this term to a number up to three or four as Lane does.
Let me now cite some examples of the use of this term from
different sources to show that it denotes spies and scouts. We
begin with the story of Zuhayr b. Jadhima, a leader of the Banu
*Abs of the Banu Ghatafan in pre-Islamic times. It is
appropriate to give a detailed account of this story because it
contains terms other than tall*a with which we have to deal
later on.
The general outline of the story, culled from various
sources^is as follows. Shas b. Zuhayr was on his way home
after visiting al-Nu*man, the king of al-Hira. When he was passing
1. Irshad, IV, p.443; see also Kanz, X, p.309.
2. WaqidI, II, p.580.
3. Irshad , IV, p.443.
4. Mahmud b. *Umar al-Zamakhshari, al-Fa'iq fi Gharib al-Hadlth.
• * 9 '
ed. All Muhammad al-Ba,jawi and Muhammad Abu ' 1-Padl Ibrahim
• • •
(Cairo, 1945-8), I, p.321.
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through the territory of the Banu GhanI he was attacked and
killed, most likely by some member of that tribe. Zuhayr claimed
qisas from the Banu GhanI and their confederates the Banu 'Amir;
this was denied. Zuhayr then planned to locate the murderer of
his son by means of espionage before taking further steps. He
hired the services of a woman and sent her to the Banu GhanI with
plenty of meat to sell among them. He advised her to conceal her
identity and to try to find out the murderer of his son in the
course of her business activities by talking to people. She
acted as directed and luckily happened to meet the wife of the
murderer. This woman told the meat seller secretly^ but in a
boastful manner, that her husband Riyah b. al-Ashal had murdered
Shas , son of Zuhayr. This information was passed on to Zuhayr
who attacked the Banu GhanI and there was much bloodshed.
After some time Zuhayr went to attend the market of 'Ukaz.
There he met Khalid b. Ja'far of the Banu Hawazin and a quarrel
broke out between them over the recent bloodshed. Then they
returned to their respective tribes and managed to prepare them
for a combat with each other.
Tumadir, the wife of Zuhayr, belonged to the enemy tribe.
To reap benefit from this situation Khalid sent her brother
Harith b. 'Amir as a spy.('ayn)^1^ to get information about the
intentions and strength of Zuhayr. When Harith met his relatives .
• -J
one of his nephews, Qays b. Zuhayr, found out about the real
1 . lu-i-c- ,—J L> j LI Kamil, I, p.413; see pp.26-32
for detailed discussion about the meanings of this term.
mission of his uncle and told his father about it. Zuhayr
decided to arrest his brother-in-law because he was a tall* a^ ^
and ordered his sons to do so. Tumadir intervened to save her
brother from maltreatment and Harith was permitted to leave, on
the promise that he would not speak to anybody about their
secrets. He then started on his homeward journey. 'Alien he came
near to a gathering of Khalid's companions he put his milk skin
under a tree and addressed it, "0 tree^drink from this milk".
The people noticed his action and thought that he wanted to
convey some information to them but he seemed to be under oath
not to speak to anybody about that particular matter. They came
to the tree and tasted the milk which they found was sweet. They
thought that by his action Harith wanted to tell them that their
enemy was near at hand and there was the prospect of booty.
Having this clue>six of their riders, including Khalid,
went ahead to reconnoitre the land with a view to finding some
definite information. These riders were noticed by Usayd b.
Jadhima who told his brother Zuhayr about them. Zuhayr did not
believe his brother because he had not received such information
(2)from his spy (rabi* a). Consequently the enemy on the basis
of the information gathered by their riders attacked Zuhayr and
(3)
succeeded in killing him.
1. ! JU 1,1 Aghani, XI, p.85.
2. u *•— • Ibid . XI, p.86; see pp. 21-5 for
detailed discussion about the meaning of this term.
3. 'Iqd. Ill, pp.304-5; Aghani. II, pp.85-7; Kamil, I, pp.411- 4
Ayyam, pp.236-9.
This story is a fine example of espionage and counter
espionage in pre-Islamic Arabia. Three terms, *ayn, tall*a and
rabl 'a, are used in it to denote spies. At the moment we are
dealing with the term tall*a which is used for Harith, brother
of Tumaair, who was sent forth by Khalid. He went towards Zuhayr
on a spying mission and came back with useful information which
he conveyed to Khalid and his party in a codified form because
of his oath.
Relating the story of al-Hawfazan, Abu 'Ubayda says that
the Banu Bakr b. Wa'il intended to make a raid on the gathering
of the Banu Riyah b. Yarbu' and the Banu Tha*laba. When the
latter came to know the intentions of the Banu Bakr they sent
- 0) - (2)
two riders as tali*a in one direction and another two as rabi'a
in the other direction. After some time the riders who were sent
as rabi'a came back and reported that they had not noticed anyone
nearby. On the third day the riders who were sent out as tall*a
came back with the report that the enemy was at al-Qasumiyya.
(3)
Then they sent out another tali*a who came back with the news
_ (4}
that the enemy had reached the valley of Dhu Tuluh
• 0
This is a part of the story of al-Hawfazan in which the
term tali'a has been used twice for the persons who were sent
out to locate the enemy and returned to report their findings to
their leaders.
cL-j ) Naqa'id. I, p.49.
2. j Li i-.Jj._i Pj_ ») Ibid., I, p. 49.
- nJ- I ,3 I z j-C j xbi d. , I, p . 50.
4. Ibid., I, pp.49-50.
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This term is also applied to those spies sent out by the
Prophet or by his enemies during his campaigns. Some such examples
have been mentioned earlier and here are a few more.
When the Prophet was on his way to intercept the caravan
of Abu Sufyan in the year 2 A.H. before the battle of Baar he is
said to have sent *Adx b. Abi'l-Zaghba and Basbas b. *Amr as
spies. They went to a certain well and made inquiries about Abu
Sufyan. These spies who are termed tali*a by I. Sa'd were sent
forth by the Prophet and came back to report to him when they
found information about the whereabouts of the caravan of Abu
(2)
Sufyan.
Again, before the start of the battle of Badr the Meccans
sent 'Umayr b. Wahb towards the camp of the Prophet's army to
obtain information about its numbers and equipment. It is stated
that 'Umayr went round the Prophet's camp and went back to the
Meccans with the report that their enemy was approximately three
hundred men strong. This spy is also termed tali * a by I. Sa'd.^"^
Again, when the Prophet was on his way to Duma in the year
4 A.H. he sent out a spy who belonged to the Banu *Udhra. It
is stated that the spy returned after he came to know the
whereabouts of the enemy and reported it to the Prophet. This
-. _ (4)
spy is termed tali'a by Waqidi.
1 . f -i—'i_S—: ' j j-*-*- j-f ^ ' 0r~. J-c' :)
I. Sa'd, II, p.24. C.1—11 W-"'1-* j-h
2. Ibid., II, p.24.
3.VU-*I J Ibid. , IV, p. 199.
(<^!
4. Waqidx, I, p.403.
These examples substantiate the definition of tali'a given
by the authorities,^^ namely that it was applied by the Arabs
to a scout or a party of scouts who used to go out on spying
missions.
Sariyya
According to Lane, sariyya is a portion of an army. It
originally meant marching by night and was afterwards applied
(2)
also to marching by day. Sometimes this term denotes spies
as Lane says, when he defines tall*a. According to Lane, up to
three and four spies are called tall*a and more than that are
(3)
termed sariyya. However, Lane goes on to say that it is
(4)
related of the Prophet that he sent a single person as sariyya
but he cites no examples to substantiate that claim. He would
appear to be referring to one or more of the following incidents.
One is cited by Shaybanl^^ and I. Sa'd^^ who mention a single
person being sent as sariyya, Dahya al-Kalbi. A second incident
is cited also by Shaybanl who refers to a single person being
sent as sariyya during the siege of Medina in 5 A.H. This person
- (7)
was Hudhayfa b. al-Yaman . A third incident is cited by
1. Lisan, al-Qastallani. Lane etc.
2. P. 1356.
3. P. 1870. Muhit agrees with Lane in this regard. P.409.
4. P. 1356.
5- ^^Siyar, I, p.69.
6. -^-.)I. Sa * d, IV, p.251.
ry f* ^^ —; / <—^ * J L—'—i I , - i\, c.—> J ->■ ——' \7• • t- u - <_r^ Siyar, I, p.69.
^ 4 J ->• ^ <3—^ ~~ '
Shaybani, al-Mas'udi and al-Dhahabi who mention that a single
person was sent as sariyya. This was 'Abdallah b. Unays who was
(1)
sent to kill someone in 5 A.H.
These sources provide us with further examples of two
persons being sent as sariyya. For example, Ibn Mas'ud ana
- (2)
Khubab were sent out as sariyya. Again. 4Amr b. Umayya and
Salma b. Aslam were sent as sariyya to Mecca in order to kill
- (3)
Abu Sufyan.
These various examples cannot be called exceptions to the
general rule that s'ariyya refers to at least three scouts as
- -(4)
Lane suggests. Perhaps Lane could not consult Shaybani and Ibn
- (5)al- 'Arabi who held the opinion that a single scout can be
termed sariyya♦ It would appear more likely that the term
sariyya is used for any number of scouts.
Now the question naturally arises that if there is no
difference in tali4a and sariyya (when the latter term is used
v
to denote spies as mentioned by Lane) then what is the justifi¬
cation for using these separate terms in the sources?
1 . (jM~t— ' cj—. ' o-;-& sjyar, I, p .69 ; Tanbih (B) ,
p. 21 2; (j-.-U I ^ IJ al-Dhahabl, Tarikh
al-Islam (Cairo, 1367-9), II, p.299.
2. ( t-t _j-~ I—s ,J- j j Siyar, I, p. 69.
3. <uJ~ J j Tanbih (B) , p. 21 3.
C I J —t C " L-5—: ^ . -1 I ^——a i__J i d—' ,—w a f . * >
4.J>' C;' <_*.l—j^^TTsi.yar, I. p. 69.
(
5. , cJ I ~ j. I . I j^,\Sahih al-Tirmidhi bi Sharh al-Imam
(\j t; 1. *
Ibn al-'Arabi (Cairo, 1931-4), VII, p.45.
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Al-Sarkhasi^1 ^ and al-Nuwawi1*furnish us with the answer. They
say that a sariyya is despatched only by night, works in the
darkness but remains hidden during the day. The important
feature of this term is that it stresses activity only at night.
On the other hand, there is no such condition for the application
of the term tali'a who can be despatched at any time and can
perform his duties during the day as well as during the night.
As has already been mentioned, 'Umayr b. Wahb was sent by the
Meccans as tall'a to have an idea of the number of soldiers in
the Prophet's camp. The situation implies that 'Umayr worked
during the dayjbecause at night he could not have obtained an
estimate of the Prophet's force without meeting somebody^which
he apparently did not do.
Here is an example of a tali'a sent by night by the Prophet
and who worked under cover of darkness. It is stated that
during the siege of Medina in 5 A.H. the Prophet despatched two
separate persons as his tali'ai3) who did not know about each
other's mission. While on duty they came across each other and
fighting broke out between them as enemies. After the exchange
of some blows they realised their misunderstanding and came to
the Prophet and reported their misdeed. The Prophet consoled
, L- u L-._: I
1-
(,UJIL0.,A Sijar. I, P.68
JtUJJI rJ- ($ r l_n2. JU J '-i. : - J Sahih Muslim bi Sharh
( U J 1 » r
al-Huwawi (Cairo, 1348-9) XII, p.37; see also Xindl, The
Apology of e.l-Xindi (London, 1885), p.77; Nihava. II, p.173;
Muhit. p.409.
3. 3 I Cr* !' J Siyar, I, p. 104;
^ dJJ I LJL I j Waqidi, II, p . 474.
them sympathetically.^^
There is another difference in the nature of tall*a and
sariyya. A tall*a is always sent for spying (although he can
become involved in fighting for self defence) but a sarivva has
wider meanings than the activity of spying because sometimes
it is sent for fighting and sometimes for secret assassinations
too.'2'
There are many examples of a sariyya being sent for
fighting^"^ or secret assassination. ^ They are, however_,beyond
the scope of this study and we will restrict our discussion only
to the examples of the sariyya sent for spying.
The Nakhla expedition in 2 A.H. under the command of
'Abdallah b. Jahsh resulted, according to some sources, in the
battle of Badr^because a man from the Qurayshite caravan was
killed at the hand of one of the Muslims. This expedition is
termed sariyya by WaqidI who says that it was sent with the
sole purpose of spying.
1. Siyar, I, p.104.
2. Ibid., I, p.70.
3. Such as when the Prophet sent Hamaza along with thirty
riders to intercept a Meccan caravan led by Abu Jahl.
(L__5I j Sa'd, III, p.9; and when the
Prophet sent Bashir b. Sa'd with a force of three hundred
men towards Janib.
u^^j^ ^
^I^ I. Sa'd, IV, p. 280.
4. Such as when the Prophet sent 'Abdallah b. Unays- to
assassinate someone as mentioned earlier. See above p.17
5* ( l_>I Ucl) WlqidI, I, p
20
It is stated in some sources that the Prophet sent ten of
his companions under the command of ' Asim b. Thabit towards Mecca
on a spying mission. This mission failed because the spies were
noticed and overpowered by the Banu Lihyan at a place called
al-Rajl4 in the vicinity of Mecca. The traditions recorded in
the sources state that these people were sent as sariyya for
(1)
spying.
Another example of a sariyya sent for spying by the Prophet
(2)
is already mentioned, Hudhayfa. During the siege of Medina
he was despatched by night to the enemy camp where he performed
his duties under cover of darkness,as will be discussed later,
and, then, came back with valuable information about the
intentions of the enemy.
To sum up the discussion so far we have to say that sariyya
is a term used for various kinds of expeditions, one of which
is to gather intelligence and it can be applied to any number
of scouts. Moreover, a sariyya is despatched secretly at night
and it tries to fulfil a mission under cover of darkness.
1 . I j ''--i-s- 4-J-l I J r~j 1'-^Musnad , XV, p. 230;
See also Waqidi, I, p.354; Abu Da'ud, Sunan, ed. A.M.A.Hamid
(Cairo, 1950), III, p.69; Isaba, I, p.418; al-Suyutl,
al-Khasa'is al-Kubra (Cairo, 1967), I, pp.549-50.
2. See above, p. 16.
Isti ab. Ill, p. 132;
/ W -I. _
Rabi 'a
Abu 'Ubayda,^1^ Lisan.^ Ibn al-Anbari^ , Nihava.^
Wasit, ^ ^ Fayruzabadi^^ and Lane^^ agree on the definition of
rabi 'a: namely that it is applied to a spy who climbs a hill or
(8)
any high place to observe the activities of the enemy.
There are also verses ascribed to the pre-Islamic or early
Islamic poets containing the term rabi'a or rabi' denoting the
meanings given above.
*Amr b. Ma'dikarb says-,
'we sent our spy (rabi 'a) who climbed a higher
place (and watched the territory below and then
came back) and said that the enemy forces (could
be surprised because they) were relaxing.'^
1 . Naqa'td. I, p.234.
2. I, p.82.
3. Diwan al-Mufaddalyat ma'a Sharh al-Qasim b. Muhammad
al-Anbarl. ed. C.J. Lyall (Beirut, 1920-1 ), p.864.
4. II, p.58.
5. I, p.321.
6 . I, p . 16.
7. Pp. 1007-8.
8. Rabi' and murtabi'un are also used in the meanings given
above. See Ibn al-Anbari, 0£. cit. . p.67; Lane, pp.1007-8;
Wasit. I, p.321. Al-mirba'a is a place where a rabi'a stations
himself. Ibn al-Anbari, op.cit. . p.736; Lisan, I, p.82;
Lane, p.1008.
9. I U-L^U
Al-Asma'I, al-Asma'iyyat, ed. Ahmad Muhammad Shakir and *Abd
• - • •
al-Salam Harun (Cairo, n.d.), p.200.
Another poet says,
"The commander_in the battles kept on spying
(la jazalu rabi'tan) while mounted on the
slender-saddled back of his horse in a brave
manner."^ ^
(Rabi'a b. Maqrum uses the word mirba1 a in one of his verses^
the translation of which is as follows,
"And many the watching place (mirba* a) I have
mounted as the evening drew on, like as the falcon
takes up his place to watch for the prey."^.
1 * J'jr- ^ Vj/
0 jt I * ^ '■ I ^ I I K imtJ ? ^ t 4 Lft I "K M»i<
Al-Asma'i, o£. cit. . p-113•
2. Al-Dabbiyy, al-Mufaddalyat. ed. C.J. Lyall (Beirut, 1920-1)
p. 736. ^J,l
3. Al-Dabbiyy.al-Mufaddalyat ^ Trans. C.J. Lyall as :The Mufaddalvat
(Oxford, 1918), p.315. There are, however, other verses
containing the term rabi'a although not as revealing as the
ones mentioned above. For example, Rabi'a b. Maqrum says,
"As the scout of an army or of a troop of horse
assembled for a foray, what time a weakling
tribesman cannot captain his men." Ibid.. p.315.
Lnj-. !» j-U I j JI y—j j
Al-Dabbiyy, od. cit. . p.737)and 'Abd al-Shariq says,
"We sent Abu 'Amir as a scout, then he said:
Re.joice at (the fortune you may gain from) the
people. rr_u | j ULi * L, I U)
Abu Tammam, Kitab Ash'ar al-Hamasa ma'a Sharh al-Tabrlzi.
— . 1 '
ed. G.G. Freytag (Bonn, 1928), p.219. 'Adi b. Zayd uses
the word rabiyya in one of his verses as follows,
I a> .J? I j ^ Li I j! L» oJ I « (_j ? |*J
I. Hisham, I, p.48. Al-Suhayll says that the word rabiyya which
occurs in this verse is a changed form of rabi'a. Al-Rawd al-Hnuf.
ed. 'Abd al-Rahman 'Abd al-Wakll (Cairo,1967-70) , I, p.324.
Apart from these verses the sources provide some examples
of the use of this term in the meanings given at the beginning
(1)
of this section. One example has already been mentioned and
here are a few more.
1. During the Day of Shaqiqa Bistarn b. Qays of the Banu
Shayban was advancing towards the territory of the Banu Dabba.
When Bistam, along with his companions, reached a sandhill called
(2 )
al-Hasan he climbed it to watch the underlying territory. He
saw a herd belonging to the Banu Dabba nearby and fell suddenly
(3)
upon it,
In this example the word li.yarba'a is used which means,
(4)
according to Lane,
• to take a high and commanding position upon
a mountain or to ascend upon it to look.'
The person who acts like this is called rabi'a as raba'a lana
(5)fulan means, according to Lane,
"Such a one was, or became, or acted as, a
scout to us."
2. Giving the account of the Day of al-Iyad, Abu 'Ubayda says
that the Banu 'Utba, the Banu 'Ubayd and the Banu Zubayd were at
war with Bistam. The Banu 'Utba and the Banu 'Ubayd were
encamped at Rawdatal-Thamad, the Banu Zubayd were at Hadiaa and
• •
1. See above p.13.
2. J Naaa'id. I, p. 234.




Bistam's force was at Hidbatal-Khasiyy. Bistam sent a scout
• • • •
(rabl'a) who climbed a hill and saw a gathering at Hadiqa. Then
Bistam happened to capture a slave who belonged to the Banu 'Ubayd
and asked him where his tribe was. The slave told him that his
tribe was at Hadiqa. On further interrogation the slave revealed
the numbers of his tribe's force and the location of the Banu 'Utba.
As Bistam's rabi'a had noticed a gathering at Hadiqa. he
• ————— • _j
believed the statement of the slave and advised his tribe to
(1)
surprise the enemy.
3. There are also examples from the Prophet's time. In the
year 8 A.H. the Prophet sent a .sariyya headed by Ghalib b. *Abd-
allah towards the Banu Mulawwuh. When the party reached Batn• •
al-KadidjGhalib sent Jundub b. al-Mukayth as rabi 'a. Jundub said
that he set out towards a nearby hill and climbed it so that he
(2)
could see the territory below. Unfortunately an enemy soldier
saw him and shot an arrow towards him which badly wounded him.
Jundub said that he kept motionless. The enemy soldier again
shot him with another arrow which again hit him but he did not
move. Jundub went on to say that the enemy thought that if his
target had been a rabi'a he ought to have moved^"^ because of the
pain he had given him by his arrows. He (the enemy soldier)
then went his way satisfied with the situation.
1. Naqa'id. II, p.581.
2. Tabarl, III, p.27.
J U u-t Y hfp 1 ) Kamil. II, p. 174.
jjj Tabarl, III, p.28; Kamil. II, p. 175.
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These examples along with the verses ascribed to the pre-
Islamic period quoted in this section seem enough to substantiate
the meaning of the term rabi'a given at the beginning of this
section, namely that the term rabi'a is applied to a spy who
climbs a hill or any high place to observe the activities of the
enemy.
Shayyifa
According to Abu 'Ubayda^1^ and Lisan^^ this term has the
same meaning as that of tall*a (scout). It is interesting to
note that the present author could find no other example of the use
of this term in the above meanings except the one below.
Qays al-Manqariyy was planning to make a raid on the Banu
Bakr, Before taking any steps he sent out a scout (shayyifa)^ ^
for spying purposes. During his search for news the scout who
was known as al-Ahtam met another man and both agreed to give
each other correct information about themselves. When al-Ahtam
asked the other man who he was he answered that he was such-and-
such a person of the Banu Bakr who were camping at a watering-
place nearby. In reply to a similar question al-Ahtam told him
that he was Sinan b. Sumayy. Then they both returned to their
respective tribes to tell the tale. Now al-Ahtam's name Sinan
was little known and he was known by his nickname, al-Ahtam, only.
Therefore when the Bakrite went to his tribe and told them that
1. Naqa'id. II, p.1024.
2. VIII, p.237.
3. %<>-» j ) Naoa 'id. II, p. 1024.
(" j— (_j!
- 2b -
he had met a person named Sinan b. Sumayy they could not know
whom their fellow tribesman had met. On the other hand, al-Ahtam
managed to get information about the location of the enemy's camp
and told Qays about it who took the Banu Bakr by surprise and
Ibn 'Abd Rabbih. defines this term as tall*a meaning a spy.
It is interesting to note that no example of the use of this
term, in the above meaning, has come to the notice of the present
author except the one given by the above mentioned source and it
is actually another version of the earlier mentioned story of
- (2)
Qays b. ' Asim who planned to make a raid on his enemies and
sent out a spy to get some information. This spy is termed
(3)
sabaqa by Ibn 'Abd Rabbih. .
captured a large amount of booty. (1)
Sabaqa
'Ayn
According to Ibn Abi'l-Hadid, al-Bahrani,^ Nihaya,^
1. Naoa'id . pp.1023-4.
2. See above, pp.25-6.
3. 'lad. Ill, pp.332-3.
( ^pi.>J I 4 1—1 Lj 4* <..IJr J I 4-j , - II
4. 0p_. cit. . XV, p.90
5. Op. cit IV, p.377.
6. Ill, p.163.
- dl -
FayruzabadI,^ Lisan,^ Lane,^ Muhit,^ Sihah^ ^ and Wasit^
*
ayn is a person sent out for spying like tall* a.
Pre-Islamic poetry supports this definition. Yazld b.
(7)
al-Khadhdhaq uses this term in one of his verses, a translation
of which is as follows,
"If you will send a spy (* ayn) to search us
out he will find around my tents the whole
tribe sitting". ^
One example of the use of this term in the above meaning
(9)
has already been mentioned and here are a few more examples
from the sources.
1. Imra'l-Qays is the most famous pre-Islamic Arabic poet. His
father Hajar b. *Amr was killed by the Banu Asad and for his
honour's sake he set aside his literary activities and resolved
to take revenge for the murder of his father. He sought help
from the Banu Bakr and the Banu Taghlib against the Banu Asad and
managed to collect a considerable force. Then he sent his spies








7. it, 'i -i i i - al-Oabbiyy, on. cit. ,p.6Q0.
^—' —i—. i • —
8. Lyall, o£. cit., p.237.
9. See above, p.12.
10. (jZ_. ^ J I j Aghanl, IX, p. 90.
1
. cr-!| J j
I TJ t_;z_^Z I ?zl*__- 0 Li
KamiI. I, p.378.
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their position and strength.
The Banu Asad while in the territory of the Banu Kinlna
received a warning from 'ilba b. al-Harith that the spies (*uyun\
of Imra'l-Qays had visited their ranks and had managed to get
away with information about their secrets to report back to
(0
Imra'l-Qays. Ilba, then, advised the Banu Asad to leave the
said territory at once without informing the Banu Kinana because
he feared an attack from the enemy_,and the Banu Asad acted upon
this advice. Later on, when Imra'l-Qays advanced to attack he
missed his target because the situation had changed since the
(2)
departure of his spies.
This story is an example of espionage and counter espionage.
It illustrates how Imra'l-Qays tried to plan a successful raid
by despatching his spies who came back with useful information
but when he set out for a raid and reached the spot he found
the situation completely changed because the enemy had taken
counter-intelligence steps.
2. Here is another example of the use of the term fayn]in the
meaning of a spy. It is the account of the Day of al-Falj .
It is stated that the Banu Eakr b. Wa'il sent a spy (*ayn\ towards




IJ Aghanx . IX, p. 90;
(VAr II , j U Kamil. I, p.378
2. AghanI, IX, pp.90-1;
Kamil. I, pp.378-9;
Ayyam, p.119




found the enemy herds poorly guarded. He returned to his tribe
with this precious information and they hurried to prepare for a
raid to capture the herds. When they, the Banu Bakr, came near
to the well they heard the voices of a large number of men and the
neighing of horses which shattered their dreams. They asked their
spy (iayn] about the situation but he could not give any satisfactory
answer. Then they sent another spy to get wind of the new
situation who returned with the report that he had seen a large
gathering of people and a great many horses which meant that the
main body of the tribe had come back. The Banu Bakr hurried back
towards their territory at night but the morning revealed their
footprints to the Banu Ka'b who pursued them and succeeded in
(2)
capturing some booty from the intruders.
This term is also frequently used in the accounts of the
Prophet's battles with his enemies. Here are some such
examples.
1. When the Prophet was preparing a raid upon the caravans of Abu
Sufyan before the battle of Badr it is stated that he sent two
spies (*aynaynl in advance towards his enemies to bring back any
(3)
news about his enemy. Some of the sources mention these spies
1 • ( I ja L. I jJ l_i_») Aghani, V, p . 22 .
2. Ibid. . V, pp.22-23; Ibn al-Athir records
that during the feuds between Bakr and Taghlib in the
Jahiliyya Kulayb had a spy in the ranks of the enemy who used
to listen to their talks with the view to informing Kulayb.
L. ^ L5 Kamil, I, p . 386.
(1)
3.
I uerJ I 4J J I J f
. I. Sa'd, II, p.12.
J i)
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individually as they record that Basbas was sent out as 'ayn
towards the caravan of Abu Sufyan to find out what was going on
there. ^ ^
When 'Adi and Basbas returned after a short stay at the
well of Badr^Abu Sufyan reached the spot and asked Majdl (a
local Bedouin) if he had seen any of the spies/'uyun )of
Muhammad. ^
2. When giving the account of the incident which happened at
(3)
al-Rajx*, WaqidI states, as mentioned earlier, that the
expedition of al-Raji' was meant for espionage against the Meccans.
He says that the Prophet had sent the 'people of al-Raji*" towards
Mecca as spies ('uyunan^ to get information about the activities
(4)
of the Quraysh. The tradition recorded in Musnad regarding
1. }) Abu Da'ud, op. cit. ,
I
cr_, I
III, p.53; Isaba, p.147, 179.
2. (j- I jj-I J J-a>)wIqidI, I, p. 20;
( j I o-i-l »l P • ^ 3 •
WaqidI mentions that before the battle of Uhud when the
Prophet found out the advancing Meccan army he sent two
spies named Anas and Munis ( jj ^ , f- ^ . ; i ,y, (
who located the Meccan army. Then they travelled some
distance flanking it and came back to the Prophet with
their report. I, pp.206-7.
3. See above , p . 20.
( _i' ,—=» * . ,-^i -j-J
^ LeJI l_l llu- ) -4. L > - - - -> • ' Waqidi, I, p.345.
this event also states that these people were sent out as spies
!'aynan).^ ^
3. When the Prophet was on his way to attack the Banu al-
(2)
Mustalia his companions captured an enemy spy ('aynan). They
• • *
asked him the whereabouts of his tribe but he expressed his
ignorance. It was only when 'Umar threatened to kill him that he
said that he belonged to the Banu al-Mustaliq and that he had
left his leader Harith gathering a force to attack them. He went
on to say that he had been sent by his leader in search of news
about their activities.
4. When the Prophet was on his way to Mecca in 6 A.H. (an
expedition which resulted in the treaty of al-Hudaybiyya) he sent
for Busr b. Sufyan and ordered him to go to Mecca as a spy
aynan).^^ He told Busr that the Quraysh had learnt about his
journey for the lesser pilgrimage and that Busr should go to
Mecca and find out the reaction of its inhabitants towards this
(5)
journey and to report back to him. Busr reached Mecca, care¬
fully watched the activities of the Quraysh and came back with his
report. He told the Prophet that the Quraysh had resolved not to
1. (lu-j- "*dJJ I J Musnad, XV, pp.57-8, and according
to another tradition recorded in Musnad £ *Jj I I
XV, p.230; see also Isti'Ib. Ill, p.132; Usui. VIII,
p.255; Isaba . I, p.418; SuyutI, o£. cit. , pp.549-50.
2. (L—-"fr v ^*9^aqidl, I, p.406; see also Maqrizi, p.366.
3. Waqidi, I, p.406; Maqrizi, p.366.
4.0---^ l-j)Waqidi, II, p. 573 and according to IstI*ab. I, p. 163
cr-c-1—'' and according to Kanz. X, p.31 2 u-t-< '
5. Waqidi, II, p.573; Isti*ab, I, p.163; Isaba , I, p.151.
let him enter the city. They had called their allies for help and
had pitched their camp outside the city at a place called Baldah.
They had sent Khalid with two hundred horsemen to al-Ghamim^1^
and had placed ten spies ('uyun^^ on the hill tops starting from
Baldah to a hill called Wazar. They, the spies, had adopted a
(3)
secret language to convey messages to one another.
These examples are, perhaps, enough to confirm the definition
the term 'a.yn given at the beginning of this section, namely that
the term 'ayn is used for a person sent out as tali'a for the
purpose of spying.
Jasus/ta.iassus/tahassus
According to Lisan.^ Sihah.^ PayruzabadI,^ al-Bahranl^^
Lane^®^ and Waslt/^ , jasus is equivalent to tali*a and 'ayn. The
activity of a ,iasus is called ta.jassus }a term used in al-Qur1 an.
1. Name of a place between'Usfan and Dajnan. SamhudI, II, p.354.
Dajnan is 25 miles from Meccq^ ibid.. II, p.378,and
'Usfan is two days'journey from Mecca_, ibid. . n, p. 345.
2 4^ '—ur;-'-" ' 9 -*-Vj)WaqidI, II, p. 580.




7. Op. cit. , IV, p.378.
8. P.423.
9. I, p.123.
wala tagassasu^ ^ (do not ye inquire respecting,
or search or inquire or spy into, private
circumstances) .
_)
The Qur'an and other sources use another word tahassus with ha,
sometimes instead of ta.iassus and sometimes along with it. As the
1 . XLIX: 12 ( I V ^ )
2. Lane, p.423. There seems to be a general consensus of the
commentators of al-Qur'an, the traditionalists and the other
scholars that this statement of al-Qur'an is intended to forbid
the Muslims to spy out the hidden matters of fellow Muslims
which they themselves do not like to be made public. They
do not include espionage against the enemies of the Muslim
state in this prohibition because the Prophet himself was in
the habit of sending spies towards his enemies (some examples
of which have been quoted earlier and some will be mentioned
later on). See Sahnun, al-Mudawwana (Cairo, 1323 A.H.), III,
• ——————————
p.3; Tabarx, Taf.,XXVI, p.87; Kanz, III, p.462; Ibn Kathlr,
Tafsir al-Qur'an al-Azim (Beirut, 1388 A.H.), IV, p.213; al¬
iiazl, Mafatih al-Ghayb (Cairo, 1307-9 A.H.), VII, p.416;
al-Ba.ydawi, Anwar al-TanzIl (Cairo, 1330 A.H.), V, p.89;
Jalalayn , II, p.113; Muhit. p.109; Mishkat. II, p.620; Irshad.
V, pp.67-8; al-Mawardi, al-Ahkam al-Sultanivya (Cairo, i960),
p.43; al-Nuwayrl, Nihayat al-Arab (Cairo, 1924-55), VI, p.158;
Sayyid Qutub, Fi Zilal al-Qur'an (Beirut, 1391 A.H.), VII,
pp.534-5; al-Tabataba'i, al-Mizan fi Tafsir al-Qur'an (Beirut,
1393 A.H.), XVIII, p . 323 ; 0«Sale., The Koran (London, n.d.), p.498
Bell, The Qur'an (Edinburgh, 1937-9), II, p.525.
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Qur'an says "tahassasu" and a tradition is recorded in some sources
"
- - (2)
'wala ta.lassasu wa]a tahassasu' do not be
inquisitive about one another, or spy on
one another)
Qurtubi mentions various opinions on the differences on the meanings
of these words. According to one view, tajassus means to investi¬
gate those facts which have been kept secret while tahassus means
(4)
the act of seeking out and investigating information: According to
another opinion ta.jassus is used for investigation and tahassus is
used for the activity in which one comes to know about some fact
without intentional effort^^ According to another opinion mentioned
by Qurtubx ta.iassus is used for the activity of that kind of spy
who is sent by someone else for the purpose of spying while
tahassus is used when one tries to get information for oneself.
According to al-Suhaylx ta.iassus means to investigate with
the help of someone else while tahassus means to indulge in spying
n (7)personally.
1. XII:87 cx- (j-, f j li (0 my sons, go and make inquiry
after Joseph. G. Sale, o£. cit. , p.236.
2. Malik b. Anas, Muwatta, ed. Ahmad Ratib 'Armush (Beirut,
1400 A.H.), p.653; Musnad, XIV, p.246; Muslim, IV, p.178;
Mishkat, II, p.620.
3. Al-Khatxb al-Tabrxzx, Mishkat al-Masabxh, trans. James Robson,
(Lahore, 1972), III, p.1045.
4 t y j I—I ,Ur LxJ I ij* ..-w • I I J iljXt f ^ ; L*-C- >r. V t...l wT. *11^1 )
( I a& cu11
Al-Jami* li Ahkam al-Qur'an (Cairo, 1935-50), XVI, p.373.
5 . J 1 : I J ' \J? y— J J-i-* ) C. I yA " I I (J I)
( I y> I j I Lt y* y LkJ I Ibid. , XVI, p . 373.
5, O t_J' I* , y * ■*-' -- I * ; L»J I L J
(*-JJ 1
Ibid. , XVI, p. 373.
7# I U I y I t . : 6I UJ! L I)
(^. - yhj op . cit. , V, p . 116 .
According to Zamakhshari ta.jassus is used when one tries
one's best to obtain news while tahassus is used when one endeavours
to find news by simply using one's listening (or seeing)
(1)
faculty.
Ibn Kathir in his Tafsir says that tajassus is generally
used for a spy who investigates private affairs of an evil nature
(2) — —
and tahassus is its opposite. Ibn Kathir also quotes al-Awza'i
saying that ta,jassus means to investigate some matter and tahassus
(3)
means to listen to the conversation of the people stealthily.
These definitions do not provide us with exact information
on the difference between the use of these words but they would
have us believe that ta.jassus is used when one spies for somebody
else and tries one's best to unveil the secrets of the enemy by
whatever means one can muster,while on the other hand tahassus isj r ,
used for the activities of a person who spies for himself and gets
some information without much labour. It is interesting to note
that the historical sources do not seem to stress such differences
very much and they use these terms as synonyms on occasion. Here
are two such examples.
1. Ten nights before setting out from Medina to intercept the
caravan of Abu Sufyan before the battle of Badr, the Prophet sent
^—______
^
djJ t I I ^JI J_i_ I <_J j-*—^ |» ' '—. )^ "
/ M
y ♦ -I I {_,g—i**^ ^11 <1 , ; 1 I L—— tM L>.—. ^ —I I U' .. 1 I * I > -I t ^^ ^ —O 9)
op . cit. , I, p.195.
I Lv-1 u op. cit#> JV p.213.
See also Fayruzabadi, II, p.214; al-Tabataba' I, ojo. cit. , XVIII
p.323.
3. £_ I I , I ^ J I ' I1 ) op . cit. , IV, p . 21 3
(u 5I' c-w- t_s ' '
2. UJ Lit
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two spies, towards the enemy. This event is described by
_ c 1 ) - (2) -
Waqidi and Tanbih with the word tahassus but Ibn Khayyat
(4)
and Kamil describe it with the word ta.jassus.
2. Later on,when the Prophet was on his way to intercept the
_
_ — (5)
said caravan he sent two more spies, *Adi and Basbas. Waqidi
(6)
and Ibn Hisham mention their mission using the word tahassus
(7)
while Ibn Sa'd employs the word ta.jassus.
These examples clearly illustrate that there may be some
difference in the meanings of these words but as long as they are
used in a spying context the sources do not bother about such
differences. Perhaps this is the reason that Nihaya quotes an
(8)
opinion that the two words are synonyms.
Here are some examples of the use of tahassus.
1. The expedition of Nakhla , mentioned earlier in the section
dealing with sariyya is said to have been sent in search of news
. - (9)
of the Quraysh fan yatahassasu].
1 j-I I j ... I. v—'' -J I , P « 1 9 •
p.205.
3.(O-i-*J 1 j-r* u' y-' -)I, P.23.
u1 ~)ll, p.106.
5. (-^Jl P.40.
0 L^_^.)i, p. 374.
—Jill, p. 496.
8. I, p.191.
9. I , . Waqidi, I, p.16.
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2. Before the battle of Badr the Prophet sent 'All, Zubayr,
Sa'd b. Abx Waqqas and Basbas b. 'Amr towards the well of Badr
in search of news ^ yatahassasu n) . They captured some water
carriers of the Quraysh and brought them back for interrogation.^^
3. Haijaj b. 'Ulat accepted Islam after the conquest of Khaybar
• •
in 6 A.H. The Meccans did not yet know about his.conversion.
So he went to Mecca to collect his assets. It is stated that
when he reached the suburbs of Mecca he saw some Qurayshites
searching for news ^ yatahassasun ) about Muhammad. When the
Qurayshites saw Hajjaj they came to him and asked about the
(2)
activities of Muhammad.
Here are some examples of the use of ta.jassus and ,jasus
from the sources.
1 . Abu Sufyan was leading the caravan of the Quraysh before
the battle of Badr. When he was on his way home he anticipated
the danger of interception so he kept on making enquiries about
the situation £ yatajassasu al-akhbar).from the riders whom he
(3)
met on his way.
1. (_* L«J I (_s-U (j i J WaqidI, I, p. 51.
2. ! H U Lt-Jj L*-J-s j 1 or—-?*-*) Tabarl, III, p.18;
L;L4~Lil >
Tabarl also gives an account concerning al-'Abbas who came
out of the Prophet's camp at Marr al-Zahran, when the latter
was on his way to Mecca in 8 A.H. and said that he heard
the voices of Abu Sufyan, Hakim and Budayl who were on a
spying mission ( Jl ^ r,... : I ^ j-3 5 ) III, p.52.
30"^.;^' u- L-J Hishim, I, p.369;
(u '——'J. u— t_=—Cr* - >j '
Ibn al-Athir records an example of the use of ta.jassus from
the pre-Islamic time. He states that 'Abdallah b. Ufeayy did
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2. The Prophet sent his secret agents to Mecca in order to
kill Abu Sufyan but they could not fulfil their mission due to
certain reasons. When one of them was on his way back to Medina
he saw two scouts sent by the Quraysh to search for news about
the activities of the Prophet ^ yatajassasan amr Rasul Allah^^
3. During the siege of Medina in 5 A.H. the Prophet sent
Hudhayfa b. al-Yaman one night towards the enemy camp in search
of news. It is stated that because of the darkness Hudhayfa
managed to attend a meeting of notables called by Abu Sufyan.
Before starting his speech Abu Sufyan advised the participants
to be careful about the presence of enemy spies ^jawlsls wa'l-
*uyunj and that everyone should check the man sitting next to
him (in order to prevent the leakage of the proceedings of the
i. , (2)meeting).
These examples of the use of the terms ,jasus, tajassus
and tahassus confirm their meanings given in the beginning of
this section; namely that the term .iasus was probably used in
not take part in the battle of Bu'ath, which was fought about
five years before the hi.jra of the Prophet from Mecca to
Medina between the Banu Aws and the Banu Khazraj of Medina.
'Abdallah was,however,anxious to know what was happening on
the battlefield. He was seen in the vicinity of the battle¬
field by some soldiers, carrying the dead body of their
leader to Medina, searching for news . I ,v dJI ^ & Id— I
( ^ I ^ . d ^ U-_jJ t—51 c ^
Kamil, I, p . 511.
1. (-JJI J ^ j~.\ o '.-..y •-.) Kamil, II, p. 131.
2. J j-~i~' ! i j ' ) Waqidi, II, p. 489.
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the pre-Islamic and early Islamic periods for spies and that the
other two were used for their spying activities.
Nadhir, Mundhir and Nadhira
According to Lane, these terms signify a person
'who gives information, or advice, of a thing
or things, and one who warns; one who cautions;
and one who puts in fear; one who gives notice
to a people of an enemy, or other things, that
has come upon them.'^^
The act of warning is called nadhara (to give warning). The
Qur'an uses these terms in this meaning when it says,
'nazzal al furqanfala 'abdihi li yakun lil
'alamina . nidhiran(2) (send down the criterion
to His servants, that it may be an admonition)'
and
and
'law la unzila 'ilayhi malakun fa vakuna
ma'ahu nadhxran(3)(Has not an angel sent
down to him to give admonition with him)'
(4)
'qum fa andhir (arise and deliver thy
warning)'.
Nadhir and mundhj-r. however, also signify
1. P.2782. See also Ibn Zakariyya, op.cit♦,V. p.414; al-
Suhayli, oo.cit. . Ill, p.147; Nihaya. Ill, p.144;
Fayruzabadi, II, p.145; Sihah, pp.653-54; Waslt. II, p.920;
al-Baydawi, ojd. cit. , IV, p. 88 who also give similar
meanings of these terms.
2. XXV: 1 . (I ^6-1
3. XXV: 7. ( 1 Jr". u 1 J J- 1 ^
4. LXXIV: 2. ( j o- ^ f-J )
- 40 -
'a spy who gives notice, to a people, of
an enemy to put them on their guard; and
in the like manner nadhira is a spy who
informs an army of the state of the enemy' (1)
The pre-Islamic poet, al-Marrar b. Munqidh, uses nudhur
(2)
(plural form of nadhira) in one of his verses, a translation of
which is as follows.
"Many the man, mighty in his kingdom, who
has threatened me, and warning from him
has reached me before I came to him"^)
(4)
A tradition of the Prophet is recorded in Muslim ^ the
translation of which is as follows,
"0 people, I have seen an army with my eyes
and I am a plain warner that you should
immediately manage to find an escape.
Here are some examples of the use of these terms with this
meaning from other sources.
1. Harith b. Zalim was in a state of war with the Banu 'Amir
• *
and went to seek help from Hajib b. Zurara of the Banu Tamim.
The Banu 'Amir came to know of his journey through a woman
captured by a man of the Banu Ghani. When this Ghanawi went to
1. Lane, p.2782.
2* al-Dabbiyy,op.cit. , p. 152.
_> ii J ' • — i "O m— ji • t q • ~ 1
3. Lyall, 0£. cit. , p. 51; another pre-Islamic poet uses the
word nadhira in one of his verses which is as follows
U, J-1J I J 1 O- us-1—"1 al-Dabbiyy, od_. cit.,p.152.
^44 „ I I. V. I I I ^^ ^ J L '
4. Muslim, IV, p.59. '
UJ U .Ly.JI r,JJI Ul UJ
5. Muslim, al-Jami' al-Sahih. Trans. A.H. Siddiqi as:*
i ' ■——— > " ■ 9 •
Sahih Muslim (Lahore, 1976), IV, p.1234.
sleepjthe woman managed to escape at midnight. In the morning ^
the Ghanawx discovered the flight of the woman and went to Ahwas
• •
b. Ja'far (leader of the Banu 'Amir) and informed him that the
woman was a warner ^ ^ mundhira) for her tribe^ sent to spy on him.
'Amir b. Malik pursued the woman and found her sitting with
Hajib b. Zurara who was asking her about the people who had
captured her. 'Amir heard her saying that her captors were the
_ _ (2)
Banu 'Amir and such-and-such people were among them.
2. Abu 'Ubayda says that once Bistam b. Qays attacked a
section of the Banu Dabba and plundered their camels. He did
T (3)
not go very far when a warner fnadhir\ reached the main body
of the Banu Dabba and told them what had happened. The Banu
m
Dabba pursued Bistam, overtook him and killed him.
3. Giving the account of the Day of Kilab al-Thani,Abu
'Ubayda says that Yazid b. 'Abd Maydan was on his way to make
a raid on his enemies. When he halted at a place called Tayman
he was noticed by an enemy tribesman named Mushammit b. Zinbagh
who was pasturing his camels along with another person.
Mushammit advised the other fellow to look after the camels and
(4)
went to his tribe with the view to warning them of the
advancing enemy. On receiving the warningjhis tribe prepared to
1.
, I l-O Aghani , XI, p. 99.
2. Ibid. , XI, p.99;
Ayyam. p.344.
3. C Naca'ia., I, p. 190.
^ ' LS— '4# j • I : ^ ! I :\ ^bid, I, p. 150.
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repel the attack.^^
4, There is also an example from the Prophet's time.
It has been mentioned earlier that the Quraysh had resolved
(2)
not to let the Prophet enter Mecca in 6 A.H. and had sent
Khalid to al-Ghamim with two hundred horsemen. Al-Bukhari
states that when the Prophet managed to avoid this force and
marched forward by another route Khalid hurried towards Mecca
(3)
to act as a warner to the Quraysh fnadhiran li Quraysh).
These examples of the use of the terms nadhir and mundhir
confirm their meaning given at the beginning of this section;
namely that these signify a spy who gives notice, to a people,
of an enemy to put them on their guard.
So far we have discussed the terms tali'a. sariyya. rabi'a.
shayyifa. sabaqa. (ayn. .iasus. nadhir and mundhir which are
used in the sources for spies. There are, however, other terms
(4)
which are to be found in the Arabic dictionaries. As such
terms are seldom used in the medieval Arabic sources they have no
1. Napa'id, I, pp.149-50.
2. See above, p.10-11.
3^4^_JLJ I J- i A-5 _. , Li)Irshad, IV, p. 443. Al-Qastallani
commenting on this sentence says^I 11 J^- 1 . I ^ j• ,(as a
warner of the Prophet's advance) Irshad, IV, p.443.
4. Such as baghiyya ( ) Lisan, VIII, p.237, raqib (
Elias, al-Qamus al-'Asrl (n.d., Cairo), pp.641,
687; ra 'id ! j) naqida ( ) dasis ( )
G.P. Badger, English'Arabic Lexicon (London. 1881),
pp.929, 1012.
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practical importance for the purpose of this study and we have,
therefore, left them untouched.
The terms discussed so far can be placed in four categories.
In the first category can be place tall* a. *ayn. ,jasus,
sabaqa and shayyifa. These terms may technically have different
shades of meaning but the sources use them in the simple meaning
of a spy who is sent out to gather intelligence. Ibn Sa'd even
uses the first three of these terms for the spies of the same
mission. This strongly suggests that there is practically no
difference between these terms.
The second category contains only the term rabi' a. The
feature which distinguishes it from other spies is that a
rabi'a spies against the enemy from an elevated spot or a
mountain and keeps a watch on the territory below him.
The third category consists of sariyya which is used in
the sources for those spies who were despatched at night and
whose mission was to collect secret information about the enemy
while working under cover of darkness.
The fourth category consists of nadhir and mundhir which
is perhaps used especially for those spies who patrolled the
outskirts of their tribal territory. Their function was perhaps
to bring any suspicious activity of the enemy to the notice of
their leaders so that adequate preparation could be made before¬
hand to meet the threat.
Apart from such differences_, some qualities must have been
common to all the spies. Because they were entrusted with great
responsibilities, and they were, in practical terms, the eyes
of the tribe with which they looked into the territory and the
- 44 -
ranks of the enemy and planned accordingly, spies needed to be
courageous, with eyesight as sharp as that of a hawk. As
Rabl'a b. Maqrum said:
"And many the watching place I have mounted
as the evening drew on, like as the falcon
takes up his place to watch for the prey."^
1. See above, p.22.
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CHAPTER II
ESPIONAGE IN THE PRE-ISLAMIC PERIOD
Al-Qalqashandl in his extensive work Subh al-A'sha writes
that the first person who sent out spies against an enemy was
Alexander.^1^ Before making this statement he surely did not
consult the Bible which records two incidents of sending spies
(2)
against the enemy in much earlier times. But as the history
1 . (j I I J j') Subh al-A'sha (1920,
J -■ ^ I . 1 I
reprinted Cairo, 1383/1963), I, p.429.
2. The first incident concerns Moses_,when God ordered him,
"Send thou men, that they may search the
Land of Canaan, which I give unto the
children of Israel; of every tribe of
their fathers shall ye send a man, every
one a ruler among them. And Moses by the
commandment of the Lord sent them from
the wilderness of Paran: all those men were
heads of the children of Israel."
(Numbers 13:2, 3)
"And Moses sent them to spy out the Land
of Canaan and said unto them, Get you up
this way southward, and go up into the
mountain: And see the land, what it is;
and the people that dwelleth therein,
whether they be strong or weak, few or
many."
(Numbers 13: 17 & 18).
"So they went up and searched the land from
the wilderness of Zin unto Rehab, as men
come to Hamath."
(Numbers 13:21)
"And they returned from searching of the
land after forty days. And then they
went and came to Moses and to Aaron, and
to all the congregation of the children
of Israel, unto the wilderness of Psran,
to Kadesh and brought back word unto
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of intelligence, in general, is not the topic of this study
them, and unto all the congregation
and shewed them the fruit of the land."
(Numbers 13:25-26).
The second incident is connected with Joshua. It is
stated that,
"Joshua the son of Nun sent out of
Shittin two men to spy secretly, saying,
Go view the land, even Jericho. And they
went, and came into an harlot's house,
named Rahab, and lodged there."
(Joshua 2:1)
Then after describing that how the king of Jericho came
to know their presence in that house and searched for
them and how the harlot hid them on the roof of her
house and then managed to send them out of the town,
it is stated
"So the two men returned, and descended from
the mountain, and passed over, and came to
Joshua the son of Nun, and told him all the
things that befell them: And they said
unto Joshua, Truly the Lord hath delivered
into our hands all the land; for even all the
inhabitants of the country do faint because
of us." (Joshua 2:23-24).
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would be unwise to consume all one's energies in search of the
records of espionage of all the nations of all the world. On
the other hand, because this study is about the intelligence
gathering activities of the Prophet of Islam who started and
ended his career in Arabia^1^ it is appropriate to give a brief
account of what is known of the spying activities of the pre-
Islamic Arabs to show that the Prophet, when engaged in
espionage, was working according to the Arab traditions and was
not an inventor or introducer of this aspect of warfare in
Arabia.
The Arabs of pre-Islamic times were either Bedouin or
(2)
settled people, as Lammens writes, who were once Bedouin.
The Bedouin constituted the great majority of the population
and their main economic basis was the breeding and pasturing of
camels and other animals. The settlers were either traders
1. The Arabian peninsula, says O'Leary,
"Has the Hijaz and Yemen along the Red
Sea Coast, minor settlements and Oman
along the opposite coast; in the land
between there is in the north the great
Nefud, Jebel Shammar, and Nejd, in the
south the great desert with Yemen,
Hadramant, Zofar and Oman along its
southern edge."
Arabia Before Muhammad (London, 1927), p.10.
2. H. Lammens, Islam: Beliefs and Institutions, trans.
E. Denison Ross (London, 1929), p.5.
3. Watt, Society, p.26.
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or farmers.^1'' Living conditions in the Arabian peninsula were
generally unfavourable, water was scarce, the weather was too
hot and the Arabs were, therefore, in a constant state of struggle
(2)
for survival and were 'always on the look out for loot'.
This looting or plundering each other's property was called
raiding (ghazw) and was, according to the Encyclopaedia of Islam.
(3)
'one of the oldest institutions of the Arabs , according to
(4)
Watt 'a feature of desert life , according to Lewis 'a natural
(5)
and legitimate occupation' and in the words of Hitti 'a national
sport* .
According to the rules of the game, says Hitti, no blood
(7)
should be shed except in cases of extreme necessity. To
achieve the objective, booty, without bloodshed^the raids had
to be carried out after careful planning and intelligent choice
of time and place and in complete secrecy in order to ensure
/ ON
surprise. Such arrangements could only be made if tribal
spies would go out to ascertain the position and numbers of the
enemy, the booty that might be expected, and whether the fighting
men of the tribe were with the rest of the people or away on
1. Saleh A. ©l-'Alx, "Muslim Estates in Hidjaz in the Hirst
Century A.H.", JESHO (1959), pp.247-8, 253.
2. L.B. Jones, The People of the Mosque (London, 1932), p.6.
3. II, p.1055.
4. Watt, Society, p.26.
5. B. Lewis, The Arabs in History (London, 1970), p.44.




other business.^1^ This implies that espionage was an essential
factor in the success of a raid.
In such circumstances one could not expect the enemy to sit
idle, waiting for the raiders to come and carry away their
property. People knew that they would be subject to surprise
attacks if they could not foresee forthcoming dangers. For this
purpose it was necessary for them, too, to try to get wind of the
plans of the would-be aggressors beforehand so that they could
change the place of their camp (if weaker than the aggressor)
or could prepare to fight back (if equal or stronger than.the
aggressor). To have such timely warning of forthcoming attacks
they must have their own spies in the ranks of the enemy (if
possible) or their scouts must reconnoitre constantly on the
outskirts of their tribal territory. All this implies that
espionage was a basic need of the tribes in their defence of
their properties.
Espionage was also a basic need for the settlers who were
either traders or farmers. The Meccans were merchants and had
(2)
established a vital monopoly of the West Arabian caravan trade.
They had business relations with the nations beyond the frontiers
of Arabia and used to travel long distances in caravans in
connection with their business. They had made an arrangement
called ilaf (referred to in al-Qur'an)^with the tribes on
1. Gindi, p.48.
2. Wa11, Society , p.6.
3. CVI: 1 ^ V
their caravan routes which allowed them to pass safely through
their territories.^^ But this arrangement did not remove from
1. It is stated that Hashim met the leaders of the Arab tribes
on the route to Syria (from Mecca) and obtained an ilaf.
The ilaf was that the Meccan caravans were to be secure
among them in their (Arab tribes) tribal territories
without a treaty ( I I U; ^ I uJ-fV ( , ) , it
U>. I~^-
being only a guaranty of security for the people ( ^ I
'—:—110 '—01 ) or for the road ( ' u ) on
condition that the Quraysh transport for them merchandise,
saving them its transportation, and return to them their
principal and their profit. When Hashim died, al-Muttalib
b. 'Abd Manaf obtained ilaf from the Arab tribes on the
caravan route to Yemen. After al-Muttalib's death 'Abd Shams
• •
b. 'Abd Hanaf obtained ilaf from the tribes on the route
to Abyssinia and after his death Nawfal b. 'Abd Manaf
obtained ilaf from the tribes on the route to 'Iraq.
Al-Qall, Dhayl al-Amall wa'l-Nawadir (Bulaq, 1324 A.H.),
pp.204-5; Muhammad b. Hablb, Kitab al-Munammaq (Hyderabad
Deccan, 1384 A.H.), pp.32-36; al-Kala'x, Kitab al-Iktifa',
ed. H. Masse (Alger, 1931)pp.208-9;Isaiah Goldfeld, while
discussing the three groups of the Arab tribes in respect
of their attitude towards the Ka'ba of Mecca and towards the
inviolable months, writes that one of these groups was called
Muhrimun or the people respecting the Haram (the sacred
territory encircling Mecca) and the inviolable months. There
were;however among these tribes groups and individuals who
were still liable to commit hostile -actions during the
the Meccans the fear of being plundered by thieves called
al-Sa'alxk who did not care for such treaties and lived by
(1)
raiding and plundering. This element was a constant source
inviolable months. They were the Muhillun against whom
some tribes organized combat forces or Dhada Muhrimun.
"The Tribal Policy of the Prophet Muhammad", unpublished
Ph.D. thesis (Cambridge, 1970), p.59. About the group
called Dhada Muhrimun Goldfeld writes,
"They seem to have been a tribal force
protecting the interests of all those
who respected the inviolable months.
Hence they were acting in the interest
of the Quraysh." Ibid.. p.44.
1. Yusuf Khalxf, al-Shu'ara al-Sa'alxk (Cairo, n.d.), p.132;
Gindx, p.5;
Sa*alxk (singular .Su*luk) means poor men. Al-Dabbiyy, op.
cit. . pp.204, 342; 'Umar Farrukh, Tarxkh al-Adab al-'Arabx
(Beirut, 1978), I, p.212; Lisin. X, p.455. Gindi says that
they were brigands and outlaws and though extremely poor,
were proudly disdainful of dependence upon others. They
lived by raiding and plundering and were famous for their
physical strength and swift running, for their courage and
fearlessness in face of danger and for their indifference
to death (p. 5). See also Nihaya, II, p.54. This was the
class referred to by 'utba b. Rabl'a when he advised the
Quraysh to leave Muhammad alone before the start of the
battle of Badr. Waqidx states that 'Utba said that if
Muhammad was a liar the Arab brigands, Sa<alik, would finish
him off. If he was a king, they, the Quraysh, would share
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of danger for the caravans and could only be neutralised with
his fortune and if he was a Prophet they would be the
L_ j L5 r.1
most fortunate among all the people (
fJj-Sl ULL iL 0\ , _ v ^J I L,- ■ ll^t *} \aj .<? . .
r-"—5 U^- f r5--2*1 u-> 1 ). WaqidI, I, p.63.
Because of their fearlessness in face of dangers they
sometimes worked as mercenaries, as Imra'l-Qays is said to
have employed a number of them in his service in order to
take revenge for his father's killing. Yusuf Khallf, op.
cit., p.25.
Many famous (or notorious) Arabs belonged to this class
such as 'Urwa b. al-Ward (a poet) , ( . . < . . < )
j—tr*—L '—' 1 -*-1* (!) 1—
Waqidi, I, p.376. 'Urwa not only was himself a Su*luk but
also a patron of his comrades. Yusuf Khallf, ojd. cit. .
p.22j Farrukh, o£. cit. , I, p.212. And Fudala b. Sharlk
was a poet, an assassin and a brigand^J5^_L-*Llj:LsI ^ Li u L5 )
according to AghanI, XII, p.71. A famous Qurayshite named
'Abdallah b. Jad'an was also a brigand (Su'luk) and an
assassin ( L5_: Li I ^ j-Z. L5 ^ I f ,j L5 ) . Al-Jahiz ,
al-Bayan wa'l Tabyin ed. Hasan al-Sandubi (Cairo, 1351 A.H.)
I, p .31 f.n. See also Suhayli, oo_. cit. . II, p.78.
Hammad al-Rav/iya is also said to have been a companion of
brigands (Sa* alik) and thieves ( J I L»^J
AghanI, VI, p.87.
For more information on this class of brigands see Yusuf
Khallf, £D. cit., pp.21-61.
the help of spies employed by the management of the caravan^1^
who would reconnoitre the land over which the caravan would pass
and bring any suspicious activity to the notice of the leader
of the caravan. Warned beforehand the leader could change the
route or take any other appropriate step to avoid the danger of
being plundered.
The inhabitants of Yathrib_, al-Ta 'if and Khaybar were
generally farmers and were not without enemies. As their
livelihood mainly depended on the produce of their lands it was
necessary for them to keep their enemies away from their crops.
For this purpose they had to keep a watch on the activities of
their enemies and this object could only be achieved with the
help of espionage.
It has become obvious from the discussion so far that
almost all the Arabs of the pre-Islamic era were dependent upon
espionage in their everyday life. It was this institution
which defended their animal flocks, ensured the safety of their
caravans, protected the produce of their farms and guaranteed
the success of their raids. Now it is time to search for the
ways and means adopted by them to gather intelligence and to
present some examples of the activities of their spies.
The following categories are useful to impose order on
the wealth of anecdotes in the sources but inevitably there is
some overlap between certain types of spies.
1. O'Leary, oo_. cit. , p.185.
Uf -
Regular Spies
The most commonly adopted way of gathering intelligence
in pre-Islamic Arabia was to despatch spies towards the enemy
whenever needed. Some examples of such despatches have been
given earlier^^ in the first chapter of this thesis. Here
are some more examples of the gathering of intelligence through
this sort of spy.
(1) The pre-Islamic poet, 'Abd al-Shariq b. 'Abd al-'Uzza
describes in one of his poems how they sent a spy against the
enemy and how he returned successful after fulfilling his
mission. He says,
"We sent Abu 'Amir as a scout; then he
said: Rejoice at (the fortune you may
gain from) the people.
They (the enemy) secretly sent a warrior
from them to spy on us (we recognised him
but) we did not betray their warrior (when
we recognised him close) to us.
They came like a cloud across the horizon,
with a heavy shower of hail, and we
advanced like a raging torrent."(2)
Abu 'Ubayda says that the Banu Sulayt were expecting a
raid from their enemies and therefore they sent out a scout
to have an early warning of the advancing force. Unfortunately
1. See above, pp.12-4, 24-6.
2. Abu Tammam, Hamisa, ed. G.G. Freytag (Bonn 1828), p.219
fpJ Ul .-a-"—> I J LU # W-o ^Ll l_L.^ Li )
tu—j^ I ^ j j jn. I ' I. <*.-£- —9 ? ; j ,
Jl , 1 J—' 1 ^ ^ ^
the scout fell asleep and the enemy bypassed him and took the
Banu Sulayt by surprise and plundered their animals.^1^
3- Aghani states that the Banu Khuza'a captured some of the
camels belonging to the Banu Ka'b of the Banu Kalb. The
latter tribe planned to attack the Banu Khuza'a to balance the
accounts. When they set out to make a raid and came near to
the territory of the enemy, they halted and sent 'Amr b. Sufyan
as a spy to the enemy. 'Amr met some of the Banu Khuza'a in
the guise of a tribesman of the Banu Hilal and told them that
he had come in advance of his tribe who was coming to seek
their protection. The Banu Khuza'a granted him protection and
entertained him. During the conversation he obtained detailed
information about the position and the strength of the Banu
1. Naqa'id, I, p.30. Abu 'Ubayda records two more examples
of this sort which are as follows:
(i) Once Qays b. Zuhayr sent his slave towards the enemy
and advised him to pretend to be pasturing his camels.
If the enemy questioned him about his activities then he
should narrate the story of the killing of a certain Malik
and listen carefully to what they would say about it. The
slave went out, acted as directed and then came back to
report their conversation to his master. Naqa'id. I, p.92.
(ii) During the Day of al-Quwayra_, 'Imran b.'Murra gathered
the Banu Shayban and advanced towards the territory of the
Banu Numayr b.'Amir. When he reached quite near to the enemy
territory he despatched a spy to obtain information about
the state of the enemy. The spy went out and came back
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Khuza'a and then returned to join his tribe. On the basis of
this information the Banu Ka'b attacked the Banu Khuza'a and
inflicted a heavy defeat upon them.^
(2)
4. Several sources have recorded another incident concerning
espionage through one such regular spy. It is stated that
Jadhima al-Abrash, a prince living in a castle named Baqqa on
the bank of the Euphrates, was killed treacherously by Dabba,
a neighbouring queen. Now Qasir b. Sa'd being a friend of the
slain prince encouraged his successor and nephew, 4Amr b. 'Adi,
to take revenge. 'Amr sent him to the queen after cutting off
his nose to pretend that he had been mutilated by *Amr and had
come to her to seek protection. When Qasir met the queen she
believed his story and took him into her confidence. She gave
him some money to trade on her behalf. Qasir hastened to the
palace of 'Amr, met the prince who sent him back to the queen
laden with riches. It increased the queen's confidence in him.
So he said to her one day, "It is necessary for every king and
queen to provide themselves with a secret passage wherein to
take refuge in case of danger". Dabba told him that she had
with the report that the Banu Shayban were scattered in
search of forage. For 'imran it was the best opportunity
to make a raid., which he did and plundered their animals
and captured their women. Naqa'id, I, p.405.
1. Aehani, X, p.14.
2. Kami1, I, pp.245-51; Al-MaydanI, Uajma* al-Amthal. ed.
M.M.A. Hamid ( [Cairo?], 1955), I, pp.233-7; R.A. Nicholson,
A Literary History of the Arabs (Cambridge, 1953), pp.35-7.
already done so and showed him the secret tunnel constructed
for this purpose.
After some time Qasir again went out for trade and on his
return journey brought one thousand camels laden with
merchandise. The sight of the caravan made the queen extremely
happy but her happiness was short-lived because Qasir, with
the help of *Amr, had brought two thousand soldiers concealed
in sacks on the backs of the camels. When the caravan entered
the castle these concealed men suddenly came out of the sacks
and attacked the queen's forces. Dabba tried to escape through
the tunnel but Qasir, who knew that passage, barred her way.
When she saw no alternative she took her life by sucking her
seal ring containing poison.
Prisoners
The second source of gathering intelligence about the
enemy was prisoners. Some examples of the use of this source
have been mentioned earlier.Here are some more examples
of this sort.
1. During the battle of Bashr, 'Umayr and Shu'ayb were at
war with each other. Once a companion of 'Umayr informed him
of the presence of spies from Shu'ayb in his ranks. 'Umayr
took immediate steps and captured all the spies sent by his
enemy and killed all of them except Qatab b.'Ubayd. Then he
inquired of Qatab about the activities of Shu'ayb. Qatab told
him that Shu'ayh was coming to attack him with his force while
1. See above, pp.24, 40-1.
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Tha'laba b. Niyat had forsaken him.^^
2. Al-Hawfazan attacked a section of the Banu Sa'd b. Zayd
Manat and plundered their herds^taking many of them prisoner.
When the news of this mishap reached the main section of the
tribe, the Banu Sa'd,Qays b. 'Asira went out to pursue the
plunderers. Al-Hawfazan was away from the main force as a spy
to get early warning of a possible pursuit when he met Qays
(both did not know each other). Qays asked al-Hawfazan who he
was. Al-Hawfazan revealed his identity but in reply to a similar
question from him Qays told him that he was Abu 'All. Al-
Hawfazan then returned to his companions and told them that he
had met such-and-such a person named Abu 'All. A woman who was
among the prisoners told al-Hawfazan that the man whom he had
met was actually Qays b. 'Asim. This information from a
prisoner proved to be very useful because al-Hawfazan saved the
booty he had achieved by a quick march in order to escape from
(2)the pursuers.
These examples clearly illustrate that prisoners belonging
to the enemy tribes were a useful source of information in pre-
Islamic Arabia but sometimes the tables were turned because such
prisoners managed to convey the secrets of their captors back
to their own tribes. One such example is the activities of a
woman of the Banu Tamim mentioned earlier who managed to escape
from her captors at midnight and informed her tribal leader,
1. Aghani, XII, pp.207-8.
2. 'Iqd. Ill, pp.339-40. \
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Hajib b. Zurara, about the forthcoming danger.
Here is another interesting example of this sort. It is
stated that Nashib b. Bashama of the Banu 'Anbar was a prisoner
of the Banu Qays b. Tha'laba and lived among them as a prisoner.
He came to know that his captors were planning to make a raid
on his tribe with the help of some other tribes. He became
restless and wanted to warn his tribe of that raid. He requested
his captors to be allowed to send a message to his relatives
concerning his domestic problems. The Banu Qays agreed to his
request but with the condition that the message would be
delivered to the messenger in their presence. The captors then
brought a slave to perform the duties of a messenger.
Nashib made a complaint that they had brought a foolish
man who was unfit for the job. The slave swore by God that he
was not a fool. Nashib then expressed his suspicion that the
slave was a madman but the slave again swore by God and assured
him that he was a sensible man. To test his good sense Nashib
asked him whether the stars exceeded the fires in number. The
slave answered that although both were numerous the stars were
more numerous. Then Nashib took a handful of sand and asked
him how many particles of sand were in his hand. The slave
answered that he did not know the exact number but they were
in abundance. Then Nashi"b pointed towards the sun and asked
him what it was. The slave answered that it was the sun. After
this session of questions and answers Nashib expressed his
satisfaction and told his captors that he was a wise man and
1. See above, pp.40-1.
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fit for the job and gave him a message to be delivered to his
relatives which was as follows:
"My relatives should let my red camel wander and
should ride my she-camel of dirty white colour.
They should take care of my needs among the
Banu Malik. They should know that the box-
thorns had put forth their leaves. They
should obey Hudhayl b. al-Akhnas because he
is a resolute person instead of Hamam b.
Bashama who was unlucky and they should ask
Harith about myself."
•
The slave went to the Banu 'Anbar to deliver the message
and reached his destination. When he gave the message no-one
could understand it. Then they sent for Harith who listened to
the message once again and the conversation between him and
Nashib. He then advised the slave to go back and tell Nashib
that they would do as he wished.
After the departure of the slave, Harith told the Banu
'Anbar that Nashib had warned them about an immediate danger of
a raid, which was as obvious as the sun by a force of soldiers
which were as numerous as the particles of sand. He had advised
them to leave the mountain (red camel) on which they were
stationed and take refuge in the desert (dirty white coloured
she-camel) . He had also advised them to inform their allies^,
the Banu Malik,about the raid which was very near because the
enemy had taken up arms (the boxthorns had put forth their
leaves) and was ready to attack.
The Banu 'Anbar acted upon this advice and saved them¬
selves while the Banu Malik did not care and met their fate.^^
1. ' Iqd , III, PP.330-1; Kami 1, I, pp.471-2; Ay,yam. pp.170-72;
Jawwad 'All, Al-Kufassal fi Tarikh al-'Arab (Beirut, 1970),
V, p.437.
Relatives
People who belonged to a certain tribe but happened to
have some kind of relationship with the enemy tribe served,
sometimes, as a vehicle of intelligence. One such example is
the activities of Harith b. 'Amr, described in the story of
Zuhayr b. Jadhima,^^ who was the brother of Tumadir, the wife
of Zuhayr, and was sent to spy on Zuhayr by Khalid b. Ja'far.
Here are more examples of espionage through relatives.
During the hostilities between the Banu Aws and the Banu
Khazraj it is stated that once Uhayha b. Julah, a leader of the
Banu Aws, planned a raid on his enemies. . His wife, Salma,
belonged to the Banu al-Najjar of the Banu Khazraj and did not
like her relatives to be attacked. The night before the planned
raid she bound a string round her son and made him cry almost
all the night so that her husband could not sleep. When most
of the night had passed, she undid the string and the child
went to sleep. Uhayha, too, fell asleep of utter exhaustion.
• •
Salma, then, stealthily went out and warned her people of the
forthcoming attack. When Uhayha attacked his enemies he found
them ready to fight and could not succeed in carrying out his
plan. Later on, he found out that his wife had spied on him.
Therefore he beat her harshly, broke her arm and then divorced
her (later on this lady was married to Kashim and became the
(2)
great-grandmother of the Prophet).
1. See above, pp. 12-3.
2. Kamil, I, p.496; Ayyam, pp.70-71; Gindi, pp.50-1.
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A sister of Zuhayr b. Janab of the Banu Kalb was married,
to a tribesman of the Banu Qayn. Once she sent a messenger to
her brother with two parcels, one of sand and the other of
spikes. When Zuhayr received these parcels he told his people
that his sister was warning them about a forthcoming attack of
a mighty army (spikes) consisting of countless soldiers
(particles of sand) on them. He advised his people to leave
their camp to save themselves from destruction. Julah b. 'Awf
did not agree with him and said that they should not desert
their camp on the advice of a woman. The story goes on to say
that Zuhayr left the place and saved himself while Julah remained
rooted to the spot and suffered heavy losses at the hand of the
invading force of the Banu Qayn.^1^
'Umayra b. Tariq of the Banu Yarbu' of the Banu Tamim
was married to a woman of the Banu 'Ijl • Once he went to
visit his wife in the quarters of the Banu Ijl where he found
out that they were planning to make a raid on his tribe. He
left their quarters and hurriedly reached his tribe and warned
them about the forthcoming raid. Regarding this event 'Umayra
says:
"0 Ibn Asma', do not command me to do
what prevents the warrior of great taste
speaking.
That you are raiding my people and I sit
among you and make my knowledge as unknown
hidden thoughts."
1. Kami1, I, p.370.
2. Naaa'id, II, pp.781-85; * lad, III, pp.334-5; Kamil, I,
pp.477-8; Ayyam, pp.184-90.
UJJLi- 0I rJiJI j "-ill^^ l_ >l_l I U ui-j-* l—~ NJJ )
( j~° V-i-®" 11)^ J-*-?-' 5 f ^ 1 j t_r^> r~* ; j—-*—1 u ;
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Women
Women were a tool of the espionage apparatus of the pre-
Islamic Arabs. A woman sent out by Zuhayr b. Jadhima to find
out the murderer of his son has been mentioned earlier.
Another woman who was captured by a man of the Banu GhanI in
(2)
the course of his spying activities has also been mentioned
Here is another example of a woman working as a spy.
Hu'awiya b. al-Shurayd al-Sulami went out to fight Hashim
b. Harmala of the Banu Murra with a large force. While he was
on his way he gave up the idea of fighting and dispersed his
force. Then he came to a well accompanied by only nineteen
soldiers where he happened to meet a woman. When he asked her
identity, she told him that she belonged to the Banu Juhayna
and then managed to escape. She reached Hashim and informed
him about the presence of Mu'awiya at the well with just
nineteen soldiers. Hashim at first did not believe her but
when she described the appearances of the people she had seen
he believed her account. Finding his enemy practically alone
(3)
Hashim attacked and killed him.
Travellers
Travellers were a useful source of information for the
pre-Islamic Arabs about the territory through which they had
1. See above, p.12.
2. See above, pp.40-1.
3. 'lad.Ill, p.320; Aghlnl. II, p.329; X, p.28 , XIII, p.134;
apud Ayyam, pp.283-5.
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travelled especially when the tribes were anxious during the
raids to know the whereabouts of the enemy. Here is an example
of a traveller feeding information to a raiding party.
The Banu Dubab and the Banu Ja'far (both were the branches
of the Banu 'Smir) were at odds with each other. Once, the
Banu Dubab were travelling to some destination when they
happened to meet a traveller named Mazld b. Sahm of the Banu
Ghani. The Banu Dubab said to each other that Mazld was a
traveller and they should try to get some information from him
about the Banu Ja'far. Then they asked him about it and he
told them that he had seen a herd belonging to their enemy
. (1)nearby.
In this example a traveller furnished the invaders with
information useful to them because they had treated him with
respect but the following example is of a traveller who was
treated in a bad manner by the raiders and he ,therefore,spied
against them.
During the Oay of Shi'b Jabla, the Banu Tamxm, the Banu
Asad and the Banu Ghatafan were advancing towards the territory
of the Banu 'Amir for a surprise attack. En route they
happened to meet a person named Karb b. Safwan of the Banu Sa'd
whom they asked about his activities. He told them that he
was searching for his lost camel. They refused to believe him
saying that he wanted to warn (an tunahira) their enemy about
their attack,and would not let him go until he promised not to
1. Naqa'id , p.938 and Mu'jara al-3uldan, VIII, p.430; apud
Avyam. pp.304-5.
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speak to anybody about their attack.
On regaining his freedom Karb hurriedly went to the Banu
'Amir and devised a stratagem to warn them about the danger
within the limits of his oath. He took his cloak and put some
dust and thorns in it. Then he took two Yemenite cloaks,
another red cloak and ten black stones and threw them all towards
the Banu 'Amir. Mu'awiya b. Qushayr of that tribe carried this
material to Ahwas, leader of the tribe, and told him that
• •
somebody had thrown it towards them. Ahwas asked Qays b.
• •
Zuhayr about it who told him that somebody who seemed to be
under oath not to speak had tried to inform them about some
danger. He explained that the warner wanted to tell them that
the invaders were as numerous as particles of dust. By the
thorns he wished to indicate their strength which was in
abundance. With the two Yemenite cloaks he was trying to
inform them of the presence of two Yemenite tribes among the
invaders while the red cloak seemed to indicate the presence of
Hajib b. Zurara of the Banu Tamlm among them. Qays further
explained that ten black stones meant that the enemy might
reach them in ten nights' time. This warning proved to be very
useful for the Banu 'Amir because they prepared themselves for
the battle. 'When the invaders attacked them the Banu 'Amir
- - (11
repelled their raid and killed their leader Hajib b. Zurara.
In this example Karb did not belong to the Banu 'Amir and
1. Naqa'id, II, pp.660-61; Kami1, I, pp.435-6; Ayyam. p.354-
Aghanl describes this event with a slight difference in
details. See XI, p.139.
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was not in the service of that tribe. He seemed to be
conducting his own business but the Banu Tamim thought he was
spying for the Banu 'Amir and treated him in a bad manner. This
act of theirs made him a real nadhlr and he went to the Banu
'Amir and warned them of the forthcoming danger in codified
form.v
Traitors
Traitors or deserters were a very useful source of
information for the Arabs about their enemies. Here 'is an
example of this sort.
The Banu Rabl'a were camping at a well called Maba'id
when a slave belonging to one of them managed to escape and
reached the territory of the Banu Tamim. He told them that
the Banu Rabl'a were camping at such-and-such a place. Now,
the Banu Tamim had a feud with the Banu Rabi'a which was still
unresolved. They,therefore,attacked their enemies on the basis
of information achieved through the slave.
Traders
Traders have always been a source of information about the
enemy. The example of Qaslr mentioned in the section on
(2) -
regular spies and of the woman sent toward the Banu Ghani
to find out the murderer of Zuhayr's son^^ may also be
1. 'Iod, III, p.345.
2. See above, pp.56-7.
3. See above, p. 12.
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mentioned under this heading.
How spies communicated information back to their tribes
Pre-Islamic spies had very limited resources at their
disposal to convey information about the enemy to their tribes.
Usually this act was performed by the personal journeys of the
spies themselves. Sometimes, however, they used to convey
intelligence by waving certain kinds of cloth,^1^ if distance
permitted them to do so. If they were unable to travel because of
imprisonment or some other reason they would send messengers to
their tribes with messages in codified form as did the sister of
Zuhayr b. Janab and Nashib b. Bashama.^^
The last two examples along with the examples of Harith b.
'Amr^ who was sent by Khalid b. Ja'far to spy on Zuhayr b.Jadhima
- (5)
and Karb b.Safwan indicate that the use of codes was fairly common
in the intelligence activities of pre-Islamic Arab spies. Jawwad
'Ali^^ has given some codes and their meaning but he does not
give a comprehensive list. A list of the codes used on different
occasions with their likely meanings is now given below.
1. See Gindl, p.186 where he quotes a poet saying,
"When the scout signalled with his robe,
the horses were watered and the grooms
poured away the remainder.
Then the attendants took charge of the
camels, while the cavalry raised against
the enemy were given the order by their
trusted leader to range over enemy territory."
2. See above, p.62.
3. See above, pp.59-60.
4. See above, pp.12-3.
5. See above, pp.64-5.
6. Op. cit., V, pp.437-8.
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1. Milk indicates the presence of a weak enemy with the
prospect of booty nearby.
2. Thorns indicate a mighty army but broken thorns means an
army suffering from disunity.
3. A handful of dust or sand means a force consisting of
numerous soldiers.
4. A Yemenite cloak means a Yemenite Arab tribe.
5. A black stone means night.
6. A reference to the sun means that a fact is obvious.
7. A red camel means a mountain.
8. An ordinary camel means desert.
9. Boxthorns with leaves mean the enemy has taken up arms.
No doubt other codes were also in use but in the present
state of knowledge these are the main terms which are found
in extant sources. Moreover, it may be noted that the traitors
and the wise men of the tribe were in a position to reveal the
meaning of a code used at a particular time. Thereforej the
above codes cannot be regarded as a permanent arrangement. On
the contrary, it can be suggested that a particular code may
have been used only once.
The discussion so far has presented a general picture
of the intelligence network of the pre-Islamic Arabs. It has
become obvious that the pagan Arabs, when on the offensive,
were accustomed to sending spies towards the enemy to get
information about its strength, position and the expected booty
before planning a raid. The defenders, too, kept themselves
abreast of the latest developments in the neighbouring lands
with the help of their own spies who sometimes used to work in
the ranks of the would-be aggressors and sometimes used to
patrol in the outskirts of their own tribal territories.
Occasional travellers were a useful source of information about
the land through which they had travelled for those who could
capture them. Captured enemy spies were forced to reveal their
own secrets. Matrimonial relationships with the enemy were
fully utilised and codes were used to convey secrets.
The preceding evidence suggests that espionage among the
pre-Islamic Arabs was well-developed. It was such a system
which the Prophet received as an inheritance. Later on we will
discuss the activities of the Prophet in this field. It is
interesting to note that he not only made use of this existing
framework but that he developed it further according to his own
needs and requirements. But first of all we must answer the




WHY THE PROPHET UNDERTOOK ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES
The Prophet faced three main enemies during his Medinan
career (622-632 A.D.). These were the Meccans and their
confederates,^^ the Jews of Medina and Khaybar, and the
Munafiqun of Medina. These groups had collectively a superior
and decisive strength against Muhammad. For the success of his
mission and to foresee any hostile activity on the part of these
1. In the battle of Uhud the Meccan army included ahabish
• •
[which included the Banu Harith, the Banu Adal, Al-Qara, and
• •
al-Dish (the last three branches of the Banu al-Hawn b.
Khuzayma) the Banu Nufatha and the Banu Haya and the Banu
al-Mustalia (both branches of the Banu Khuza'a) , the Banu
Thaqif, the Banu Kinana and the people of Tihama, the
coastal strip between the Hijaz and the Red Sea. The
force which laid siege to Medina in 627 A.D. under the
command of Abu Sufyan consisted of, along with the Jews,
the Banu Fazara, the Banu Murra and the Banu Ashja' (all
parts of the Banu Ghatafan). I. Hisham, II, pp.65, 156.
The presence of these tribes in the ranks of the Quraysh
during their struggle to finish the Prophet off strongly
suggests that the Quraysh had close ties with these tribes.
For further information on ahabish see W.M. Watt. Muhammad at
; ' (
Mecca (Oxford, 1953), pp.154-7.
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enemies the Prophet had to keep a constant watch on them. There
was, however, another element to be watched carefully; this
consisted of the Muha.jirun and the Ansar. The Muha.iirun were
the people who migrated to Medina after their conversion to
Islam with the Prophet or later joined him there from the
CD
Meccans or from the nomadic Arabs. The Ansar were the people
of Medina who had accepted Islam either before or after the
hijra. Since these groups may well have had amongst them people
in contact with the enemy, the uneasiness of the Prophet during
the Medinan period of his life was, therefore_, fivefold. Let us
have a look at the relations of the Prophet with these groups
of his contemporaries and try to find out how dangerous they
were for him and for his mission in order to establish that
there was a need for espionage on the part of the Prophet.
First come the Meccans, the people of his own tribe the
Quraysh, who had occupied Mecca and had become the custodians
(2)
of its sanctuary, the Ka'ba under the leadership of Qusayy
1. But not after the conquest of Mecca in 8 A.K. because the
hi.1 ra is said to have come to an end on this occasion.
Amwal, pp.310-11; al-Azraqi, Akhbar Makka. ed. Rushal
Salih Malhas (Madrid, n.d.), II, p.165; al-Dariml, Sunan.
(Cairo, 1398 A.H.), II, p.239; al-Khafajl, Nasim al-Riyad
(Cairo, 1325-7 A.H.), I, p.159.
2. Although there were other sanctuaries in Arabia bearing
this namejSuch as the Ka'ba of Najran venerated by the Banu
Harith b. Ka'b and the Ka'ba of Sindad venerated by Iyad in
the region between al-Xufa and al-Basra (though these cities
were not yet built). None of these, however, acquired more
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b. Kilab by ousting the Banu Khuza'a from Mecca a few generations
earlier.This Ka'ba was the leading cultic centre of Western
Arabia and almost all the Arabs sought to travel to it for
(2)
pilgrimage. An attempt made recently by Abraha al-Ashram,
the famous Abyssinian viceroy in Yemen from A.D.525 to 571,to
divert the attention of the Arabs from the Ka'ba towards his
newly built temple called al-Qalis had ended in complete
(3)
failure. This had naturally enhanced the religious position
of the Ka'ba and the Meccans.^^ Deriving benefit from such a
importance than that of a local centre of worship or
gathering. Al-Kalbx, Kitab al-Asnam, ed. A.Z. Pasha
(Cairo, 1343 A.H.), pp.44-5; al- A'sha, Piwan (Beirut, 1960),
p.25.
1. I. Hisham, I, p.78; Azraqx, o£. cit. . pp.100-107; al-Mas'udx,
Muru.j al-Dhahab, ed. Y.A. Daghir (Beirut, 1978), II, p.32;
al-Maydani, Ma.jma* al-Amthal, ed. M.H.A. Hamid ( ^Cairo? ),
1374 A.H.), p.216; Bidaya. II, pp.205-7.
2. Al-Kalbx, 0£. cit. . pp.6, 33.
3. I bid.. pp.46-7; I. Hisham, I, pp.28-35;
Azraqx, o£. ext., I, pp.136-48; Tabarx, II, pp.131-7;
Tabarx, Taf., XXX, pp. 166-9; al-Baydawx, Anwar al-Tanzxl
(Cairo, 1330 A.H.), V, p.195; R.A. Nicholson, A Literary
History of the Arabs (Cambridge, 1930), pp.65-9; S. Qutub,
Fx Zilal al-Qur'an (Beirut, 1971), VIII, pp.664-8; M.J.
Kister, "Some Reports Concerning Mecca", JESHO, XV (1972),pp.63-75.
4. I. Hisham records that after this incident the Arabs held the
Quraysh in high respect and said "They are God's people, God
hath fought for them and hath defended them against their
enemies; and made poems on this matter." I, pp.37-8.
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situation the Quraysh had established close relations with many-
tribes of the Peninsula and had extended their trading activities
beyond the Arabian frontiers. They had also developed a very
profitable industry of tourism in the name of the little and great
• n • (Dpilgrimages.
As is well known, the Meccans like most of the Arabs
(except the Jews and the Christians) were idol worshippers. As
the prestige and the prosperity of the Meccans depended on the
(2)Ka'ba which housed many idols venerated by themselves and by
those Arabs who sought to travel to it, one could not expect a
favourable hearing if one attacked the idols and criticised
idol worship. That is why the Prophet came under heavy attack
from the Meccans who 'resolved to treat him as an enemy when
- (3)
he spoke disparagingly of their gods'_,as I. Hisham mentions.
The Meccans feared that if they abandoned the idols, the flow
of the visitors would cease, which would deprive them of one of
1. During his stay at Mecca no pilgrim was allowed to consume
the food brought by himself nor was he allowed to circum¬
ambulate the Ka'ba in his own garments. He had to obtain
these things from the Meccans either as a gift or loan or
by paying the price. AzraqI, o£. cit. . I, pp.177-82.
See also Nicholson who writes that 'the Quraysh saw in the
Ka'ba and its venerable cult the mainspring of their
commercial property', od. cit. , p.154. See also Sha'ban who
writes that the Meccan trade was dependent on its religious
prestige. Islamic History (Cambridge 1971), I, p.3.
2. Such as isaf, na'ila and hubul.
3. I, p.162.
- 74 -
their means of livelihood. The other source of their wealth
was their trade with foreign countries and it too would come to
an end because the safety of the caravans could not be guaranteed
in the presence of hostilejidolatrous tribes on their route.
The Pieccans did not want to die of starvation and if the
Prophet could manage to guarantee their livelihood by providing
a third source of income for them they were ready to accept his
prophethood. ^^ In their view such a source could only be
agriculture so that they could live an independent life but it
seemed impossible to them because their land was barren and
water was scarce. I. Hisham mentions a proposal put forward
to the Prophet by the Meccans in this respect. He says that
the Quraysh once said to the Prophet,
"You know that no people are more short of
land and water, and have a harder life than •
we do, so ask your Lord, who has sent you,
to remove for us these mountains which shut
us in, and to straighten our country for us,
1. As they accepted his prophethood after the conquest of
Mecca (630 A.D.) because the situation had changed and the
Prophet had established himself firmly in the Peninsula.
To carry on opposing him meant the blockade of their
caravan routes and the end of the flow of the visitors to
their city because most of the Arabs had gone over to
Muhammad. In this situation the acceptance of his prophet-
hood not only guaranteed the continuation of the previous
economic state of affairs but there were prospects of
another source of income too in the shape of booty which
they realised after the battle of Hunayn immediately after
their own submission.
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and to open up its rivers like those of
Syria and 4 Iraq.
When the Prophet refused to perform this 'miracle' the
(2)
Meccans resolved to protect their life-blood, the idols. We
do not need, however, to give a detailed account of the hostilities
between the Quraysh and the Prophet because they are well-known.
We, therefore, pass on to the fact that due to the vigorous
opposition from the Meccans to the Prophet and the latter's
realisation of the fact that his struggle of more than a decade
(3)
had shown no positive results in Mecca he decided to search
for new horizons. After two years of deliberations and negotiations
1. I. Hisham, I, p.181.
2. See Lewis who holds the opinion that 'the opposition of the
Meccans was largely economic in origin'. The Arabs in
History (London, 1970), pp.39-40, See also Gibb who writes
that
'the resistance of the Meccans appears
to have been not so much of their
conservatism or even to religious dis¬
belief as to political and economic causes.
They were afraid of the effects that his
(Prophetic) preaching might have on their
economic prosperity., and especially that
his pure monotheism might injure the
economic assets of their sanctuaries'.
Islam, (Oxford, 1969), p.18.
3. Pazlur Rahman, however, holds the opinion that it would be
impossible to hold that the Prophet had reached an
absolutely forlorn stage or had been utterly rejected in
Mecca because the Medinans would have never invited him to
be their religious and political leader if his prestige had
been low in his home town. Islam (London, 1966), p.18.
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he at last found, a place where he migrated along with his
companions in Sep. 622 A.D. This place was called Yathrib but
later on it became known as Medina.
The Ansar (people of Medina) were generally farmers and the
Muha.jirun had come from a city where people were engaged in
trading activities to earn their livelihood and had no experience
of farming. Most of the Muhajirun were poor and had no money
to start a business. In a situation where the newcomers had
neither the skill necessary for farming nor the money necessary
to set up a business their leader was confronted with the problem
of providing them with food and lodging through some other
source. Soon a source was discovered and it was to plunder the
Meccan caravans.^^ Since it was the Meccans who had maltreated
the Prophet and his Muha.jirun followers so far hetherefore,
focussed the attention of the latter on the caravans of the
Meccans. Their route from Mecca to Syria was between Medina
and the coast of the Red Sea and the Meccans had to pass within
a range of eighty miles of Medina even if they kept as close to
(2)
the coast as possible. Although the first few attempts to
1. R. Bell, Introduction to the Qur'an (Edinburgh, 1953), p.23;
P. Gabrieli, Muhammad and the Conquests of Islam, trans.
V. Luling and R. Linell (London, 1977), p.68; Watt goes
further and tells us that Muhammad had planned to raid the
Meccan caravans before he went to Medina. Society. p.11.
2. Watt, Medina, p.2.
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plunder the Meccan caravans did not succeed, the Meccans
realised the consequences of the migration of the Prophet. They
became fully aware that the Prophet had become more dangerous
to them than if he were still in their city. So the migration
of the Prophet to Medina exacerbated the enmity between him and
the Meccans who would now be prepared to take any step to
remove this danger from their caravan route. As the Prophet
was not in Mecca, he needed information on their plans,
movements, and preparations. Such an aim could only be
achieved by means of intelligence.
The second group of the Prophet's contemporaries with whom
he had to deal was the Muha.iirun. Some seventy of his followers
had preceded him to Medina from Mecca and some others joined
him there later immediately after his migration_,such as 'Ayyash
and Salma who managed to escape from imprisonment with the help
(2)
of Walid b. al-Walid . Miqdad b. *Amr and 'Utba b. Ghazwan
(3)
changed sides during the expedition of Ubayda, which took
place before the battle of 3adr and migrated to Medina. This
group kept on increasing day by day and won great respect in
the new community because they had left their homeland,
relatives and properties for the sake of their new religion.
1. According to Hasan, I, p.107 these expeditions were sent
out for spying purposes.
2. I. Sa'd, IV, p.132.
3. I. Hishlm, I, p.360; I. Khayyat, p.21; Tabarl, II, p.404.
These people belonged to different clans and tribes from all over
Arabia. Although they had broken their previous ties, it was
quite natural for them to have sympathetic feelings towards their
relatives in case of danger. In such a situation it was likely
that they might try to save their loved ones. This could
undermine the success of the Prophet's mission. The sources
have preserved for us some examples of such behaviour on the
part of some of the Muhajirun. Here are two such examples.
Before the start of the battle of Badr the Prophet
according to I. Hisham and Ansah advised his people not to kill
al-'Abbis because he had joined the Meccan force against his
will. Abu Hudhayfa b. 'Utba , one of the Muhajirun, said that
it would be strange 'to kill our fathers, brothers, sons and
other family members and to spare al-'Abbas' and he swore by
God to kill him if he could lay his hand on al-'Abbas. It is
stated that when it was reported to the Prophet he complained
to 'Umar about it who sought permission to kill Abu Hudhayfa
because he had become a hypocrite.^^^
Another example has been preserved by some of the sources
which is about Hatib b. Abx Balta'a. It is stated that when
the Prophet was making preparations to attack and capture Mecca
1. I. Hisham, I, p.283; Al-3aladhurl, Ansab. ed. A.A. Duri
(Beirut, 1398 A.H.), III, p.2; according to the latter
source al-'Abbas had written a letter to the Prophet
informing him that he had joined the Meccan force as a
courtesy towards the Quraysh and that he did not intend to
fight against him. Ill, p.3.
in 8 A.H. Hatib wrote a letter to the ffieccans which contained
• •
secret information about the proposed attack. Hatib, then,
employed a woman to carry it to the Meccans. This letter was
intercepted and the woman was captured by 'Ali and Zubayr
while she was on her way to Mecca. When it came to be known
that it was from Hatib, 'Umar sought permission to kill him
• •
because he had become a hypocrite. The Prophet asked Hatib why
he had acted like that. Hatib replied that although he
• •
believed in God and in his Prophet he was not a man of standing
among the Quraysh'and he had a son and family there and that he
had to deal prudently with them for their sake.^^
Apart from these examples of occasional awakening of old
sympathies there was always a possibility of regular enemy
spies working at Medina in the guise of Muha.jirun. One such
example is that of Furat b. Hayyan. It is stated that after
the battle of 3adr the Meccans sent a caravan to 'Iraq under
the guidance of Purat. This caravan was intercepted by Zayd
1. I. Hisham, II, pp.264-5; al-Shafi'x, Kitab al-Umm (Bulaq,
1321-5 A.H.), IV, p.16; Waqidx, II, pp.797-8; Amwal, p.158;
Musnad. II, pp.36, 143-4; Irshad, V, p.141; Abu Da'ud,
Sunan, ed. M.M.A. Hamid (Cairo, 1950), III, pp.64-5;
Tabarx, III, pp. 48-9; Tabarx, Taf., XXVIII, pp. 36-7;
al-Razi, Mafatxh al-Ghavb (Cairo, 1307-9 A.H.), VIII,
♦
Abu'l-Fida, al-Mukhtasar ( [Cairo?}, 1325 A.H.), I, p.143;
I. Khaldun, 11(2), p.42; Isaba, I, p.300; Maqrxzx, pp.362-3
al-Zarqanx, Sharh al-Zaraanx 'ala al-Mawahib (Cairo, 1325-8
A.H.), II, pp.296-7; Nayl, VIII, p.7.
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b. Haritha^^ who captured all the merchandise along with its
guide Furat. When brought to Medina Furat converted to Islam
and made Medina his residence. Sometime afterwards the Prophet
ordered his companions to kill him because it was feared that
- (2)
he was a spy of Abu Sufyan.
As head of a religious movement the Prophet constantly
hoped and looked for new converts and found many such people
during his Medinan career. At the same time there were
possibilities of defections too and the would-be defectors were
bound to be a useful source of secret information for his
enemies about his activities. One example of such a defection
is that of 'Abdallah b. Sa'd. He was one of the Muhajirun and
was one of the secretaries of the Prophet who used to write
down revelations for him. He apostatised and fled to Mecca
where he published strange stories about the revelations and
caused great harm to the Prophet's mission. When the Prophet
conquered Mecca he ordered his men to search for 'Abdallah in
order to kill him. 'Abdallah was a foster brother of 'Uthman
b. 'Affan. He,therefore>took refuge with the latter. 'Uthman
took him to the Prophet and asked for mercy. The Prophet
remained silent but 'Uthman kept on requesting pardon. At last
the Prophet pardoned him and they went away. But his crime was
so serious that after their departure the Prophet complained to
his audience and asked why they had not killed Sa'd while he
1. I. Hisham, II, p.58.
2. Abu Da'ud, op. cit. , III, p.66; Navl, VIII, p.7.
•1 + (1)was silent.
Another person ordered to be killed on this occasion was
'Abdallah b. Xhatal of the Banu Taym b. Ghalib. He had, migrated
to Medina after his conversion. The Prophet once sent him to
collect zakat in company of one of the Ansar. During their
journey he killed his servant and apostatised. He fled to Mecca
where he employed two singing girls who used to sing satirical
songs about the Prophet. Sa'd b. Hurayth and Abu Barza al-
Aslam! carried out the order of the Prophet and killed Ibn
(2)
Khatal.
Another such person was Miqyas b. Hubaba (or Subaba) who
• •
belonged to the Banu Kalb b. 'Awf and before his conversion used
to live among the Banu Sahm at Mecca. After his conversion he
migrated to Medina. His brother Hashim was also among the
Muha.jirun but was killed in a battle by a member of the Ansar
by mistake. Miqyas killed the murderer of his brother and fled
to Mecca. After the- conquest of Mecca the Prophet issued orders
(3)
to search for Miqyas in order to kill him.
1. I. Hisham, II, p.271; Waqidi, II, pp.855-6; Amwal, p.158;
Ibn Qutayba, Kitab al-Ma'Irif (Cairo, 1300 A.H.), p.103;
Tanbih (3), pp.232-3; Usui. II, p.208; Kanz. X, p.320;
R. Bell, Introduction to the Qur'an (Edinburgh, 1953), p.18.
2. I. Hisham, II, pp.271-2; Amwal. pp.158, 159, 192; al-Darimi,
Sunan (Cairo, 1398 A.H.), II, p.211; Futuh, p.53; Tanbih (B),
p.233; Xanz, X, p.323.
3. Waqidi, II, pp.861-2; Amwal, p.158; Futuh. pp.53-4;
Tanbih (3), p.233; Abu'1-Fidl, _op. cit. , I, p.137.
The Prophet was a stranger at Medina and although many of
the Medinans had accepted his religion and were ready to defend
him against his enemies, his real strength was the Muharijun.
These examples of the activities of some of the Muhajirun indi¬
cate that all was not well in their ranks and it was necessary
for the Prophet to keep the suspects under close watch. This
object could only be achieved by means of intelligence.
The third group of the Prophet's contemporaries were
the Ansar. Until the conquest of Mecca in 8 A.H. this group
formed the main body of support to the Prophet. Most of the
members of this group were faithful followers of the Prophet
and they had provided Muhammad's Meccan followers with refuge
and supported them against all their enemies. In spite of their
remarkable services to the Prophet's mission they were, after
all, human beings and were likely to indulge in unworthy
activities which could undermine the success of the Prophet's
mission. Some sources have preserved for us some examples of
such activities on the part of the Ansar.
Usayd b. Hudayr was among the early converts who belonged
to the Ansar and was a chief of considerable position because
his father had led one of the warring factions in the battle of
1. The numbers of the Muha.iirun and the Ansar who fought for
the Prophet in the battle of Badr or received a share from
the booty captured during this battle are said to have been
83 and 231 respectively. I. Hisham, II, p.26. The numbers
of the Muha.i irun and the Ansar who took part in the conquest
of Mecca are said to have been 700 and 4000 respectively.
WaqidI, II, p.800.
Bu'ath. Usayd did not take part in the battle of Badr at a time
when the Prophet was suffering so badly from the shortage of
men. When the Prophet returned to Medina victorious_,Usayd,
however, approached the Prophet and excused himself saying that
he had never thought that there would be any fight. Otherwise
(1)
he would have been among the Prophet's ranks.
Harith b. Suwayd and Mujadhdhar b. Dhiyad belonged to the
Ansar and an unresolved feud existed between them. They
participated in the battle of Uhud (3 A.H.). Harith instead of
fighting the Meccans treacherously attacked and killed
Mujadhdhar. After the battle the Prophet came to know about
this incident and ordered Harith to be executed for his crime
m
(2)
and the order was carried out.
During the battle of al-Khandiq Muhammad entered into
negotiations with^Uyayna b. Hisn (a leader of the Banu Ghatafan)
• i •
in an attempt to bribe him to lift the siege. He had offered
the enemy leader one third of the date crops of Medina and
'uyayna had accepted the offer with some amendment but the
Prophet had to drop the project because Sa'd b. 'Ubada and Sa'd
b. Mu'adh, leaders of the Ansir, had refused to endorse the
(3)
agreement.
1. Wiqidl, I, pp.116-7; Watt, Medina, p. 15.
2. Al-Shafi'I, o£. cit., IV, p.203, WaqidI, I, pp.304-5;
IstI(ab, III, p.481; Isaba, III, p.364.
3. I. Hisham, II, p.161; WaqidI, II, pp.477-8; Amwal, pp.235-6
I. Sa'd, II, p.69; Tabarl, II, p.573; Istl'ab, II, p.38;
I. Khaldun, 11(2), p.30; Isaba, II, p . 36^-MaqrIzI, pp.235-6;
J. Gould, "A Study of Two Rivalries in the Umma (1-11 A.H))"
unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Edinburgh, 1975-6), p.130.
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When the Banu Qurayza, a Jewish tribe of Medina, were
besieged by the Prophet in 5 A.H., they asked him to send Abu
Lubaba b. 'Abd- al-Mundhir of the Banu Aws for consultations.
The Prophet advised Abu Lubaba to go and see what the Jews had
to say. When Abu Lubaba met the Jews they asked him what would
happen to them in case of their surrender. Abu Lubaba disclosed
the Prophet's intention that in that case they would be
slaughtered. He is said to have been ashamed afterwards of his
dishonesty towards the Prophet.
The attitude of Hassan b. Thabit (the court poet of the
Prophet who belonged to the Banu Khazraj) towards the Prophet
and his mission appears to have been unsatisfactory on at least
three occasions.
1 . 'When the Banu al-Nadlr were leaving their quarters in
order to comply with the Prophet's demand to go into exile,
Hassan openly expressed his grief and sorrow over their
•
departure. ^
2. He took active part, along with some others, in slandering
4Aisha( wife of the Prophet) and received the legal punishment
(3)
for his part in this scandal.
1. 'Urwa, p.187; Waqidi, II, p.506; Tabari, Taf., XXI, p.88.
2. Waqidi, I, p.375;W.Arafat,"A Critical Introduction to the
Study of the Poems Ascribed to Hassan ibn Thabit",
unpublished Ph.D. Thesis (London, 1954), p.7.
3. Waqidi, II, p.434; I. Hisham, II, p.207; Tabari, Taf..
XVIII, p.61; Kindi, The Apology of el-Kindi (London, 1885),
p.82.
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3. Hassan is said to have composed verses to express his deep
concern over the large numbers coming to Medina, after the
battle of al-Khandiq, and their resulting influence. One such
verse is as follows,
"The scum have become powerful and numerous,
and the son of al-Furay'a (the poet himself)
has become insignificant in the town."^.
The Prophet is said to have been very disturbed by such
verses and expressed his wish to silence the poet.
The Prophet distributed the booty captured at Hunayn
(8 A.H.) among his Muha.jirun followers, new converts and the
non-Muslim chiefs in his army perhaps due to political reasons
and neglected the Ansar. It is stated that the Ansar objected
to the Prophet's action and Sa'd b. 'Ubada, one of their leaders,
went to see the Prophet on their behalf. The Prophet became
worried at the situation and then made a passionate speech to
- (2)
cool down the temper of the Ansar.
1. I J J-ijI jJ* J-i I (_r—.«i
J i < 11 ± t I i j t 11 I j
Hassan b. Thabit, Dlwan, ed. H. Hirschfeld (Leyden, 1910),
p.62;I.Hiaham, II, p.208 with the word (tramps)
instead of : . . For further details about such
verses and Hassan's general behaviour towards the Prophet
and his cause see 'Arafat, o£. cit., pp.7-15; Idem, "A
Controversial Incident and the Related Poem in the Life of
Hassan b. Thabit", BSOAS (1955), pp. 197-205.
2. 'Urwa, pp.218-9; I. Hishlm, II, pp.324-5; Tabari, Taf., X,
p.62; al-3ayhaqi, Sunan (Hyderabad Deccan, 1344-53 A.H.),
IV, p.337.
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These examples clearly indicate that the Prophet could not
afford to leave the Ansir on their own and a close watch was
necessary to scrutinise their activities in order to avoid
unfavourable circumstances (espionage is one of the best possible
means to achieve this end).
The fourth group of the Prophet's contemporaries were the
Jews. According to legend, as recorded in Encyclopaedia
Judaica,
"The Jewish community (at Medina) dates from
Moses' war against the Amalkites, the
Babylonian exile (c. 586 B.C.), Antiochus
IV's persecutions, and the defeat by Rome
(70 A.D.). In any case, by the early
centuries of the Christian era the population
of Medina consisted mostly of Jewish tribes,
either of Judean-Palestinian, mixed Judeo-
Arabic, or Arab proselyte origin.
Sergeant states that thirteen Jewish tribes inhabited the oasis
(2) _ -
of Medina but according to Samhudi there were some twenty
Jewish tribes who had fifty nine atam. Among all the Jewish
tribes three were prominent, the Banu Qaynuqa*, the Banu
al-Nadir and the Banu Qurayza. The Banu Qaynuqa*, who were the
earliest settlers, resided in the central market. They formed
a guild of goldsmiths and possessed two strong castles in the
north of Medina. They had no agricultural lands but had a
compact settlement and conducted a market. The Banu al-Nadir
1. XI, col., 1211.
2. R.B. Sergeant, "The Sunnan Jami * ah", BSOAS. XLI (1978), p.3.
3. Samhudi, I, p. 116. A tarn were strongholds like forts in
which they could defend themselves against the enemy.
Samhudi, I, p.114.
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were the owners of some of the richest lands and cultivated
date palms west of the city. The Banu Qurayza occupied an area
in the south-eastern part of the town. Other tribes included
the Tha'lba who resided in the north east of the town and the
*Ani, a tribe of Arab proselytes who lived in the Quba area
(1)
south of Medina.
There are two different estimates of the Jewish population
at Medina in the period preceding the hi,jra. According to
(2)
Encyclopaedia Judaica the Jews numbered between 8,000 to
10,000. Barakat*s^^ estimate is between 36,000 to 42,000. To
form our own view let us consult Ibn Hisham who records that
the Banu Qaynuqa* provided 700 men to protect 'Abdallah b.
Ubayy and 600 to. 900 fighting men were executed by the Prophet
after the battle of al-Khandiq who belonged to the Banu
Qurayza. It means that the numbers of the fighting male members
of these two tribes were at least 1,300. If one estimates that
each man had five dependents, which included mother, wives,
daughters, sons below the fighting age and fathers of old age,
this would make the population of these two tribes approximately
6,500. If the other Jewish tribes were even one third of these
two the total population was about 18,500, if we consider the
number of their tribes given by Sergeant as authentic, or
1. EJ, XI, col., 1211; Barakat Ahmad, Muhammad and the Jews
(New Delhi, 1979), p.30; JE, VIII, p.498.
2. EJ, XI, col., 1212.
3. 0_d . cit. , p. 43.
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about 26,000 if we consider Samhudl's number as authentic. In
any case^it was a large population for the Arabian peninsula at
that time because at the same time Mecca had a population of
about 5,000 people.
The Jews of Medina, however, lost their dominance to
certain Arab tribes, the Banu Aws and the Banu Khazraj who had
come to live at Medina from south Arabia because the breaking
of the Ma'rib dam had ruined their lands in the middle of the
fifth century. The transfer of power was gradual and it was
completed some time in the period preceding the hi.jra. Hence¬
forth the Jews aligned themselves with the Aws or the Khazraj.
As for the relations between the Prophet and the Jews,
the Jewish Encyclopaedia records that,
'when the Prophet first went to Medina he
was inclined to be friendly towards the
Jews.1
^
1. WJjWatt.Islamic Political Thought (Edinburgh, 1968), p.3; the
Meccans who took part in the battle of Badr are said to
have been between 900 and 1000. I. Hisham, I, p.376.
Moreover,40 or 70 Meccans were with Abu Sufyan (see below,
p.120) who apparently did not take part in the battle of
Badr which makes the total about 1000 men capable of
bearing arms because Ibn Hisham records that all the Meccans
(except the caravaners) had taken part in the battle.
I. Hisham, I, p.371; Watt seems to add 4 dependents to each
fighting man which makes the population of Mecca 5,000.
2. VIII, p.423.
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According to this source the Prophet made certain concessions
to them on the grounds of religion, and adopted as their qibla
- Jerusalem - in the hope of winning them over.^^ But,
according to the same source,
"The Jews ridiculed him, and delighted
in drawing him into arguments to expose
his ignorance; so that the conciliatory
attitude of the Prophet soon changed to
enmity•"(2)
Pazlur Rahman, and Barakat put forward a different point
of view. Rahman says that the Prophet had appointed Jerusalem
as the qibla while he was still at Mecca in order to emphasise
the distinction between the pagans and the Muslims and not
(3)
after the hi,jra in order to woo the Jews. Barakat says that
the Prophet knew before his arrival in Medina that he would be
1. JE, VIII, p.423.
2. Ibid., VIII, p.423.
See also Lewis who writes that,
"Muhammad had hoped to find friendly
welcome among the Jews" op. cit. . p.42
and Katsh who holds the opinion that the Prophet never
intended to establish Islam as a new religion and in
the beginning he believed that both Jews and Christians
would welcome him. Judaism in Islam ( New York, 1954 ),
p.XVII; and H.A.R. Gibb, o£. cit. , p.30.
3. Pazlur Rahman, 0£. cit.. p.20.
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rejected by the Jews.^^ Therefore the stories of the Prophet's
conciliatory attitude towards the Jews in the field of religion
are baseless.
Whatever the case may be, it is generally agreed that the
main opposition that the Prophet faced at Medina came from the
1. Barakat, o£. cit., p.118. He quotes
some verses of the Qur'an to support his theory such as
the following,
"We settled the Children of Israel in a
beautiful dwelling-place and provided for
them sustenance of the best; it was after
knowledge had been granted to them, that
they fell into schisms. Verily God will
judge between them as to the schisms amongst
them, on the Day of Judgement." A: yj
According to Wherry,this verse is undoubtedly of Meccan
origin and the knowledge intended here is that of the Qur'an
and the allusion is to the rejection of Muhammad by the
Jews. A Comprehensive Commentary on the Qur'an (London,
1882-90), II, p.338. Barakat also quotes the Qur'anic
verses XVII: 4-10 which are regarded as Meccaw|see
al-Baydawi, Anwar al-Tanzil (Cairo, 1330 A.H.), III, p.195;
Usui. II, p.210; Jalalayn, I, p.140; G. Sale, The Koran
(London, n.d.), p.271J ana says that,
"These verses do not point towards an Apostle
looking forward to being accepted by the
Jews". . , ,,n
op . cit. , p.118.
On the basis of the above verses Barakat holds the opinion
that the Prophet from the very beginning had an idea of
the Jewish rejection to his claim. 0£. cit.. p.117.
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Jews in spite of the fact that some of them converted to
Islan/"1^ and some of them fought^^ or offered to fight^^ for
him. The Prophet, however, offered them the terms of sahifa
but the Jews did not take him seriously and adopted a hostile
attitude towards him. Let us have a glimpse of their hostile
activities towards the Prophet and his mission.
Once the Jews tried to rekindle the past hostilities of
the Banu Aws and the Banu Khazraj by reciting poems about the
battle of the Bu'ath in order to destroy the base of the Prophet
at Medina. On this occasion the situation had become so tense
that the said groups of the Ansar had reached the brink of
(4)
war but the Prophet came and cooied down their tempers.
Once Abu Sufyan made a raid on the suburbs of Medina and
met Sallam b. Mishkam, a Jewish leader, by night who furnished
him with the .secret information about the Prophet's state of
(5)
affairs. On another occasion they formed a plot to kill
1. Such as 'Abdallah b. Sallam, Yamxn b. 'Umayr, Sa'xd b.
Wahab, etc. Waqidx, I, p.373; Tabarx, Taf. XXVI, p.7;
ffiaqrxzx, p.46.
2. Amwal. p.296;
Ibn al-'Arabx, Sahih al-Tirmidhx bi Sharh Ibn al-(Arabx,
(Cairo, 1931-4) , VII, p.49.
3. Waqidx, I, p. 21 5; Maqrizx, p. 118..
4. I.Hisham,I,pp.336-7; Tabarl, Taf.. IV, p.24.
5. I. Hisham, II, p.55; I. Khaldun, 11(2), p.22; Maqrxzx, p.106;
LE, VIII, p.423; Dermenghen, o£. cit. , p.212; Abu Zahra,
Khatam al-Nabiyyin (Doha, 1400 A.H.), II, p.808.
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the Prophet treacherously but the latter came to know of this
(1)
and left the premises.
Once they sent a deputation to the Quraysh and the 3anu
Ghatafan inviting them to form an alliance (626 A.D.) against
the Prophet and gave him a very tough time by laying siege to
(2)
Medina.
When the preparations of the expedition to Tabuk (630 A.D.)
were under way the Jews tried to sow the seeds of disaffection
among the Muslims and provided a base to the Munafiqun for their
subversive activities.
Such activities as trying to assassinate'the Prophet,
trying to dislodge him by ruining his base of power, spying on
him for his enemies, trying to collect all sorts of enemies to
finish him off, could only be regarded from Muhammad's stand¬
point as major offences. He naturally could not afford to
close his eyes to the people engaged in such activities who
(4)
were in such large numbers, as discussed earlier , within
his stronghold. It was necessary on his part to keep a close
watch on them and it was only possible through espionage.
1. I. Hisham, II, pp. 142-3; Waqidi ;MaqrIzi, p. 178;
al-Suyutx, al-Khasa'is al-Kubra, ed. M.K.Harras (Cairo,
1386 A.H.), I, p.525.
2. I. Hisham, II, p.156 ; Tabarx, Taf., XXI, p.74;
JE, VIII, p.423.
3. I. Hisham, II, p.332; Isaba, II, p.205.
4. See above, pp.87-8.
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The fifth group of the Prophet's contemporaries were the
Munafiqun^ ^ who were the'influential residents of Medina who
According to Sergeant (oo.. cit. , p. 11) the term munafiq is
derived from the word nafaqa in the general sense of
maintenance which is a kind of tax paid by the Mu'minin
and the Jews alike when the urnma is at war. Because the
Jews and some Medinans were reluctant to pay contributions
towards what did not lie in their interests 'a distinction
is made by the Our* an between the munafiq who pays nafaqa
and is praiseworthy, and the munafiq who is upbraided along
with the Jews.' Hence the term munafiq originally
indicated both kinds of taxpayers but later on at a very
early stage this term came to mean hypocrites, falsely
pretending to be Muslims. Al-Qur'an mentions such people
in the following verses:
"Of the people there are some who say 'we
believe in God and in the Last Day; but
they do not (really) believe" __ QJLi.: o
"When it is said to them: 'Believe as the
others believe', They say, 'Shall we believe
as the fools believe?'" _
11:13
"When they meet those who believe, they say:
'We believe'; but when they are alone with
their evil ones, they say: 'We are really
with you: we (were) only jesting'" ^
"When the hypocrites come to thee, they
say, 'We bear witness that thou art indeed
the Apostle of God'. Yea God knoweth that
thou art indeed His Apostle, and God beareth
witness that the hypocrites are indeed liars."
LXIII:1
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had ostensibly embraced Islam, but had no intention of
surrendering their position to the intruders from Mecca' ^
(2)
and 'criticized Muhammad's political leadership'. It must
be remembered that Muhammad was not welcomed to Medina by all
the citizens but was, at best, tolerated by a large proportion
(3)
of the population. A considerable number of these tolerators
later on gathered around Ibn Ubayy who is said to have been
robbed of his dearly cherished hopes of becoming the leader of
(4)
Medina because of the appearance of Muhammad on the scene
and adopted a hostile attitude towards the Prophet. Although
they were united in opposition to the Prophet, their motives
for such an attitude were different. Some of them are said to
have had strong relations with the Jews and this relationship
prevented them from embracing Islam wholeheartedly. Some of
them are said to have been lukewarm and the others objected to
the increasing numbers and influence of the Muhajirun in
(5)
Medina.
In the sources the term munifiq (to denote hypocrites)
is used for different categories of the Prophet's contemporaries.
1. " L.B. Jones, The People of the Mosque (London, 1932), p.23.
2. P.M. Donner, "Muhammad's Political Consolidation in
Arabia up to the Conquest of Mecca", MW, LXIX (1979), p.231.
3. Gould, o£. cit., p.170.
4. I. Hisham, II, p.200; Wiqidx, II, p.419.
5. V/. Muir, The Life of Mohammad (Edinburgh, 1912), pp. 181-2;
Watt, Medina, pp. 176, 178; Donner, 0£. cit. , p.231.
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For instance, it is used for some Meccan followers of the
(1)
_ (2)
Prophet such as Abu Hudhayfa and Hatib. Some of the Jews of
- (3)
Medina are described as Munafiqun and some of the Arab
(4)
tribesmen around Medina are placed in this category. But
generally this term is used for Ibn Ubayy and his party, as
mentioned above, from the Banu Aws and the Banu Khazraj.
The battle of Badr (624 A.D.) is apparently the first
occasion when this term first came into use. It is interesting
to note that an earlier mentioned Muhajir, Abu Hudhayfa b. fUtba,
was the first person to be called a Munafiq and this occurred
during the battle of Badr. After this battle the Prophet sent
Zayd b. Haritha to Medina with the news of his victory over
1. See above , p. 78.
2. See above, pp. 78-9.
3. According to I. Hisham the following Jews had embraced
Islam hypocritically. Sa'd. b. Hunayf; Zayd b. al-Lusayt;
Nu'man b. 'Awfa; 'Uthman b. 'Awfa; Rafi' b. Huraymila;
Rifa'a b. Zayd; Silsila b. Barham and Kinana b. Suriya.
I, pp.309-10. See also Tabari, Taf., VI, p.169; Ibn
Kathir, Sxrat al-Nawiyya. ed. M.A. Wahid (Cairo, 1964),
p.349. Guillaume, however, expresses his doubts about
the origin of these people and says,
rit is by no means certain that these men
were Jews but they may well have been half
converts to Judaism like so many of the
inhabitants of Medina',
The Life of Muhammad (Lahore, 1965), p.246.
4. ;• ; i . i r m i <i . al-Qur'an. IX: 101.1—« v 1 ^ > 1 (*—1 ^ 3
(Certain of the desert Arabs round you are hypocrites.)
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the Meccans. Some of the sources record that the Munafiqun
were spreading the false news of Muhammad's defeat and the killing
of his top aides including himself.^1^ After this event this
group is mentioned frequently in the sources and one of the
chapters of al-Qur'an is entitled al-Munafiqun.
As to the numbers of this group, we have no definite idea.
Ibn Hisham gives a list of some members of this group which
includes 'Abdallah b. Ubayy, Julas b. Suwayd, Bijad b. 'Uthman,
- — _ (p)
Natal b. Harith, Wadi'a b. Thabit and Jad b. Qays. The
Prophet is said to have secretly informed Hudhayfa b. al-Yaman
about the names of twelve Munafiqun. 'Umar b. al-Khattab is
said to have been in the habit of asking Hudhayfa before
conducting anyone's funeral service whether that particular
(3)
person was included in that list because to conduct or to
participate in the funeral services of the Munafiqun was
(4)
forbidden at the time of the death of Ibn Ubayy. Ibn
1. Waqidi, I, p.115; Kanz, X, p.263.
2. I. Hisham, I, pp.312-7.
3. Tabarl, Taf., XI, p.8.
4. See Musnad, I, p.195 where a tradition is recorded that
when Ibn Ubayy died the Prophet conducted his funeral
service in spite of 'Umar's opposition but later on he
was forbidden by God to do so on the death of any other
Munafiq ( I u— cs-J-6- ? )• See also IV,
p.311 of the same source.
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Hablb's list of the Munafiqun is a comparatively detailed one
because it contains 38 names of the people who were known by
this title. ^ Waqidi mentions that some eighty of the
_ - (2)
Munafiqun had stayed behind when the Prophet left for Tabuk
while a party of them went out with the Prophet. The term
(3)
party (raht) in this case is difficult to define, no estimate
is^therefore, possible on the numbers of the Kunafiqun. There
is, however, another event which gives an idea of their number.
It is stated that when the Prophet left for Uhud/Abdallah b.
Ubayy deserted him accompanied by one third of the Prophet's
(4)
original force of 1000 soldiers. Although it is not certain
that all of these deserters were the Munafiqun. it may be
assumed that the majority of these 300 men did belong to this
group.
Whatever their numbers may have been, it is an established
1. Ibn Habib, Kitab al-Muhabbar (Hyderabad Deccan, 1942),
pp.467-70.
2. WlqidI, III, p.995.
3. Ibid. , p. 1003..
4. Ibid., I, pp.219, 299; I. Hisham, II, p.67; 'Urwa, p.169;
IbnQutayba, Kitab al-Ma'arif (Cairo, 1300 A.H.), p.52.
The sources provide evidence on the presence of the
Munafiqun on the battlefield of Uhud in spite of the
desertion of the said contingent of Ibn Ubayy. For instance,
Ibn Hisham and Waqidi mention Qazman who fought very bravely
and killed many Meccans but was a munafiq. I. Hisham, II,
p.82; Waqidi, I, p.222 ;Tabari, II, p.531 and another person
mentioned by Ibn Hisham is Harith b. Suwayd. II, p.82.
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fact that they had adopted a hostile attitude towards the
Prophet and his Muhajirun followers from within the Medinan
community. The sources record that during the expedition of
the Banu Mustaliq the Munafiqun gave the Prophet a very tough
• • '
time when a quarrel broke out between the Ansar and the
Muhajirun. The Munafiqun tried their best to exploit the
situation and Ibn Ubayy is reported to have been reminding the
Ansar of a well-known proverb "Patten your dog and he will bite
you" ( ^J-51- <X_U_5 ) and expressing his intentions
that as soon as he reached Medina he would expel the Prophet
(2)
from the city. The situation had become so tense that if
the Prophet had stayed there a bit longer an armed clash
between the Muha,jirun and the Ansar seemed inevitable. In
this state of affairs the intelligence service of the Prophet
came to his rescue. Zayd b. Arqam is said to have reported the
(3)
activities of Ibn Ubayy to the Prophet who then ordered an
(4)
immediate march which proved to be a very long one. Heat
1. I. Hisham, II, p.199; Waqidl, II, p.416; Tabari, II, p.605.
2. I. Hisham, II, p.199; Waqidl, II, p.416; I. Sa'd, II, p.65;
Tabari, II, p.605; Tabari, Taf., XXVIII, pp.66, 68; al-RazI,
op. cit., VIII, p.157; Ibn Qayyim, Zad al-Ma'ad (Cairo,
1950), II, p. 116; I. Khaldun, 11(2), p.33; Wherry, od. cit.,
IV, p.147; Qutub, o£. cit.. VIII, pp.109-10.
3. I. Hisham, II, p.199; Waqidl, II, p.417; I. Sa'd, II, p.65;
Tabari, II, p.605; Tabari, Taf., XXVIII, p.69.
4. I. Hisham, II, p. 200; WlqidI, II, pp.418-9; Tabari, II,
pp .606-7.
and the fatigue of the journey overcame inflamed feelings and
the Prophet, thus, managed to save the situation.
Hie list of the subversive activities of the Munafiqun is
very long. They were among the Ansar so no severe step could
be taken against them because they could have undermined the
Umma from within. In such a situation they were, in the words
of Amir Ali, a source of considerable danger to the newborn
commonwealth, and required unceasing watchfulness on the part
of the Prophet.^1^
In this chapter so far we have discussed the relations
of the Prophet with different groups of his contemporaries.
It has been pointed out that the Meccans and the Jews were
against his mission and that they were ready to go as far as
possible to ensure his downfall. The Munafiqun who belonged
to Medina were working against the Prophet from within the
community, and the ranks of the Muhajirun and Ansar, too, did
not lack opposition to the Prophet. This situation when
everyone, except a few, was an enemy or a possible spy or
secret agent of the enemy was very dangerous for the Prophet.
Success in the presence of so many odds seemed impossible but
the Prophet made it possible with the help of espionage, along
with other factors, which we are going to discuss in the
coming pages.
1. The Spirit of Islam (London, 1965) p.57.
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CHAPTER IV
THE SOURCES OF THE PROPHET TO GATHER INTELLIGENCE
The Prophet's espionage activities against the people who
lived at Medina, the Banu Aws, the Banu Khazraj and the Jewish
tribes of Medina, or against those who after the hijra came to
live at Medina, the Muhajirun from Mecca or from other places,
may be placed under the heading of an internal front. His
activities against the Meccans, the Jews of Khaybar and the
Bedouin Arab tribes may be placed under the heading of an
external front. These are as follows:
The internal front
It would appear likely that about seventy Muslims from
Mecca migrated with the Prophet to Medina. He instituted
brotherhood between these Muha,jirun and the Ansar^ ^ to provide
lodging and shelter to the emigrants in the families of the
helpers. In this way the Prophet spread his Meccan followers
all over Medina. These Muhajirun were his potential spies on
the local population which included the Ansir, the Munafiqun
and the Jews of Medina. It was in any case in the interests
of the Muha.iirun to report to the Prophet any hostile activity
or any other useful information which might come to their
notice so that he could take appropriate action to secure their
1. I. Hisham, I, pp.303-5; Ibn Habib, Kitab al-Muhabbar
(Hyderabad Deccan, 1942), p.75; Abu'l-Fida, al-Mukhtasar,
([Cairo?], 1325 A.H.), p.127.
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future.
There were, moreover,devouted followers of the Prophet
among the local community especially those seventy or so Kedinans
at whose personal invitation he had migrated to Medina.
They had to protect their invitee against any possible danger
from his enemies for their honour's sake. It made them ready
instruments of a comprehensive espionage system from which no
Medinan Arab family was secure. Moreover, these Ansar were
especially useful in that they had personal relations with the
Jews of Medina and this relationship was a potential source of
information from the Jewish quarter.
The external front
On this front the Prophet had various means of espionage
at his disposal. These included the following:
Permanent spies:
According to some sources al-'Abbas was the Prophet's spy
at Mecca who used to inform him about the activities of the
(2) — —
Quraysh. Al-Shafi'x mentions that the Prophet had permitted
some Meccans after their conversion to Islam to stay at Mecca
and al-'Abbas was one of them. With reference to the
activities of al-'Abbas before the battle of Uhud, which will
1. See below, p. 109.
2. Al-Baladhurx, Ansab al-Ashraf, ed. A.A. Durx (Beirut,
1398 A.K.), III, p.3; Istx'ab. Ill, p.95; Isaba, II, p.271;
J. Gould, "Two Rivalries", unpublished Ph.D. thesis
(Edinburgh, 1975-6), p.23.
3. Al-Shafi'x, Kitab al-Umm (Bulaq, 1321-5 A.H.), IV, p.84.
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be mentioned later on/1^ it is obvious that these people were
allowed to stay at Mecca to work as the secret agents of the
Prophet.
Ibn Sa'd mentions another secret agent of the Prophet at
Mecca who was an ironsmith by profession. It is stated that
the Prophet once advised Walxd b. al-Walld (brother of Khalid)
to go to Mecca and to hide in the house of that ironsmith, who
had become a Muslim, and to try to contact 'Ayylsh and Salma,
two Muslims who had been kept prisoners at Mecca, in order to
(2)
help them to escape from their imprisonment.
Waqidi and al-Azraqi mention some other Muslims who
remained at Mecca due to their inability to migrate to Medina
for certain reasons but who had secret contacts with their
(3)
brethren at Medina.
1 . See below, p . 139•
2. I. Sa'd, IV, p.132.
3. Waqidi, I, pp.72-4; al-Azraqx, Akhbar Makka (Madrid, n.d.),
II, p.212. See also I. Sa'd who mentions that a person
named Nu'aym al-Nanham b. 'Abdallah of the Banu 'Adx had
• •
accepted Islam very early but did not migrate to Medina and
remained at Mecca till 6 A.H. when he migrated along with
forty of his family members (IV, pp.138-9). Although it is
not mentioned that he was in the secret service of the
Prophet, it is likely that he was working as a spy on the
Meccans for the Prophet during his stay at Mecca.
Aslam Siddxqx writes about the Muslims still at Mecca that
they 'must have devised some means to pass information to the
Prophet'. "Jihad, An Instrument of Islamic Revolution",
Islamic Studies (1963), p.385.
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Then there were the Banu Khuza'a who lived in the suburbs
of Mecca but their leader Budayl had a dar at Mecca.^^ It is
stated that the Prophet's grandfather Abd al-Muttalib had
j .. J
concluded a treaty with them to help each other which was, in
the words of Goldfeld, one of his most outstanding achievements.
According to Goldfeld, Ibn Hisham records this treaty according
to which 'Abd al-Muttalib had to support them (the Banu
• •
Khuza'a) against anyone seeking blood revenge on sea or on
land, on plain ground or on uneven ground. The Banu *Amr (of
the Banu Khuza'a) had to support 'Abd al-Muttalib and his
• •
descendants against all the Arabs, in the east or west, on
(3")
rugged ground or smooth ground. This agreement made the
Banu Khuza'a vehicles of intelligence and as soon as any
activity of the Quraysh hostile towards the Prophet came to
their notice it was reported to him without any delay.
The Prophet had appointed his secret agents in other
places besides Mecca. Examples include Anas (or Unays) b.
(4)
Marthad b. Abi Marthad who was his spy at Awtas (near Hunayn)
• •
1. WiqidI, II, pp.783-4; al-Qalqashandi, Subh al-A'sha (1920;
reprinted Cairo, 1383/1963), I, p.426.
2. I. Goldfeld, "The Tribal Policy of the Prophet Muhammad",
unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Cambridge, 1970), p.69.
3. Ibid., pp.69-70. See also Waqidx, II, pp.781-2; Al-ZarqanI
Sharh al-Zarqani (ala al-Mawahib (Cairo, 1325-8), II, p.289
4. Isti' ab , I, p.61; Isaba , I, p . 73 ;M^Iamidullah, The Muslim
Conduct of State (Lahore, 1977), p.146.
and Sinan b. Abl Sinan al-Asadi who was his spy among the Banu
Asad and is said to have been the first person who informed the
Prophet about the activities of Tulayha b. Khuwaylid (a false
prophet).^^^ Musa b. 'Uqba and Hamldullah mention another
agent named al-Mundhir b. 'Amr al-Sa'idi who was in Najd and
(2
kept the Prophet informed of all that passed in those countries.
Husayl b. Nuwayra and his son Kharija of the Banu Ashja' seem
to have been the Prophet's secret agents working in Najd. It
is stated that once Xharija came to Medina and told the Prophet
that the Jews of Khaybar were trying to raise an army against
- (3)
Medina with the help of the Banu Ghatafan and once Husayl
• •
came to Medina with the news that the Banu Ghatafan were
(4)
gathering at Janab in order to attack Medina.
New Converts
During the Medinan career of the Prophet there was a constant
1. Isaba, II, p.82.
2. Fragment of the Lost Book of Musa b.*Uqba, trans.
A. Guillaume together with his translation of Ishaq's
Sirat Rasul Allah, as: The Life of Muhammad (Lahore,
1955), p.XLIV; Hamldullah, oo. cit. , p.146.
3. Waqidi, II, pp.566-7.
4. Tabarl, III, p.23.
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flow of new converts from all over Arabia. The battle of Badr
which took place in the early period of his Medinan career
provides evidence of this phenomenon. If one looks at the list
of the companions of the Prophet who took part in this battle
one finds some of them were those who belonged to the tribes
other than the Quraysh and the Banu Aws and the Banu Khazrag.
Waqidi's list includes *Aqil b. Abi'1-Bukayr of the Banu Sa'd
b. Bakr, Abu Marthad and Marthad of the Banu ChanI, Malik b.
*Amr and his two brothers Midlaj and Thiqaf of the Banu Sulaym,
Suwayd b. Makhshi of the Banu Tayy, Hubab of the Banu Mazin,
Mas'ud b. al-Rabl* of the Banu al-Qara, Abu'1-Haytham, 'Ubayd,
Abu Barda and Nu'man of the Banu Bali Malik b. Thabit of
J
the Banu Muzayna, 'Adx of the Banu Juhayna, 'Usaym of the Banu
Asad and Kharija and 'Abdallah sons of al-Humayyir of the Banu
Ashja'.^"'^ Such converts whose flow to Medina never ceased
were a useful source of information about the activities and
plans of their tribes. Moreoverjit is likely that the Prophet
had established sources to have access to secret information
(2)
about their tribes through them.
The Prophet was also receiving new converts in his ranks
from Mecca as mentioned earlier. Such persons were another
source of information about the activities of the Quraysh.
1. WaqidT, I, pp.145-69.




The Prophet used negotiators to spy on the Jews of
the Banu Qurayza when he sent Sa'd b. 'Ubada and Sa'd Mu'adh
during the siege of Medina to their quarters as will be
discussed later on/^
On another occasion, during the expedition of al-Hudaybiyya,
the Prophet sent 'Uthman b. 'Affan to Mecca as his envoy.
'Uthman, while at Mecca, started visits to the Muslims
- - (2)
detained at Mecca,_ as Waqidi records, along with performing
his duties as an ambassador. It seems that his secret activities
came to the notice of the Meccans which caused them to detain
him as is well known. It may be suggested that he was sent
by the Prophet to contact those detainees with a view to
(3)
obtaining an estimate of the Qurayshite power at that time.
Intelligence Missions
The Prophet sent out individuals' and parties on a number
of occasions to procure information about the enemy whenever
(4)
the need existed.
1 . See below, p.137.
2. Waqidi, II, p.601.
3. It is not farfetched because at the same time, as Waqidi
(II, p.594) records, Suhayl b. *Amr was advising the
Meccans to send him to the Prophet as their ambassador so
that he could act as a spy and bring back a report on the
situation in the Muslim camp.
4. See below, pp.120, 129, 131, 140, etc.
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In addition to these means of intelligence the Prophet on
a number of occasions made use of traders, travellers, prisoners
and traitors as a means of procuring information against his
enemies as will be discussed later on. ^
After having a brief look at the sources of the Prophet to
gather intelligence, let us now move forward. It is time to
discuss, in detail, the Prophet's activities in the field of
espionage during his Medinan career. As his career at Medina
began with his hi.jra it seems appropriate to start this
discussion from this very event.
The hi.jra
The migration of the Prophet which is known as the hi,jra
(622 A.D.) started his Medinan career. This event changed
the shape of world history because as a result a suppressed
Prophet succeeded in establishing a powerful state in Arabia
which soon after his death expanded enormously and conquered
a considerable part of the known world. Although much has
been said about the causes and the consequences of this event ,
the fact which made this event possible has never been
illuminated in its real perspective. If one examines this
event carefully one is surprised to find that intelligence
played a basic role in this apparently simple event of
migration from one place to another which was actually one of
the most dangerous events of the Prophet's life.
1. See below, pp.134, 149, 151, 176, 177.
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The hi,jra can be divided into two phases; the decision to
migrate to Medina and the journey leading to Medina. The
first phase started some two years before the hijra actually
took place. Some of the sources record that some time before
the hijra the Prophet sent Mus'ab b. 'Umayr, one of his Meccan
(1)
followers, to Medina. His ostensible duty was to instruct
the Medinans in Islam but as Watt suggests he was expected to
(2)
inform Muhammad about the political situation in Medina.
Margoliouth goes further when he writes,
"He (the Prophet) was of course kept
constantly informed of what was going
on in Yathrib, and regularly sent
instructions to his agent."
The sources which record the correspondence between
. (4 j
the Prophet and Mus ab appear to support these statements.
Even a visit of ffius'ab to Mecca from Medina to discuss the
(5)
situation of Medina with the Prophet is on record. This
evidence makes Mus'ab agent in place of the intelligence
1. 'Urwa, p.123; I. Hisham, I, p.261; I. Sa'd, III, p.118;
I. Jawzi, I, p.45; al-Nuwayrl, Nihayat al-Arab (Cairo,
1924-55), XVI, p.313.
2. W.M.Watt.Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman (Oxford^,
1978), p.83.
3. Mohammed and the Rise of Islam (New York, 1905), p.202.
4. I. Sa'd, III, p.118; .1. Jawzi, I, p.152; Bidaya. Ill, p.151;
Hamidullah, Kajmu'a al-Watha'iq al-Si.yasi,yya (Beirut, 1969),p.35.
5. I. Sa'd, III, p.119; I. Jawzi, I, p.152; 'U.yun, I, p. 161 .
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apparatus of the Prophet who conveyed the situation of Medina
to the latter. In this way the Prophet became able to weigh
up the whole situation in an informed way before making any
decision about the hi.jra. As Margoliouth writes,
"As the reports of that agent's success
reached him (the Prophet) he began to
frame the scheme of conduct to be pursued
when the invitation to Yathrib should
arrive."^ ^
It seems that on the basis of the reports of Mus'ab the
»
Prophet had decided to migrate to Medina before he went to meet
(2)
about seventy of the Medinans at al-'Aqaba (622 A.D.)^ .
Al-'Abbas is said to have accompanied the Prophet and attended
(3)
the meeting where both parties reached an agreement. '
1 . 0j3. cit. , p . 202.
2. Al-'Abbas is described in the sources as addressing the
audience saying that his nephew was well protected among
his clan but that he wanted to join them at Medina. He
advised the Medinans to consider the matter well and count
the cost and if they found themselves able to defend him,
then they should give the pledge^otherwise they should drop
the project. I. Hisham, I, p.266; I. Sa'd, IV, pp.7-8.
This speech, however, is either a diplomatic one to give
the Prophet the upper hand in the negotiations^ or the part
in which al-'Abbas is described as saying 'that the Prophet
was well protected and secure among his clan' is a fabric¬
ation of our historians as will be discussed below. See pp.110-11.
3. I. Hisham, I, p.266; I. Sa'd, I, pp.221-3; Maqrizi, p.35.
Maqrizi states that before the meeting started al-'Abbas
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The journey to Medina was, however, not safe because at
Mecca the Prophet was under the protection of Mut'am b. 'AdI
since his return from al-Ta'if about two years earlier^1''
appointed 'Ali at one end of the 'Aqaba and Abu Bakr at
the other end as spies.
1. Mut'am b. 'Adi is one of the neglected figures in Islamic
history in spite of the fact that his services for the
Prophet are unique. Although he was and remained a non-
believer he helped to bring the blockade of the Banu Hashim
to an end (some three years before the hijra) which was
causing unprecedented hardships to the Banu Hashim in
general and to the Prophet in particular. I. .Hisham, I,
pp.228-9.
When the Prophet went to al-Ta'if to seek new horizons
his mission proved to be a failure. When he was on his
way to Mecca after a stay of approximately one month at
al-Ta'if (Isti'ab, I, p.27) he was afraid of entering
• —————
Mecca without adequate protection. He approached, through
a messenger, Akhnas b. Shariq and Suhayl b. 'Amr but they
refused to take him under their protection. Then he
approached Mut'am b. 'Adi who agreed to give him protection.
Ibn Qutayba, Kitab 'Uyun al-Akhbar (Cairo, 1925), p.49;
IstI'ab . I, p.231 ; Maqrlzl, p.28; Abu Zahra, Kbitam al-
Nabiyyln (Doha, 1400 A.H.), I, p.554; Watt, Muhammad at
Mecca (Oxford, 1953), p.140. This incident indicates that
the Banu Hashim including al-'Abbas under their leader Abu
Lahab were either too weak to protect their clansman or had
refused to do so. That is why the Prophet had to approach
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and the Medinans had promised to defend him in their
other Meccan leaders in search of protection and that the
earlier mentioned part of the speech of al-'Abbas seems to
be a fabrication of our historians.
Earlier, Abu Talib had protected the Prophet but it
was his duty to do so because he was the head of the clan
of the Banu Hashim. Mut'am, on the other hand, protected
the Prophet in spite of the fact that the latter did not
belong to his clan. Such a man is really praiseworthy.
'A'isha, wife of the Prophet, once asked her husband
if he had experienced a more difficult time than that of
the day of Uhud (when some seventy of his followers were
killed, the remaining except a few had fled away, he
himself had fallen into a ditch after receiving heavy
injuries and the enemy had surrounded him for a final
blow). The Prophet told her that the occasion of the
failure of his mission at al-Ta'if was worse than that.
Muslim, III, pp.169-70. The man who came to his rescue
on this occasion was gratefully remembered by the Prophet
when the latter received the first reward of his fifteen
years' struggle. Some of the sources mention that the
Prophet said to his companions after the battle of Badr,
"If Mut'am b. *Adi had been alive and
spoken to me about these filthy ones
(prisoners of Badr), I would have left
them for him."
WaqidI, I, p.110; Amwal, p.164; Irshad. VI, pp.273-4; Abu
Da'ud, Sunan, ed.M.M.A.Hamid (Cairo, 1369/1950-1370/1951), III,
p.82; Istl'ab, I, p.231; Mishkat, II, p.391; Usui, VIII, p.205.
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(1 )
territory, but between Mecca and Medina his blood could be
shed with impunity. Therefore every step on a long route to
Medina was very dangerous for the Prophet. It is well known
that the Prophet, accompanied by his close friend Abu Bakr,
left Mecca and hid in a cave called Thawr, one hour's march
south of Mecca in the opposite direction from Medina, where they
remained for three days. Meanwhile, the Meccans had come to
know of his departure and began to search for him. They also
announced a prize for anyone who could capture him and bring
(2)
him back.
At this point, intelligence came to the Prophet's rescue.
Some of the sources record that Abu Bakr's son 'Abdallah
worked as a spy at Mecca to keep him aware of what was going
on in the city. He used to spend the day at Mecca listening
to the plans and the conversations of the Meccans to report to
the Prophet in the cave at night.Accordingly, the Prophet
1. I. Hisham, I, p.375.
2. Musa b. 'Uqba, o£. cit. , p.XLIII; I. Hisham, I, p.294;
Tabarl, II, p.379; I. Jawzi, I, p.49; Kamil, II, p.81;
Hasan, I, p.99. Glubb writes that the Meccans offered a
hundred camels as a reward for his apprehension. A Bedouin
family can live on a flock of twenty, so that the reward
offered was sufficient to maintain five Bedouin families.
Glubb, Conquests. p.56.
3. 'Urwa, p.130; I. Hisham, I, pp.291-2; I. Sa'd, III, p.173;
Tabarl, II, p.379; I. Jawzi, I, p.49; Kami1. II, p.81.
Isaba, II, p.283; Maqrizi, p.40; Hasan, I, p.99.
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spent three days in the cave and the Meccans had no knowledge
of his whereabouts, whereas he was fully aware of their
activities. When on the fourth evening 'Abdallah reported
as Glubb writes 'that the way was clear' ^ ^ the Prophet started
his onward journey because according to Dermenghem 'his
_ (2)
('Abdallah's) alert, subtle intelligence could be relied on'.
It can be suggested that the route to Medina, first to
the Red Sea coast and back up north by devious routes cutting
(3)
across the main road to Medina, was chosen in the light of
the intelligence reports brought by 'Abdallah. Becuase of
this route which took more than a week to cover and reach
_ (4)
Quba no-one could practically locate him and the hi,jra
became a reality.
Hence we can say that it was the intelligence activities
of Mus'ab b. 'Umayr which helped the Prophet in making his
decision to migrate to Medina and it was 'Abdallah's activities
1. A Short History of the Arab Peoples (London, 1978), p.33.
2. The Life of Mahomet, trans. Arabella Yorke (London, 1930),
p.147.
3. M. Rodinson, Mohammed. trans. Anne Carter (Harmondsworth,
1971), p.145.
4. Two miles from Medina. Zakariyya b. Muhammad al-QazwInx,
Athar al-Bilad (Beirut, n.d.), p.103.
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which guaranteed the safety of the long journey to Medina.^
The external front
Prior to Badr
As mentioned earlier, when the Prophet arrived at Medina
he was soon confronted with the problem of providing a means
of livelihood to his Meccan followers who migrated with him and
(2)
so he thought of plundering the Meccan caravans. There was,
however, another reason to adopt this tactic against the
Meccans which has been discussed in detail by Donner. He
writes that the coastal route to Syria from Mecca was the
lifeline along which the supplies of the Meccans' staple
foodstuff flowed. Therefore, the Prophet planned to cut this
lifeline in order to compel the Meccans to accept his
1. There were, however, at least two more agents who worked
in connection with this event: the one who worked as
messenger between the Prophet and Mus'ab and the one who
took the news to Medina as soon as the Prophet left Mecca,
because the correspondence between the Prophet and Mus'ab
has been mentioned above and we find the Medinans waiting
for the Prophet at the outskirts of their town. (See
I. Hisham, I, p.296; I. Khayyat, p.13) but the sources
have not recorded their names.
2. See above, p.76.
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(1)
supremacy. As it was impossible to appoint permanent parties
1. "Mecca's Pood Supplies and Muhammad's Boycott", JESHQ. XX
(1977), pp.255, 263. Donner explains that the Meccans
depended partly for their staple foods on the territory
occupied by the Banu Hanlfa within Arabia. Donner, op♦
cit., p.254. When the Hanafite chief Thumama b. Uthal
converted to Islam he told the Meccans that they could not
get any foodstuff from his territory without Muhammad's
permission. Mishkat, II, pp.390-1. Until now the Prophet
had practically blocked the route to Syria and the Meccans
had no alternative other than to plead to Muhammad for
mercy. Donner, o£. cit. , pp.264-5. See also Ibn Qayyim,
Zad al-Ma'ad (Cairo, 1950), II, p.119. Isaba, I, p.203;
Tabari in his Tafsir describes the moment of this
humiliation and tells us that after the conversion of
Thumama Abu Sufyan reached Medina and asked Muhammad why
if he was rahmatan lil 'alamln had he killed the fathers
with the sword and the sons with hunger. Tabari, Taf.,
XVIII, p.30. Glubb says,
"The strategy (to cut the supply line) used
by Muhammad in 623-630 A.D. was the same
as that used by Peisal and Lawrence in
1916-18. In the First World War, the Turks
maintained large garrisons in Mecca and
Medina, which depended for their maintenance
not on camel caravans but on the railway
from Medina to Damascus. The Amir Peisal
and T.E. Lawrence placed themselves north
of Medina where they were in a position
to cut this lifeline to Syria."
Glubb, Conquests, pp.60-1.
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at different places for the purpose of plundering the caravans
because of shortage of men and provisions the Prophet, therefore,
needed information from Mecca about the exact time of departure
of the caravans and their projected timetables in order to
send raiding parties at specific times and places. Luckily
he was in a position to obtain information from Mecca through
the sources mentioned above.
On the basis of the information received from Mecca the
Prophet, in the early period of his career at Medina,
despatched several expeditions, some of which were led by
himself, to intercept the Meccan caravans. Almost all of these
expeditions failed due to the leakage of the news of the
(2)
despatches through Meccan associates in Medina. To counter
this problem the Prophet gave sealed instructions in the
beginning of 624 A.D. to an expedition leader, 'Abdallah b.
Jahsh, with the order not to read them until after two days'
(3)
journey to the east by the Najd road. When the letter was
(4)
opened it contained instructions to proceed to Nakhla on
the road from al-Ta'if to Mecca and there to lie in wait for a
1. See above, pp.101-3.
2. Watt, Medina. p.6.
3. See above p. 19 where this expedition is mentioned in
brief.
4. A night's journey from Mecca. Bakri, IV, p.1304.
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Meccan caravan.The party acted as directed and met a
caravan at Nakhla. They put the caravan off their guard by
posing as pilgrims and at a suitable opportunity they attacked
the caravan and captured all the merchandise.
Thus the event, which is said to have taken place in Rajab
(2) -
in 2 A.H. ' is related by Waqidi and as presented above it
appears that the party was sent to intercept a Meccan caravan.
The success of this mission shows that the Prophet received
correct information about the departure of a Meccan caravan by
an unusual route so far from his own territory through his
espionage system. Then he managed to prevent the Meccan
espionage system from discovering what he was about, first by
giving 'Abdallah sealed orders and then sending the party to
the east while the goal lay south. These were his counter-
(3)
intelligence measures.
1. Waqidi, I, pp. 13-14. On the basis of this storytell
suggests that Muhammad was able to write because,
"The secrecy with which the expedition was
despatched makes it doubtful whether he
would entrust anyone with the writing of
the letter."
Introduction to the Qur'an (Edinburgh, 1953), p.19.
2. "Chronology", p.247.
3. Watt, Medina, p.6. Aslam Siddlql, 0£. cit. , p.386; Imtiaz
Ahmad, "The Significance of Sunnah and Hadlth and Their
Early Documentation", unpublished Ph.D. Thesis (Edinburgh,
1974), p.334. Here is another measure adopted by the
Prophet to prevent the leakage of the news of his activities
and it was to send instructions to the party leaders, while
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Ibn Hisham,^^ Tabari,^^ Kindx,^"^ and Ahmad1 ^^ supported
- (5)
by Sulayman's statement quoted by Waqidi, give another
version of this event. According to these sources, 'Abdallah's
party was sent originally for spying against the ffieccans but
they indulged in fighting without prior permission of the Prophet.
Although western scholars like Margoliouth, Tor Andrae^^
(8)
and Watt do not agree with these sources in this matter
this version is also significant for the sake of the present
study. It shows that the Prophet sent out a party of spies to
patrol in the territory neighbouring Mecca to procure information
about the Meccans and managed to keep the mission and
they were on their way to some destination. It is stated
that the Prophet wrote to Suhayl b. 'Amr, who was on his
way to Mecca,
"If this letter of mine reaches you during
the night, do not wait for the morning;
if it arrives during the day, do not wait
till evening (to carry out its orders)."
Isaba. I, p.21; Imtiaz, ££_. cit. , p.334.
1 . I, p.366.
2. II, p.411; Taf., II, p.195.
3. The Apology of el-Kindi (London, 1885), p.78.
4. 'All b. Husayn, Makatib al-Rasul (Beirut, n.d.), p.605.
5. I, p . 1 6.
6. Ojd. cit. , pp.244-45.
7. Mohammed: the Man and his Faith, trans. T. Kenzel (London,
1936), pp.197-8.
8. Medina , p.7.
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destination of the party a secret. The spies, however, do not
seem to have been experienced in intelligence trade because
although they posed as pilgrims to perform their duties, a
suitable measure to deceive the enemy, they could not resist
the temptation to plunder the caravan, setting aside their
original mission.
Battle of Badr
The next important event in the field of our study is the
(1)
battle of Badr which took place in Ramadan 2 A.H. it is
stated that the Prophet received intelligence from Mecca that
(2)
a large caravan had been despatched to Syria. The Prophet
(3)
tried to intercept it but failed to do so. Then he decided
to attack it on its homeward journey and summoned his
companions for this purpose. Abu Sufyin, the leader of the
caravan, realised the danger of a possible attack and is said
to have sent Damdam b. 'Amr to Mecca with a request to despatch
(4) - (5)
a rescue force because according to I. Hisham ' he himself
1. I. Hisham, I, pp.373, 381; I. Sa'd, II, p.19; Watt,
Medina, p. 12; "Chronology", p.24.
2. Waqidl, I, pp.13-14; I. Sa'd, II, p.10.
3. Ibid. , II, p.10
4. I. Hisham, I, pp.369-70; Waqidi, I, p.28; I. Sa'd, II,
p.10; Tabarl, II, pp.421-2.
5. I. Hisham, I, p.369.
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had thirty or forty and according to Tabari^ ^ seventy men to
guard the caravan. Damdam reached Mecca in due time and the
Quraysh set out to defend their caravan with a force of 950
(2)soldiers.
The Prophet was unaware of these developments and was
determined to intercept the caravan. Ten nights before leaving
Medina for this purpose he sent Talha b. 'Ubaydallah and Sa'id
b. Zayd to reconnoitre the proposed route of the caravan which
(3)
was coming back to Mecca from Syria. These spies are said
to have travelled to Nakhbar, a place near the sea-shore,
where they stayed with Kashad al-Juhani, a local Bedouin,
waiting for the arrival of the caravan. When it arrived they
saw the whole caravan and even heard some of the caravaners
asking Kashad if he had seen any of the spies of Muhammad and
Kashad answering them in the negative. When the caravan
passed the spies spent the night with Kashad and the next day
they started their journey back to Medina. The Prophet, in
the meantime, had left for Badr and when the spies set out for
Badr to meet him there he was on his way back to Medina after
1. II, p.421.
2. Waqidi, I, p.39; Tabari, II, p.423.
3. Waqidi, I, p.19; I. Sa'd, II, pp.11-12; I. Khayyat, p.23;
Irshad, VI, p.248; Tabari, II, p.478; Tanblh, (L), p.239;
Isti1ab , II, p.220; I. Jawzi, I, p.130; Maqrizi, pp.61-2.
See also pp.35-6 above where this event has been
described in brief.
the battle with the Meccan force so that they met him at
Turban^ ^ (18 miles from Medina on the road to Mecca).
There were serious consequences of this delay.
Muhammad's original plan did not include a battle with the
Quraysh. He was interested only in intercepting a slow moving
and ill-guarded caravan. Before the news of his attack on the
caravan reached Mecca he hoped to be back in Medina distributing
the booty. He might have achieved his goal without a battle if
his intelligence mission had worked properly. His spies
obtained the necessary information but failed to convey it to
him at the proper time. The Prophet had left Medina on the
(3)
8th of Ramadan and the battle was fought on the 17th of this
•
- (4)
month according to Ibn Hisham and even later according to
-(5)
Waqidi which means that these spies were sent out at least
nineteen days before the battle took place. They are said to
have reached Nakhbar in Hawra'. Waqidi says that a place called
Dhu'l Marwa (on the route to Hawra') was at a distance of
8 burd^ ^ from Medina, a distance of 96 miles. Prom
- (8)
Dhu'l Marwa^ Hawra' was two nights' journey according to the
1. Waqidi, I, pp.19-20; Tabari, II, p.478.
2. Bakri, I, p.308. Kasnad was rewarded by the Prophet for
his assistance in this espionage mission. Waqidi, I, p.20.
3. I. Hisham, I, p.373.
4. Ibid., I, p.381.
5. Waqidi, I, p.51 .
6. Ibid. , p.101 .
7. Because a distance of twelve miles is termed burd. Lane,
p.185.
8. Waqidi, I, p.101.
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same source, a distance of about 40 miles^1^ which makes the
total distance from Medina to Hawra' about 136 miles one way
and 272 miles return.
Now the journey of the hijra of the Prophet from Mecca
(2)
to Medina, a distance of 200 to 300 miles, is said to have
(3)
been accomplished in seven to ten days in spite of the fact
that it was undertaken by a devious route which naturally had
made the journey longer than it really was. It means that a
journey of 272 miles could be accomplished in seven to ten
days. Moreover, at a latter stage when al-'Abbas sent a
messenger to the Prophet to inform him about the preparations
of the Quraysh for the battle of Uhud he is said to have asked
(4)
the messenger to reach Medina in three days' time.
Although it is not mentioned that the messenger arrived in that
time, it indicates the possibility of accomplishing this
1. See Samhudl, II, p.314 where a distance of 41 miles is
described as two nights' journey.
2. According to Gibb , ££_. cit. . p. 18, the distance
between Mecca and Medina was 200 miles. According to JE
this distance was 250 miles. VIII, p.422. According to
Lewis this distance was 280 miles. 0d_. cit. , p.40. But
according to Hafiz Wahba_,Medina is 300 miles from Mecca, ten
days' journey by camel. Jazlrat al-'Arab (Cairo ,1935) p.19.
3. Dermenghem, o_o. cit .,p. 152; W.M.Watt, Muhammad: Prophet and
Statesman (Oxford, 1978), pp.90-1; Rodinson, op.cit.,p.145.
4. Waqidi, I, pp.203-4.
journey in three days. Perhaps this is the reason behind the
statement of Joseph Hell that "Yathrib was four days' journey
north of Mecca".It means that a journey of 272 miles
could be completed in four or five days' time in case of
emergency. Giving the allowance of a couple of days to the
spies for their stay to gather intelligence of the caravan
their absence from Medina should not have exceeded seven days.
But Talha and Sa'xd failed to return even in ten days' time
• •
which spoiled Muhammad's original plan.
Moreover, it is stated that Talha and Sa'id saw the
• •
caravan passing on its journey to Mecca from their hiding
place at Nakhbar. It is interesting to note that a slow moving
caravan reached Badr (far ahead of Medina) but these spies who
were expected to be faster than the caravan could not reach
Medina in the same period of time and when at last they reached
Medina the caravan was apparently in the neighbourhood of
Mecca.
The Prophet, however, had his own idea of the situation.
According to his assessment, the caravan, at the end of the
first week of Ramadan, was passing through the territory
between Medina and Badr. He,therefore, set out towards Badr
to intercept it instead of going out in the opposite direction,
towards Syria, in which he had sent out Talha and Sa'Id.
When he was on his way to Badr the Prophet sent two other
1. J. Hell, The Arab Civilization, trans. S.K. Buksh
(Cambridge, 1926), p.20.
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spies, the earlier mentioned *AdI and Basbas, towards Badr
in search of the news of the caravan^^ and he himself followed
them. The activities of these spies have been mentioned
(2)
earlier. Glubb writes that when the Prophet was waiting
for the report of these scouts he was at a distance of some
twenty-five miles north-east of Badr and Abu Sufyan and his
caravan were at about the same distance north-west of Badr
and were moving towards the Prophet with the intention of
watering at Badr. If both parties would continue to move as
they were then moving, the Prophet would have encountered the
(3)
Meccan caravan at Badr the following day. But his spies
deprived him of this opportunity, the details of which are
as follows.
It seems that the Prophet had instructed them on their
departure to come back as soon as possible. So they did not
bother to see the caravans with their own eyes. Instead,
1. 'Urwa, p.131 ; I. Hisham, I, p.374; WaqidI, I, p.22;
I. Sa'd, II, pp.12-13; I. Xhayyat, p.23; Ibn Habib,
Kitab al-Muhabbar (Hyderabad Deccan, 1942), p.285;
Tabarl, II, p.433; Aghinl. IV, p.176; Istl'ab, I, pp.180-1,
III, p.140; Ibn Qudama, Istibsar, ed. A.Y. Nawihid (n.p.,
1971), p.63; I. Khaldun, 11(2), p.19; Isaba. I, pp.147,
179; al-Zarqanl, ojd. cit. , I, p.411; Iqtibis, p.168.
2. See above, pp. 15, 29-30.
3. Glubb, Conquests. p.62.
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they came back as soon as they got wind of the caravan.^1^ But
1.. If we compare the accounts of this mission given by I.
Hisham and Waqidi we find some differences between them
regarding the time and place of the despatch of this mission
and the place where they reported back to the Prophet.
Before this discussion it seems appropriate to have a
look at the route of the Prophet to Badr, given by I.
Hisham and the distances between the places en route from
BakrI's Mu' ,jam which are as follows:
Medina to al-'Aqlq to Dhu'1-Hulayfa (6 or 7 miles
from Medina. Bakri, III, p.954) to Ulat al-Jaysh to
Turban (18 miles from Medina. Bakri, I, p.308) to Malal
(16 miles from Dhu'1-Hulayfa or about 22 miles from
Medina. Bakri, III, p.954) to Ghamis al-Hamam to
Sukhayrat al-Yaman to Sayala (7 miles from Malal or about
29 miles from Medina. Bakri, III, p.954) then by the
ravine of al-Rawha' (11 miles from Sayala or about 40
miles from Medina. Bakri, III, p.954) to Shanuka to 'irq
al-Zabya (according to al-Waqidi, I, p.40, 2 miles away
from al-Rawha') to Sajsaj to al-Munsaraf to al-Naziya to
a wadi named Ruhqan to al-Safra' (36 miles from al-Rawha'
• • •
or 76 miles from Medina and 20 miles away from Badr.
Bakri, III, p.954) to Dhafiran to Asafir to al-Dabba and
• •
then to Badr. I. Hisham, I, pp.374-5.
Waqidi says that Basbas and 'Adi were sent out when
the Prophet was at Buyut al-Suqya', a place described by
himself as the suburbs of Medina, on 12th Ramadan. They
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this mission proved to he a failure because the spies did not
went as far as Badr and reported back to the Prophet when
the latter was at {Irq al-Zabya where he was on 14th of
Ramadan. Waqidi, I, pp.40, 46. It means that these spies
covered about 95 miles distance to reach Badr and then
58 miles from Badr to 'irq al-Zabya, a total of 153 miles
in two days. It seems a difficult task for seventh
century Arab spies who had only camels at their disposal
because there were only two horses with the Prophet's army
during this expedition (see Waqidi, I, p.27; Ibn Qayyim,
op. cit.. II, p.85; Kanz, X, p.266) and those certainly
were not at the disposal of these spies. Therefore, it
is hard to believe the account of WiqidI in this regard.
I. Hisham (I, p.374) says that these spies were sent
out when the Prophet was near al-Safra' and he does not
mention the place where they reported back. If the
Prophet had been waiting for them at al-Safra' it means
that they had to accomplish only 40 miles to and from
Badr, a distance which may have taken only two nights or
even less than that.
This comparison shows that although Waqidi's account
is not impossible in view of the advice of al-'Abbls
to his messenger, mentioned earlier, I. Hisham's account
seems more plausible.
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care to remove the signs of their visit to that particular hill
Abu Sufyan benefitted from their mistake. It is stated that
when he went forward to be in the front of the caravan as a
precautionary measure and came to the watering place he asked
Majdi if he had noticed anything strange. Majdi replied that
he had seen nothing of that sort except two riders who stopped
on the hill and took water away in a skin. Then Abu Sufyan
came to the spot where the riders had halted. He picked up
some camel dung and broke it into pieces and found that it
contained date stones. 'By God', he said, 'This is the fodder
of Yathrib and those riders were certainly Muhammad's spies.
I am sure that Muhammad and his companions are very near.'
He then returned to his caravan and changed its direction from
(1)
the road to the sea-shore leaving Badr on the left. If
'Adx and Basbas had removed the traces of their visit from the
place then Abu Sufyan could have been kept in the dark' and
the Prophet would have been able to attack the caravan success¬
fully with the help of the information achieved by these spies.
By the help of his watchfulness Abu Sufyan had a narrow
escape. When he felt himself out of danger he sent a message
to the advancing Meccan force to return to Mecca. Abu Jahl,
one of the leaders of the force, refused to go back and
1. 'Urwa, p.132; I. Hishirn, I, p.377; Waqidl, I, p. 41;
I. Sa'd, II, p.13; Tabari, II, pp.437-8; Aghanl. IV, p.181
I. Xhaldun 11(2), p.20.
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insisted on going up to Badr to make a show of strength.^1 ^
The Prophet who appears to have been at al-Safra' (20 miles
from Badr) at this time was still unaware of the advancing
Meccan force and was looking for an opportunity to plunder the
caravan. When he moved forward and reached Dhafiran he learnt
that the Meccan force had come out to rescue their caravan.
The Prophet, then, consulted about the new situation with his
(2)
companions, proceeded onwards and stopped near Badr.
Because of the failure of the previous missions in the
intelligence game and because there was no more time left to
examine the capabilities of anyone else, Muhammad himself
accompanied by one of his companions set out on a spying
mission. He met an old Bedouin named Sufyan al-Damrx who did
not know who he was. He, the Prophet, inquired about the
Quraysh as well as Muhammad and his companions. The old man
said, "I won't tell you until you tell me to which party you
belong." The Prophet said, "If you tell us we will tell you."
The old man said, "Tit for tat?" "Yes" the Prophet replied.
The old man said, "I have heard that Muhammad and his
companions went out on such-and-such a day. If this is true,
today they are in such-and-such a place'* referring to the
place in which the Prophet's companions actually were, "and
I have heard that the Quraysh went out on such-and-such a day,
1. I. Sa'd, II, p. 13; Tabarx, II, p.438.
2. I. Hisham, I, pp. 374-5; V/aqidI, I, pp. 48-9; I. Sa'd, II,
p.14; Tabarx, II, p.434; Aghanx, IV, p.177.
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and if this is true, today they are in such-and-such a place',
meaning the one in which they actually were." 'Alien he had
finished he said, "Of whom are you?" The Prophet said, "We
are from ma'." Then he left him while the old man was saying,
"What does from ma' mean? Is it from the water of 'Iraq?" ^^^
In this way the Prophet received exact information about the
projected route of the Meccan force without disclosing his own
identity.
Then the Prophet returned to his camp and at night he
sent another party composed of 'All, Zubayr, Sa'd b. Abl Waqqas
and Basbas towards the well of Badr in search of news, as
(2)
mentioned earlier. The party came across the water carriers
of the Quraysh and captured two of them whom they brought to
the camp for interrogation. The captives told the interrogators
that they belonged to the Meccan force, an answer to which they
did not want to listen because they were still hoping to
plunder the caravan, so they beat them. After having harsh
1. I. Hisham, I, pp.375-6; Waqidi, I, p.50; Tabarl, II,
pp.435-6;Ibn Qutayba, 'Uyun al-Akhbar (Cairo, 1925), p.194;
Maarlzi, p.76. Al-Ibshihl tells us that the Prophet had
referred to these Qur'anic verses,
"Let a man consider, therefore, of what he
is created. He is created of seed poured
forth ( JJjl j yL, ) issuing from the
loins, and the breast bones." LX2XVT:5-7
(G. Sale, The Koran (London, n.d.), p.577). Al-Mustatraf
(Cairo, n.d.), I, p.62.
2. See above, p. 37.
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punishment, the captives said, "Yes, we belong to Abu Sufyan".
At this moment the Prophet appeared on the scene and cross-
questioned the captives. He realised that they were speaking
the truth when they said that they belonged to the Meccan
force. He then asked them about the Meccan numbers but they
did not know. Then he asked them how many animals they
slaughtered every day and when they said nine or ten, the Prophet
concluded that the Meccans were between nine hundred and a
thousand. Then he asked how many nobles of the Quraysh were
with the force and the captives named some of them. On further
interrogation they disclosed the location of the Meccan army
and announced that they were beyond the farthest hill which
could be seen in the distance which meant that they were several
(1)miles away.
This mission was partly a failure and partly a success.
The spying party had let some of the water carriers go back to
the Quraysh who told them about the presence of the Prophet
nearby and it was the first news which the Quraysh received
(2)
about the Prophet. The party should either have not
attacked the water carriers or they should have captured all
of them to prevent them from taking the news to the Quraysh.
1. I. Hisham, I, p. 376; WaqidI, I, pp.51-3; I. Sa'd, II, p.15;
Musnad, II, p.193; Muslim, III, p.159; Tabarl, II, pp.422,
436-7; Aghanl, IV, pp.179-181; Ibn Qayyim, 0£. cit. , II,
p.86; ffiaqrizi, p.77; Haykal, p.221; Iqtibas, p.168.
2. Waqidl, I, p.51 .
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If they had acted wisely the Prophet would have been in a
position to attack the Meccan force by surprise and could have
achieved the booty without any losses which he later suffered
in the battle. The bright side of this mission is that the
Prophet managed to obtain definite news about the strength and
the location of the enemy before they had much news about him
because the water carriers, who had managed to escape, could
have told the Keccans only about his presence nearby without
giving any hint of the exact location ana the strength. This
situation gave the Prophet a tactical advantage.
The Prophet, however, was not satisfied with the
information achieved through this interrogation. He may have
feared that the captives had not told him everything truthfully
for fear of further punishment. He, therefore, sent 'Ammar b.
Yasar and Ibn Mas'ud towards the enemy in search of news.
They took a round of the enemy camp by night and came back with
the report that the enemy was so frightened and alarmed that
if a horse neighed he was punished and constant rain had
(1)
increased their miseries.
When the Prophet became sure that the enemy was nearby
and a combat with them was not far away, he adopted the
strategy suggested by al-Hubab b. al-Mundhir to move to the
water nearest to the enemy, build a cistern and block all the
wells beyond it so that his force would have plenty of water
1. Waqidi, I, p.54.
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and the enemy would have nothing to drink.This strategy
worked and the next morning when the enemy crossed the hill,
they found themselves confronted with the Prophet's force who
had left nothing for them to drink. The desert soon dried
their throats and they started to struggle for even drops of
(2)
water. For how long could such a force fight? The result
of the battle lies in the answer to this question. As the
details of the battle of Badr are well known and are not
within the scope of this study, we move on therefore to some
concluding remarks.
In the sequence of events which culminated in the battle
of Badr, Muhammad seems therefore to have been well aware of
the importance of intelligence. He knew that with the help
of intelligence certain goals could be reached without
resorting to war and without much cost. On the other hand,
1. I. Hisham, I, p.378; WaqidI, I, p. 53; AghanI, IV, pp.183-4;
I. Khaldun, 11(2), p.20; Maqrlzl, pp.77-8; Abu Zahra,
Khatam al-Nabiyyin, (Doha, Qatar, 1400 A.H.), II, p.82.
To procure such information is a part of intelligence
work. See EB, XII, p.347 where geographic intelligence
is discussed in these words,
"Geographic intelligence, the comprehensive
term for land, sea and air data required
for military plans and operations, includes
several sub divisions of major importance,
such as topographic, hydrographic, weather
and meteriological intelligence."
2. I. Hisham, I, p.379; WaqidI, I, p. 61; al-Zarqanl, o£. cit.,
■ pp.414-5.
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most of the spies sent out by him did not perform their task
satisfactorily. Had the first two missions worked properly
Muhammad might have captured the whole caravan. At a later
stagejhad the third mission worked properly he might have taken
the Meccan force by surprise and captured the booty without
the losses which he suffered in the battle. In the subsequent
outcome of the unsuccessful attempts of the first two missions
Muhammad did not rely solely on his agents, but he himself
acted as a spy. Moreover he was not content with an interrogation
of the captives made by his companions but he himself took part
in it and managed to obtain accurate information about his
enemy which he verified by another mission. Then he adopted
a strategy which determined the result of the battle before
it actually started.
Between Badr and Uhud
■ —«
For the Quraysh the result of the battle of Badr was to
'say farewell to the streams of Damascus' as the Prophet's court
poet described 'because the road that way was barredAs
the water fetched from those streams was shared by the Bedouin
1. Hassan, Piwan, ed.. H. Hirschfeld (leyden, 1910), p.19;
I. Hisham, II, p.58. Moreover Hassan told the Meccans that,
"If they take the road to the valley over
the back of the sand dunes (as an alternative
route), then tell them: 'There is no road
that way.'"
uJ
j ! yi I Js L*_«J I * I L5 I jJs La_i ^ j J L> ais |» LkJ I I j
uJJ J I J LaJ SJ i—s Li J_oj ul j i.-Jr j-il u I
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Arab tribes en route^^ because of the arrangement called
- - (2)
ilaf, mentioned earlier, the blockade of the route to
Syria meant economic disaster for these tribes too. To avert
this disaster they decided to strike against Medina immediately
after the battle of Badr and the Banu Sulaym and the Banu
Ghatafan took the lead. A hostile gathering of theirs at
(3)
al-Kudr was reported to the Prophet who set out to disperse
(4)
it. When he reached the spot he found it deserted but
came across a man named Yasar who told him that the enemy had
gone to higher places. The Prophe t ^therefore^, returned to
(5)
Medina after a short stay without fighting.
1. M.A.Shaman. Islamic History (Cambridge, 1971), I, p. 8.
2. See above pp.49-51. Belyaev, however, states that the Bedouin
Arab tribes benefitted from the Meccan trade in another
way too when he says that,
"The camels, their drivers and the hands for
loading were recruited amongst the Bedouins
of the neighbourhood."
Arabs, Islam and the Arab Caliphate, trans. A. Courevitch
(London, 1969), p.89.
3. About 8 burds distance from Medina near a mine of the
Banu Sulaym. Tanbih (L), p.243.
4. According to I. Hisham, II, p.54. this expedition took
place in Shawwal 2 A.H. and according to Waqidi, I, p.182
it took place in al-Muharram 3 A.H. See also "Chronology",
p.222 where the latter date is accepted as correct.
5. I. Hisham, II, p.54; Waqidi, I, pp.182-3; I. Sa'd, II, p.31;
Tabarl, II, p.482; KaqrizI, p.107.
- 135 -
It was not very long before another gathering with aggressive
designs, this time the Banu Tha'laba and the Banu Maharib, both
branches of the Banu Ghatafan, was reported to the Prophet at Dhu
Amarr^1^ in Najd. The Prophet set out to disperse it before the
enemy could start its march to attack Medina. While on his way the
Prophet met an enemy tribesman named Jabbar who warned him that should
the enemy hear of his advance they would run away. The Prophet is
said to have kept on marching but the enemy soon heard of his approach
and retreated to the mountains. The Prophet then returned to Medina
(2)
after a short stay at Dhu Amarr without fighting.
After a short stay at Medina the Prophet once again set out to
break up a hostile gathering of the Banu Sulaym which was reported
to have taken place at Bahran, a place near the previously mentioned
(3)
mine of the Banu Sulaym. When the Prophet reached Layla, a day's
distance from Bahran, he met a tribesman of the Banu Sulaym who told
him on questioning that the enemy had disappeared. The Prophet,
(4)
however, reached Bahran and then returned to Medina without fighting.
1. Three stations distance from Medina. Samhudl, II, p.249.
2. I. Hisham, II, pp. 55-6; Waqidl, I, pp.193-5; I. Sa'd, II,
PP.34-5; Tabarl, II, p.487; Isaba, I, p.220; Maqrizx,
pp.110-1. According to I. Hisham, II, p.56, this expedition
took place in Safar 3 A.H. and according to Waqidl, I, p.193,
it took place in Rabi* al-Awwal 3 A.H.
3. Tanbih, (L), p.244.
4. I. Hisham, II, p.56; Waqidl, I, pp.196-7. According to
Waqidl this expedition took place in Jamada'1-Ula 3 A.H. ,
but according to I. Hisham it took place a month earlier in
Rablr al-Akhir.
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These three expeditions are alike in their nature. The
Prophet received information, set out to disperse the gathering,
met an enemy tribesman to answer his questions and returned to
Medina without fighting because the enemy had disappeared into
the mountains. By a minute examination of these events one of
two assumptions may be made. Firstly, there was no gathering
of the enemy at all. The Prophet by his own calculations had
concluded that such-and-such tribes might think of invading
Medina because of the danger posed to their economy by the
blockade of the caravan route to Syria. So he thought it
proper to frighten the enemy by a show of strength instead of
waiting for a possible attack on Medina.
Alternatively it is possible that an actual gathering
of the enemy did take place. In such a situation the
intelligence system of the Prophet against the tribes of Najd
must have been very effective because he received the news of
the preparations of the above mentioned Bedouin tribes so early
that he was able to go out to attack before the enemy could
start their march towards Medina. Moreover,it is interesting
to note that the enemy had its own sources of information on
the activities of the Prophet and as soon as the above tribes
(1)
heard of his march against them they disappeared.
1. Although it is not specifically mentioned in the context
of these events, WaqidI and I. Sa'd record that in 7 A.K.
when the Prophet sent an expedition against the 3anu
Sulaym there was a spy of this tribe among the raiding
party. The spy deserted the party as soon as it left Medina
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As for the Quraysh during this period, they made a raid
on the outskirts of Medina some ten weeks after the battle of
Badr in Dhu'l-Hijja 2 A.H. (624 A.D.) under the command of Abu
«
Sufyan. His control of news must have been very effective
because he reached the suburbs of Medina, met Sallam b. Mishkam,
a leader of a Jewish tribe, the Banu al-Nadir, who fed him with
the secret information about the Muslims, attacked the out¬
skirts of Medina and the Prophet only came to know about this
raid when he, Abu Sufyan, was on his way back to Mecca.
But in spite of this successful attempt to boost the
morale of the Meccans, no one among them was prepared to send
a caravan to Syria by the coastal route for fear of plundering
by the Prophet. At the same time they were worried about
their trade which needed speedy measures to avert disaster.
and took the news of the forthcoming raid to the Banu
Sulaym. Waqidi, II, p.741; I. Sa'd, II, p.123.
1. I. Hisham, II, pp.54-5; Waqidi, I, pp.181-2; I. Sa'd, II,
p.30; Tabari, II, pp.483-5; JE, VIII, p.423; "Chronology",
p.261. Aslam Siddlql comments on this raid of Abu Sufyan
in these words,
"Abu Sufyan took such measures that the
efficient intelligence service, which the
Prophet had at the time of the Nakhla raid
completely broke down. He could also gather
intelligence about the Muslims from inside
Medina. He established contacts with the
Jewish chief whom he could describe as an
'ally' and also promised him 'booty'. All
this happened right in Medina, the Prophet's
city. Something had obviously gone wrong."
op . cit. , p.390.
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Luckily they found a man, Furat b. Hayyan, who knew another
route to Syria, which passed through 'Iraq. Therefore, they
sent a caravan under his guidance. The news of the despatch
of this caravan reached the Prophet through Nu'aym b. Mas'ud
of the Banu Ash.ja' . He was at Mecca at the time of the
departure of the caravan. Then he came to Medina to visit his
Jewish friends. He disclosed this news whilst drunk at a
party held in the house of a Jew named Kinana b. Abi'1-Huqayq.
Another participant of the party was a Muslim, Sulayt b. Aslam
by name, who took' the news to the Prophet. Zayd was sent out
immediately to attack the caravan who fell suddenly on the
(1)
caravan and captured the whole merchandise.
This expedition is remarkable for its intelligence
aspects. The Quraysh must have tried to keep the news of the
despatch of their caravan a secret from their enemies but
Nu'aym was their friend, he belonged to the Banu Ashja' of the
Banu Ghatafan who were allied to them, so he shared this
secret. But he could not keep his mouth shut whilst drunk at
(2)
Medina. Sulayt, who used to attend such parties happened
to be present in Kinana's house. The latter did not suspect
him of being a spy of Muhammad but he might have been attending
such parties on Muhammad's advice to keep him informed of what
was going on in Jewish quarters. In this way, Muhammad
succeeded in obtaining information about the caravan. He then
1. Waqidx, I, pp.197-8; Maqrizx, p.112.
2. Waqidx, I, p.198.
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managed, to keep Zayd' s expedition a secret so that none of his
enemy's agents could tell the Quraysh to protect their caravan.
Battle of Uhud
The coastal route to Syria had already become dangerous
for the Quraysh and the attack of Zayd on their caravan
despatched by the eastern route, a route about which they had
(1)
thought the Prophet and his companions knew nothing, brought
their trade to a standstill. Therefore they decided on an
all-out attack on Medina to put an end to Muhammad and his
companions once and for all. After large scale preparations
they set out towards Medina with an army of 3,000 men including
two hundred cavalry.
The Prophet received the news of their march through
different sources. First of all, al-'Abbas wrote a letter to
the Prophet containing the news of the march. It enclosed
detailed information about the equipment and number of the
soldiers. He gave this letter to a man from the Banu Ghifar
and asked him to deliver it to the Prophet in three days. The
messenger reached Medina and found that the Prophet was at
Quba. He proceeded there and delivered the letter to the
Prophet. Ubayy b. Ka'b read the letter for him and was advised
to keep the contents secret. Then the Prophet went to the
house of Sa'd b. al-Rabi' and discussed the matter in secrecy
but the latter's wife overheard the discussion and the matter
1. Waqidi, I, p.198.
(1)
could no longer remain secret.
The Prophet also received intelligence about the march of
the Meccan army through 'Amr b. Salim of the Banu Khuza'a. He
left Mecca and passed by the Quraysh when they were at Dhu
Tuwa, a valley in the suburbs of Mecca, and he then reached
Medina. He told the Prophet about the invading Meccan force.
On his return journey he found the Quraysh at Batn Rabigh,
some nights' distance from Medina. Abu Sufyan felt sure that
he was coming from Medina after informing the Prophet about
their march which spoiled the chance of a surprise attack on
(2)
Medina.
To verify the information received through the above
sources the Prophet sent out two spies named Anas and Munis,
sons of Fadala, in the direction of Mecca. They found the
_(3)
Meccan army in the valley of al-*Aqiq and reconnoitred their
1. Waqidi, I, pp'.203-4; I. Sa'd, II, p.37; al-Baladhuri,
Ansab. ed. A.A. Duri (Beirut, 1398 A.H.), III, p.3;
Maqrizi, p.114; al-Zarqanl, op. cit. . II, p.21; m.
Hamxdullah, V/atha'iq (Beirut, 1969), p.50; Haykal,
pp.254-5; Hasan, I, p.111; Iqtibas. p.168.
2. Waqidi, I, p.205; Maqrlzl, p.114.
3. According to SamhudI, II, p.189 , two valleys were called
al-'Aqlq, one near Medina and the other in the
territory of the Banu Muzayna. He mentions different
views on the distance from Medina which is given as either
2, 3, 6 or 7 miles from Medina.
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movements. When the army reached the suburbs of Medina they
(1)
returned to the Prophet and told him what they had seen.
In the meantime the Prophet received information about
the numbers and the equipment of the enemy force through Aws
b. Ha,jar al-Aslaml who sent his slave Mas'ud from 'Araj, 78
miles from Medina, to the Prophet with the news/^
Then the Prophet sent another spy, perhaps to verify
the estimates of the strength of the enemy received through
some of the previous sources, and advised him to keep his
information secret upon his return. This spy was al-Hubab b.
al-Mundhir who managed to enter the enemy camp and found out
that there were nearly 3,000 soldiers and about 200 horses.
He also found out that the Quraysh had brought some of their
women with them who were singing songs of vengeance. Al-Hubab
(4)
came back and reported to the Prophet.
1. WaqidI, I, pp.206-7; I. Sa'd, II, p.37; Ibn Hablb,
Kitab al-Muhabbar (Hyderabad Deccan, 1361 A.H.), p.286;
Isaba, I, pp.70-1; Maqrlzl, p.115.
2. SamhudI, II, p.343.
3. I. Sa'd, IV, p.310.
It is stated that when the Prophet was on his way to Medina
from Mecca during the hijra the above mentioned Aws met
the Prophet when the latter was in his territory. He is
also said to have sent his above mentioned slave, Mas'ud,
with the Prophet as a guide and escort during the rest of
his journey to Medina. Isaba, I, p.86; I. Sa'd, IV, p.311.
4. WaqidI, I, pp.207-8; I. Sa'd, II, p.37; Maqrlzl, p.115.
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When considering all these activities before the battle
of Uhud, it is clear that the intelligence methods of the
Prophet were working very satisfactorily. Al-'Abbas and 'Amr
b. Salim informed him about the forthcoming attack. Aws b.
Hajar also informed him about the Meccan army when it was on
the final stages of its journey. As the intelligence brought
by the secret agents had to be verified by other sources, the
Prophet sent Anas, Munis and al-Hublb for this purpose who
worked quite satisfactorily. In this way the espionage system
of the Prophet ruled out the possibility of a surprise attack
on Medina on the one hand, which might have been disastrous
for the Prophet and on the other it provided an opportunity
to think about the best possible way to fight the enemy. He
availed himself of this opportunity and discussed the matter
with his advisors. Some of them, headed by Ibn Ubayy, advised
him to remain in the city and fight the enemy from within
because if the enemy entered the city, people would fight and
women and children would throw stones on them from the walls.
Some of them, however, headed by Hamza advised him to go out
of the city to fight the Meccans because to remain in the city
(2)
was cowardice. Passions overcame wisdom and the battle was
1. I. Hisham, II, p.66; Waqidl, I, pp.209-10; Tabari, Taf.,
IV, p.44; Ibn Qayyim, o£. cit. , II, p.91; I. Khaldun,
11(2), p.24; al-Zarqanx, op. cit. , II, p. 22; Haykal, p.256;
Hasan, I, p . 111 .
2. Waqidl, I, pp.210—1 1 ; Maqrlzi, p. 116; al-Zarqanl, ojo. cit. ,
II, P.23.
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fought at the foot of mount Uhud, at a three miles' distance
from Medina, ^1 ^ in Shawwal 3 A.H.^^(625 A.D.), which resulted
in a victory of the Quraysh. The Meccans, however, did not
follow up their success by invading defenceless Medina and
left the battlefield on their homeward journey.
Prom the battlefield the Prophet sent 'All to follow
the footsteps of the enemy to see whether they were riding
their camels and leading their horses or riding the horses and
leading the camels. In the former situation he deduced that
they must be going to Mecca but the latter case meant an
advance on Medina. 'All went out on his mission until he saw
the Meccans who were riding their camels and leading their
horses. He then came back to the Prophet with this news.^^
The Prophet then sent Sulayt and Nu'man, sons of Sufyan b. Khalid,
to keep watch on the further movements of the enemy. These
spies never returned because they fell into the hands of the
(4)
enemy at Hamra al-Asad and were killed. The Prophet,
1. Samhudi, II, p.109- According to Dabbagh, Uhud is a
mountain 7 kilometres north of Medina, 1,200 metres above
sea level. Jazirat al-'Arab (Beirut, 1963), I, p.108.
2. "Chronology", p.265.
3. I. Hisham, II, p.86; Tabari, II, pp.527-8; Ibn Qayyim, op.
cit., II, p.108. According to Maqrizi, p.159, it was
Sa'd b. Abi Waqqas who was sent out instead of 'All.
4. Waqidi, I, p. 337; I. Sa'd, II, p. 49; ffiaqrizi", p. 168.
Harnara al-Asad is 8 miles from Medina. Bakri, II, p.4o8;
Samhudi, II, p. 295.
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however, returned to Medina quite relieved and unaware of the
fate of these spies.
In the night of the same day 'Abdallah b. iAmr al-Mazini
came to see the Prophet at Medina and told him that he had seen
the Quraysh at Malal.^^ He had entered their camp and found
(2)
that they were thinking about invading Medina. This
information changed the situation and the Prophet discussed it
with Abu Bakr and 'Umar who advised him to pursue the enemy
(3)
and he decided to do so. He then summoned his companions
to pursue the enemy and reached Hamra al-Asad where Ma'bad
b. Abi Ma'bad of the Banu Khuza'a met him and perhaps at his
- (4)
instigation went towards Mecca. At al-Rawha he met the
Quraysh and told them that Muhammad was coming to fight them
with an unprecedentedly large force and all those Medinans
who did not join him in Uhud were now with him. He gave such
a terrifying account of the Prophet's force that Abu Sufyan
set out for Mecca in a great hurry. Ma'bad, then, sent
another Khuza'i to Hamra al-Asad to tell the Prophet what
had happened. On receiving this information the Prophet came
1. This place is 23 miles from Medina. Bakri, III, p.954.
2. Waqidi, I, p.326.
3. Ibid., I, pp.326-7.
4. A place 41 miles away from flgedina. Bakri, III, p.954.
Samhudi, II, p.314, says that according to Muslim this
place is 36 miles from Medina, according to Ibn Shayba it
is 30 miles from Medina, according to Abu Ghassan a place
called Waraan in al-Rawha> is at a distance of 4 hurds from
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back to Medina^1^ very relieved.
As to the intelligence aspects of this event it has been
mentioned earlier that the intelligence machinery of the
Prophet worked well and saved the Prophet from a surprise
(2)
attack. The result of the battle, however, was dictated
by passions rather than wisdom but intelligence once more came
to the rescue of the Prophet and saved him from total defeat.
Ma'bad, a secret agent of the Prophet, spread information
among the Meccans that the Prophet was pursuing them with an
unprecedentedly large force. This kind of propaganda is,
after all, a part of intelligence work.
Between Uhud and al-Xhandiq
The next event in the Prophet's Medinan career connected
with espionage is the expedition to Qatan, an account of
which is as follows.
Waqidi states that a woman named Zaynab of the Banu Tayy
was married to Tulayb b. 'Umayr, a companion of the Prophet,
and lived at Medina. One of her relatives, named Walid b.
Medina and according to al-Asadi the distance between
al-Rawha' and Medina is 35 or 36 or 42 miles.
1. I. Hisham, II, pp.90-1; Waqidi, I, pp.338-40; I. Khayyat,
p.39; Tabarl, II, pp.535-6; I. Khaldun, 11(2), p.27;
Maqrizi, p.169; Haykal, p.269; Gould, o£. cit., p.104.
2. See above, p. 1 42.
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Zuhayr, came to see her and told her husband that while on his
way to Medina he saw a gathering of the Banu Asad with
aggressive designs against Medina. The news consequently
reached the Prophet who sent Abu Salma to break up the
(1)
gathering which had taken place at Qatan and sent Walid
with him as a guide. They travelled day and night, came near
to Qatan and took the enemy by surprise who ran away leaving
large quantities of booty for the invaders. This event is
(2)
said to have taken place in al-Muharram 4 A.H. about two
•
(3)
months after the battle of Uhud.
As to the intelligence aspects of this event it may be
stated that, as mentioned earlier, one of the sources of
information of the pre-Islamic Arabs about their enemy was
their matrimonial relationships and the Prophet made use of
this source during the present event. Moreover, he planned
and despatched the expedition so secretly that no enemy agent
could get wind of it and consequently the raiding party took
the enemy by complete surprise.
After this successful intelligence operation
1. The name of a mountain in Najd near another mountain
called Payd which belonged to the Banu Tayy. Tanbih (L).
p.245.
2. "Chronology", pp.265-7, 268.
3. Waqidi, I, pp.340-4.
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came the earlier mentioned^^^ event which happened at al-Rajl'
( 3")
In Safar 4 A.H. (625 A.D.) some seven of the Prophet's
companions were overpowered by the Banu Lihyan, a branch of
(4)
the Banu Hudhayl. According to the common interpretation o
the purpose of this expedition, these men were sent out to
instruct 'Adal and al-Qara, branches of the Banu Khuzayma, so
that they should embrace Islam. When these instructors
reached al-Rajl' they were treacherously overpowered by the
Banu Lihyan and all were murdered except two who were taken
prisoners and then sold to the Meccans and were killed later
on.
(5)
There is, however, another version of this event,
1. See above, pp.20, 30.
2. Name of a watering place near Had'a between Mecca and
'Usfan. WaqidI, I, p. 355"; Ibn Qutayba, 'Uyun al-Akhbar
(Cairo, 1925), II, p.40; Bakri, II, p.641. According to
Bidaya, IV, p.62 and Hasan, II, p. 345 al-Rajl' is 8 miles
from 'Usfan towards Mecca while according to SamhudI, II,
p.345 'Usfan is two days' journey from Mecca.
3. WaqidI, I, p.354. According to I. Hisham, II, p. 130, thi
event took place a bit earlier in 3 A.H.
4. I. Hisham, II, p.130; WaqidI, I, pp.354-62; I. Khayyat,
p.39; Tabarl, II, pp.538-42.
5. 'Urwa, p.175; WaqidI, I, p.354; Musnad, XV, pp.57-9;
Irshad. VI, p.312; Abu Da'ud, op. cit. , III, p.69.
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according to which these people were sent out towards Mecca
as spies to get information about the activities of the
Quraysh. When they reached Had'a they stopped for a while to
have their meal and then resumed their journey. Accidentally
some of the Banu Lihyan passed that way and saw the date-stones
left by these spies. They examined these date-stones and
concluded that these were the dates of Yathrib and that some
travellers who belonged to, or had come from, Yathrib had
stopped there. Because the relations between the Banu Lihyan
•
and the Prophet were bad the Banu Lihyan followed
the footsteps and met the Yathribites at al-Rajl' and over¬
powered them because the latter had refused to surrender.^^^
(2)
Muir seems to agree with this version as it is but Watt
goes further and suggests the possibility of these men being
(3)
the spies for Muhammad and instructors for the Arab tribes
which makes them spies in the garments of missionaries.
Watt's suggestion does not seem far-fetched because we have
already seen Mus'ab working as the secret agent of the Prophet
as well as a religious instructor in Medina before the hijra.
The spies, however, do not seem to have been experienced
in the intelligence trade because of the fact that they did not
erase the traces of their visit to Had'a, a mistake made by
1. 'Uyun, II, p.40; Ibn Quaama, al-Istibsar, ed. A.Y. Nawihid
• •
(n.p., 1971), pp.305-6.
2. W.Muir, The Life of Mohammad (Edinburgh, 1912), p. 277.
3. Watt, Medina, p.33.
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*Adi and Basbas before the battle of Badr, and the enemy realised
from the dates that the men were fromYathrib. This mistake proved
to be fatal because they were practically in the lion's den.
The next event of the Prophet's life in the field of
intelligence was his raid on Dhat al-Riqa4 in Najd. News of
the gathering of the Banu Tha'laba and the Banu Anmar of the
Banu Ghatafan hostile towards Medina came to the Prophet through
0
a trader. The Prophet is said to have set out to disperse the
gathering but the enemy ran away as soon as they heard the
(1)
news of his approach leaving large quantities of booty.
Another gathering of the unmentioned Arab tribesmen was
reported to the Prophet which had taken place at Dumat al-
(2)
Jandal. It was also reported that these tribesmen were
plundering the travellers and thinking of a raid on Medina.
The Prophet set out to disperse the gathering and took a
1. Waqidi, I, pp.395-6; I. Sa'd, II, p.61. Ibn Hishlm, II,
p.150 says that this event took place in Jamada '1-Ula
4 A.H. and Waqidi says that it took place in al-Muharram
5 A.H. Jones, however, does not agree with both the sources
and states that this event might have taken place at any
time between 2 A.H. and 7 A.H. "Chronology", pp.270-1.
2. A place at a 13 or 15 nights' distance from Medina and 5
nights' journey short of Damascus. I. Sa'd, II, p.62;
Tanbih (L), p.248, according to Samhudl, II, p.270 Duma is
13 stations' journey from Medina and according to Bakrx, II,
p.565 Duma is the 10th station from Medina, the 10th from
Kufa, the 8th from Damascus and the 12th from Egypt.
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tribesman of the Banu 'Udhra with him as a guide. When the
Prophet reached the vicinity of Duma, the guide, whose name
was Madhkur, advised the Prophet to discontinue his march and
to let him go forward to spy out the whereabouts of the enemy.
The Prophet agreed and Madhkur set out as mentioned earlier.
On the basis of his information the Prophet attacked the herds
and captured them. Then he sent out parties of soldiers to
search for the enemy but could not find anyone except one
person who told him that the enemy gathering was dispersed as
soon as they heard of his attack on their herds. The Prophet,
(2)
then, returned to Medina laden with booty.
As to the intelligence aspects of these two events, we
have to say that the Prophet made use of a source of information,
tradersjin the case of the first event, which had also been
available to'the pre-Islamic Arabs. He could not, however,
keep his expedition secret which implies that the enemy had
either their agents at Medina or on the outskirts of their own
tribal territory. In the case of the second event the Prophet
once again seems to have received information through traders
(or travellers) because at this stage of his career it seems
1. See above, p.1 5.
2. WaqidI, I, pp.402-4; I. Sa'd, II, pp.62-3.
According to Waqidi, I, p.402 and I. Hisham, II, p.155,
this event took place in Rabi' al-Awwal 5 A.H. but Jones
says that it might have taken place at any time during
the first seven months of the year 5 A.H. "Chronology",
p.271.
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unlikely that he had his own agents at Duma, a place far from
Medina. During the journey to Duma, although the Prophet
sought help from espionage, he could not surprise the enemy
probably because inadequate counter-intelligence measures.
After these events let us have a look at a very
successful intelligence operation which is known as the
expedition of the Banu al-Mustaliq.
• •
It is stated that some travellers who had come from the
territory around Mecca brought the news to Medina that a
gathering of the Banu al-Mustaliq^1^ was taking place at
_ (2)
al-Muraysi1 with aggressive designs against Medina. The
Prophet, alarmed by the news, directed Burayda b. al-Kusayb
al-Aslami, one of his companions, to go there and make inquiries
to ascertain the truth of this report and permitted him to say
what he would think appropriate to fulfil his mission. Burayda
is said to have reached the spot and met the enemy whom he
informed of the fact that he along with his tribe was interested
1. The Banu al-Mustaliq were a branch of the Banu Khuza'a
• • •
but their policy towards the Prophet was different from
the majority of the Banu Khuza'a who were friendly to
Muhammad.
2. Near the Red Sea coast north-west of Mecca. Watt, Medina,
p.35. At a distance of one night's journey from a place
called Par' while this latter place was at a distance of
8 burds from Medina. I. Sa'd, II, p.63.
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in joining them to fight Muhammad and had come to make an
alliance for this purpose because he had come to know that the
Banu al-Mustaliq intended to attack Medina. The enemy leader,
• •
Harith b. Abi Dirar, happily agreed to this proposal and
• •
advised Burayda to go and bring his tribe as soon as possible
to join his ranks. Burayda, then, left the place and came to
Medina with the report that the previous report (of the
travellers) was true.
The Prophet, then, set out to disperse this gathering.
When he reached Baq'a'^''^ a suspected traveller fell into the
(2)
hands of his companions, as mentioned earlier. 'Umar
conveyed the information obtained from this spy to the Prophet
and then killed the spy with his permission. The news of
this killing reached the Banu al-Mustaliq and terrified them.
• •
Then the Prophet reached al-Muraysi' where the enemy proved an
easy prey and almost all of them were captured along with
(3)
their herds.
1. 24 miles from Medina. Samhudx, II, p.264.
2.
( See above, p.31.
3. Waqidi, I, pp.404-7; I. Sa'd, II, p.63; Tabarl, II, p.604;
Ibn Qayyim, op. cit., II, pp.112-3; Maqrlzl, pp.195-6.
According to I. Hisham, II, p.199, this event took place
after the siege of Medina in Sha'ban 6 A.H. and according
to Waqidi it took place in Rajab 5 A.H., but Jones puts
it in Sha'ban 5 A.H. "Chronology", p.273.
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This expedition is remarkable for its intelligence
aspects. The Prophet received the news of a hostile gathering
of the enemy through travellers who perhaps belonged to the
Banu Khuza'a. Then the Prophet verified this news through his
spy who seems to have been experienced in intelligence trade_,
because before setting out on his mission he sought permission
from the Prophet to say whatever he liked and then made use
of this permission in a very good manner,pretending to the
enemy that he had come to join them in order to fight Muhammad
and thus won their sympathies and got a chance to know their
plans. The enemy, on the other hand, had its own information
service and although one of their spies fell into the hands
of the Prophet's companions, the fact that news of his killing
reached the enemy indicates that they had some other source
of information also which could not be identified by the
Prophet and his companions.
Battle of al-Khandia
The battle of the trench (al-Khandiq) which took Dlace in
(1) (2)
Shawwal 5 A.H. (627 A.D.) or a month later in Dhu '1-Qa'da
was the most serious attempt to put an end to Muhammad and his
sect made by the Meccans with the help of their allies from
the Bedouin Arab tribes and the Jews. The Meccans had defeated




I. Hisham, II, p.155.
V/aqidi, II, p. 440; "Chronology", p. 274.
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strong and this time they had managed to collect a force
(1)
10,000 strong. They were, therefore, confident that they
would finish off Muhammad once and for all. They might have
achieved their goal if the intelligence service had not come
to the Prophet's rescue. It is stated that as soon as the Meccans
left for Medina some members of the Banu Xhuza'a also set out
towards Medina to inform the Prophet about the forthcoming
— — ( 2)
attack. These Khuza'Is reached Medina in four days and
conveyed the news to the Prophet. In this way they not only
saved the Prophet from a surprise attack but also provided him
with enough time to think over the situation and adopt the
best possible way to defend the city.
The Prophet availed himself of this opportunity and
after discussing the situation with his companions he decided
(3)
to entrench the city. The lay-out of the city was such
that the outer line of the houses was built so compactly
together that for a considerable distance these houses provided
a high stone wall, already a solid defence. It was necessary
on the one hand, however, to connect this barrier with the
rocks which lay on the north-west approach of the city and
on the other hand to carry the barrier round the open and
1. I. Hishlm, II, p.159; Waqidi, II, p.444. See Watt,
Medina, p.36 where he expresses his doubts on this and
appears to suggest that the numbers of this force were
around 8,000.
2. Waqidi, II, p.444; MaqrizI, p.219.
3. I. Hisham, II, p.156; Wlqidi, II, p.445.
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unsheltered quarters to the south and east.^^ The Prophet,
therefore, ordered that a trench should be dug starting from
Madhad^^ up to Ratij^"^ and the job was done by dint of
(4)
tremendous effort and exertion in six days , some time before
the arrival of the enemy forces. In this way the espionage
system of the Prophet spoiled the chances of the. enemy's
taking the city by surprise. Otherwise, they would have been
in a position to wipe out the Muslim force for ever. As one
of their poets said later:
"But for this ditch to which they clung
we should have wiped them all out
But it was there before them, and they,
being afraid of us, skulked behind it."^^
However, when the Meccan army reached Dhu 'l-Hulayfa^^
Abu Sufyan sent Huyayy b. Akhtab, leader of the recently exiled
• •
Medinan Jewish tribe the Banu al-Nadir and now in the camp of
Abu Sufyan, to the Banu Qurayza, the remaining Jewish tribe
1. ffiuir, ojo. cit ♦ , p.307.
2. The name of an utum of the Banu Haram. Samhudi, II, p.370.
3. The name of a hill beside the hill of the Banu 'Ubayd, west
of Bathan. Samhudi, II, p. 310.
• •
4. Waqidi', II, p.454; I. Sa'd, II, p.67; Haykal, p.303.
5. I. Hisham, II, p.179.
(
^—1 ^—!-£• 1.1J-O wX_J Jl-J I J -1 L—J "V J 1 ♦
I—'—t J I jj. L5^ {Aj._jj J U j
6. A place 6 or 7 miles from Medina. BakrI, II, p.464;
Samhudi, II, p.293.
in Medina, in order to persuade them to desert Muhammad and
loin the allied forces. He reached the Qurazi quarters
secretly and met their leaderSjWho are reported to have been
unwilling to desert Muhammad because of their incapability of
defending themselves against him^in case the allied army
failed to inflict a fatal blow upon Muhammad and returned to
their homes. But Huyayy kept on arguing and at last managed
to win them over to his side on the promise that he would enter
their fort and await his fate with them if the allied army
(1 )
returned without having killed Muhammad.
The desertion of the Banu Qurayza would have been a heavy
blow to the Muslims if the Prophet had not been able to find
out what was going on behind the scenes, especially since the
Banu Qurayza were on the undefended side of the city. Thanks,
however, to the espionage system which got wind of this
desertion, the Prophet became aware of this impending danger
and could take action accordingly. It is stated that 'Umar
came to the Prophet and told him that he had discovered that
1. I. Hishim, II, pp. 159-60; V/aqidx, II, pp. 454-6; Tabarl,
II, pp.570-1. See also J. Hell who writes that the Jews
still there (at Medina) were cooperating with the Meccans.
The Arab Civilization, trans. S.K. Buksh (Cambridge,
1926), p.20 and F. Gabrieli who gives a similar statement
on this issue. Muhammad and the Conouests of Islam.
—i >
trans. V. Luling and R. Linell (London, 1977), p.72.
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(1)
the Banu Qurayza had defected. Then at his suggestion the
Prophet sent Zubayr towards the Jewish quarters in search of
further news. Zubayr went out and saw the Jews repairing their
forts and making other arrangements necessary for a battle.
(2)
Then he came back and told the Prophet what he had seen.
His report increased the anxiety of the Prophet who, then, sent
Sa'd b. Mu'adh, Sa'd b. 'Ubada and Usayd b. Hudayr to meet the
leaders of the Banu Qurayza to find out their real intentions
and advised them not to announce their findings if unfavourable,
for fear that it might affect the army's already flagging
morale. These people went to the Jews, talked to their leaders
and found out that they had decided to help the allied forces
against the Prophet. They tried to persuade the Jewish leaders
not to desert the Prophet but the Jews asked who the Prophet
was. They had no agreement with him. Sa'd b. Ku'adh was a
man of hasty temper so he reviled them and they reviled him
and the meeting ended with bitter exchanges. The Prophet's
men then returned to him and said "*Adal and al-Qara".. By
these words they meant treachery like that of the 'Adal and
- - (3)
al-Qara tribes towards the people of al-Raji*.
1. Waqidi, II, p.457; Irshad, V, p.68; Maqrlzl, p.227.
'Umar, however, did not reveal his source of information.
2. Waqidi, II, p.457; Maqrizi, p.227.
3. I. Hisham, II, p.160; Waqidi, II, pp.458-9; Tabari, II,
pp.571-2; Tabari, Taf. , XXI, p.75; Maqrizi, p.227.
A.ccording to I. Hisham and Tabari the prophet had sent
«
'Abdallah b. Rawaha and Khawwat b. Ju'oayr with the two
Sa'ds instead of Usayd b. Hudayr.
• •
- 158 -
The Prophet, then, formed a party of 200 men under the
command of Salma b. Aslam and another under the command of
Zayd b. Haritha to patrol the territory adjoining the Jbwish
quarters and sent Khawwat b. Jubayr towards the Jewish
(1)
territory as a spy to forestall any hostile move. The
patrol parties worked satisfactorily but the spy fell asleep
while on duty and woke up on the shoulders of a Jewish spy who
was carrying him towards his fort to execute him. Khawwat
realised the dangerous situation and snatched the arms of the
(2)
Jew, while still on his shoulders, and killed him.
In the meantime, the Meccans and their allies had arrived
and besieged Medina. The Prophet tried to make up the loss
caused by the defection of the Banu Qurayza by winning over
the Banu Ghatafan, who had joined this alliance on the promise
of Huyayy that a whole year's date crops of Khaybar would be
(3)
theirs as a gift. The Prophet perhaps knew this fact so he
offered them a part of the produce of the dates of Medina in
(4) (5)
case of their retirement as mentioned earlier. The Banu
Ghatafan were Bedouins and were accustomed to a 'hit and run'
1. Waqidi, II, p.460; Maqrizi, p.228.
2. Waqidi, II, pp.460-1; Maqrizi, p.228.
3. Waqidi, II, p.443.
4. I. Hisham, II, p.161 ; Waqidi, II, p.477; Amwal. pp.235-6;
I. Sa'd, II, p.69; Tabari, II, pp. 572-3; I. Khaldun, 11(2),
p.30; Maqrizi, p.235; Hamidullah, Watha'iq (Beirut, 1969),
o.56; Belyaev, o_o. cat., p.107; Gould, op . cit. , p.130.
5. See above, p.83.
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style of battle. To besiege an enemy for a long time in order
to force them to submit to their terms was an unfamiliar
concept to them. In the present case they, along with the
Meccans, were suffering from a shortage of fodder for their
horses and camels which meant that it was impossible for them
to prolong the siege in order to defeat Muhammad and get their
share of the booty. Therefore they showed their willingness to
accept what was offered and return to their territory. But
the Prophet, as mentioned earlier, dropped the project.
Worried by the increasing threat of the enemy from both
sides of the trench and the unco-operative behaviour of some
of his companions the Prophet once more sought help from
intelligence. It is stated that Nu'aym b. Mas'ud of the Banu
Ghatafan came to the Prophet and told him that he had become
a Muslim but that nobody knew about his conversion. He put his
services at the disposal of the Prophet who advised him to do
something to break up the confederacy. Thereupon Nu'aym went
to the Banu Qurayza. In a friendly manner he expressed his
anxiety over their future if the allied forces returned home
without inflicting a heavy blow on Muhammad. He suggested to
them that they should take some hostages from the chiefs of
the confederates as a guarantee that they would not leave them
alone in face of Muhammad. The Banu Qurayza agreed to
this proposal. Nu'aym, then, went to the Quraysh and told them
that he had come to know that the Banu Qurayza had decided to
desert them and had planned to take some hostages from them and
See above , p. 83.
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then hand them over to Muhammad for execution as a proof of
their faithfulness towards him. Nu'aym advised them not to
hand over a single hostage on their demand. Then he went to
the leaders of the Banu Ghatafan and told them the same story
as he had told the Quraysh.^
Thus Nu'aym sowed the seeds of disaffection between
different parties and when, later on, the Quraysh sent 'ikrima
to the leaders of the Banu Qurayza asking them to advance
against Muhammad they demanded hostages as a guarantee that
they would not leave them alone to the mercy of Muhammad if
the tide turned against them. The Quraysh and the Banu
Ghatafan then believed the report of Nu'aym and refused to
send hostages. Upon this refusal the Banu Qurayza became sure
that Nu'aym was speaking the truth and they dropped the idea
of taking part in the battle against Muhammad in favour of the
1. I. Hisham, II, pp.164-5; WaqidI, II, pp.480-2; I. Sa'd,
II, p.69; Tabarx, II, pp.578-9; Istl'ib. Ill, p.557;
Ibn Qayyim, o£. cit. , II, p.118; I. Khaldun, 11(2),
pp.30-1; Maqrxzi, pp.236-8; Isaba. Ill, p.568; Ibshihi,
op ■ cit. , II, pp. 125-6; al-Zarqani, o_d. cit. , II, pp. 116-7
Haykal, pp.309-10; Hasan, I, 119.
Belyaev points out another aspect of the activities of
the Prophet's secret agents when he says,
"The most important factor, however, was the
success of the Medinese agents in rekindling
the old grudge of the Bedouin against their
Meccan overlords, the Qurayshites, who had
led them in their thankless and fruitless
venture."
oo. cit. , p.107.
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confederates.^1^ As the only possibility of storming Medina
lay in the cooperation of the Banu Qurayza which now seemed
impossible, Abu Sufyan decided to give up the siege. The news
of this decision at once reached the Prophet through Kudhayfa
(2)
b. al-Yaman who was in the enemy camp in quest of news.
In the sequence of events which culminated in the siege
of Medina, the intelligence service of the Prophet seems
therefore to have worked very satisfactorily. It saved the
Prophet from a surprise attack of the largest army which had
been raised against him so far in the first place and provided
him with a chance to entrench the city as a defensive measure
in the second place. Thirdly, the intelligence service got
wind of the desertion of the Banu Qurayza and saved the Prophet
from being boxed in. Fourthly, it sowed the seeds of dis¬
affection among the different sections of the enemy which
marked the end of the siege. As the two armies did not come
1. I. Hisham, II, p.165; WaqidI, II, pp.483-4; I. Sa'd, II,
p.69; Tabari, II, p.579; Tabari, Taf. , XXI p.73;
I. Khaldun, 11(2), pp.30-1; Maqrlzl, p.238; al-Suyutl,
al-Khasa'is al-Kubra (Cairo, 1386 A.H.), p.575; Kanz. X,
p.283.
2. I. Hisham, II, p.166; WaqidI, II, pp.489-90; I. Sa'd, II,
p.69; Irshad, V, p.68; Muslim, III, pp.165-66; Tabari, II,
pp.579-81; Istl'Ib, I, p.277; I. Khaldun, 11(2), p.31;
al-Suyutl, o£. cit., I, p.575; Kanz, X, p.283. See
also p. 38 above where a brief account of Hudhayfa's
activities has been given.
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face to face to fight each other, except for some individuals
who exchanged a few blows with each other, it may be suggested
that the credit for the successful defence.of Medina goes only
to the intelligence service of the Prophet. With these remarks
we move on to 'Urana where another successful intelligence
operation had taken place.
Between al-Khandiq and al-Huda,ybiyya
It is stated that the Prophet received intelligence that
the chief of the Banu Lihyan was gathering a force at 'Urana,
a spot between Mecca and al-Ta'if, to make a raid on Medina.
The prophet decided to break up this gathering by assassinating
the chief, the man responsible for this gathering. He, there¬
fore, sent the earlier mentioned^1^ 'Abdallih b. Unays for
this purpose and advised him to pose as a tribesman of the Banu
Khuza'a. When 'Abdallah reached the spot he met the chief and
introduced him as a Khuza'i who had come to know about his
attempts to raise an army against Muhammad and had come to
join his ranks because he himself was extremely hostile to the
Prophet. The chief became very happy and entertained 'Abdallah
generously. 'Abdallah, however, soon found a chance to fulfil
( 2)
his mission and killed the chief when he was alone.
1. See above, p.17.
2. I. Hisham, II, pp.401-2; WlqidI, II, pp.531-3; I. Sa'd, II,
pp.50-1; Sahnun b. Sa'Id, al-Mudawwana (Cairo, 1323 A.K.),
III, p.3; I. Khayyat, p.43; Tanbih (3), p.212; Usui, V,
p.749; Maqrizi, pp.254-5; Isaba, II, p.279. According to
Waqidi this event took place in al-Muharram 6 A.H.,
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This operation is noteworthy for its intelligence aspects.
As mentioned earlier_,the Prophet received accurate information
about the gathering and its objectives. Then, instead of
sending a force to disperse it, he sent a secret agent to
assassinate the chief and thereby to get the gathering dispersed.
The Prophet also advised his agent how to work in the
circumstances he was going to face by telling him to pose as
a Khuza'i. The agent proved himself up to the mark and ful¬
filled his mission without any mistake.
Here is another expedition containing some elements of
espionage. It is stated that the Prophet sent out a party of
his followers under the command of 'Ukasha b. Mihsan against
• •
the Banu Asad to al-Ghamr, ^ ^ perhaps to punish them for taking
part in the alliance which had laid siege to Medina. The Banu
Asad received an early warning and dispersed to higher
territory. When 'Ukasha reached their watering-place he
according to I. Khayyat it took place in 5 A.H., according
to Tanblh it took place in 4 A.H., and according to
I. Sa'd it took place before the siege of Medina while
Jones puts it in al-Muharram 4 A.H. "Chronology", p.274.
The name of the chief was Khalid b. Sufyan according to
Ibn Hisham but W'aqidi, Ibn Sa'd and Maqrizi say that his
name was Sufyln b. Khalid.
1. A well of the Banu Asad on the road to Najd from Medina.
Samhudi, II, p.353jand at a distance of two nights'
journey from Fayd towards Medina. I. Sa'd, II, p.84.
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found the place deserted. He then sent out spies to find some
clue as to the whereabouts of the enemy. Shuja' b. Wahb, one
of the spies, came back with the report that he had seen the
footprints of the animals nearby and, then, led the party
towards them. While following the footprints the party came
across a sleeping man. They woke him up and captured him. He
happened to be an enemy spy who had kept a watch throughout the
night but fell asleep in the morning. When asked about the
enemy he answered that they had run away along with their
herds. It was suspected that he was telling lieSjSo he was
tortured. Then he said that if they spared his life he would
tell them about' another herd. They promised and he, then, took
them round a hill where they found a herd with very few guards
who ran away and the party captured 200 camels.
During this expedition the spies of both sides seem to
have been at work. The Banu Asad procured information through
their information service about the march of the Prophet's
companions against them and saved themselves from an attack
by changing the place of their camp. They also posted one of
their spies behind them to keep themselves abreast of further
developments but because this man could not keep himself awake
in the cool breeze of the morning in the desert after performing
his duties throughout the night, he unluckily fell into the
hands of the raiding party. The Muslims, on the other hand,
1. WaqidI, II, pp.550-1; Tabari, II, d.640. The date given
by Wlqidl for this event is Rabx' al-Awwal 6 A.H.
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also sought help from espionage to find out the whereabouts
of the enemy when they found that the reported place of the
enemy's camp was deserted. One of their spies managed to find
the footprints of the animals which, most probably, belonged
to the enemy and then the party started to follow them. In
their attempt to pursue the enemy the party came across an
enemy spy and made use of him for their further activities.
Two months later_,the intelligence service of the Prophet
brought home another success, the details of which are as
follows. The Meccans were worried about their trade because
the Prophet had virtually brought it to a standstill by
- (1)
threatening the earlier mentioned caravan of Abu Sufyan
which was travelling on the coastal route from Mecca to Syria
(2)
and then by capturing their earlier mentioned caravan at
Qarada which had been sent by the 'Iraq route about which they
believed that the Prophet and his companions knew nothing.
As the prosperity and even the existence of the Meccans were
in danger without trade, theyttherefore,decided to take a risk
and despatched a caravan to Syria by the coastal route. To
their misfortune, the intelligence service of the Prophet got
wind of this caravan and the Prophet sent out Zayd b. Haritha
( 3)
with 170 soldiers to intercept it when it was on its way home.
1 . See above pp. Iiy-20, 123-4.
2. See above pp. 138.
3. Donner says that the Prophet generally attacked the Meccan
caravans on their homeward journey because they used to
carry staple foodstuffs (along with other items) on this
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Zayd overtook the caravan while it was at al-'Is.^^ He fell
suddenly upon it and captured the whole merchandise along with
some caravaners among whom was Abu'l-'As b. al-Rabi', the son-
(2)
in-law of the Prophet.
It may be interesting to note that the Meccans must have
kept the news of the despatch of this caravan a closely-guarded
secret because of their previous experiences but the Prophet's
intelligence service seems to have become so effective in the
case of the P^eccans that it got wind of this news. Then the
Prophet arranged an expedition with such secrecy that the
Meccans could do nothing other than bemoan their losses.
In Sha'ban 6 A.H. the Prophet received intelligence that
(3)
the Banu Sa'd were gathering at Fadakv in order to attack
Medina with the help of the Jews of Khaybar. The Prophet
despatched an expedition under the command of 'All to break up
phase of their journey. "Mecca's Food Supplies and
Muhammad's Boycott". JESHO. XX (1977). pp.256-7.
1. The fourth station from Medina and a night's journey to
the right from Dhu'l-Marwa. Tanblh (L), p.253- Four
nights' journey from Medina and a night's journey from
Dhu' l-r£arwa. I. Sa'd, II, p. 87; Samhudi, II, p. 348.
2. Waqidi, II, p.553; I. Sa'd, II, p.87.
3. Five or six nights' journey from Medina. Tanblh (L),
p.253. According to Samhudi, II, pp.354-5 there are
different opinions on the distance from Medina to Fadak
which are two days', three days', and six nights' journey.
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(1)
the gathering. When 'Ali reached Hamaj he captured an enemy
tribesman from whom he asked the whereabouts of his tribe. The
prisoner at first refused to say anything but after he had been
tortured he said that he was a spy sent out by his tribe, the
Banu Sa'd, who had gathered two hundred soldiers under the
command of Wabar b. 'Ulaym. He offered his services to lead
the Muslim party towards the enemy gathering and their herds on
the promise of his safety. 'All promised to do so and
travelled under his guidance and fell upon the herds. Some of
the shepherds ran away and informed their tribe about the raid.
They, then, scattered without offering any resistance. 'All
(2)
returned to Medina with a booty of 500 camels and 2,000 goats.
This expedition is remarkable for its intelligence aspects.
First of all, the Prophet received accurate information about
an enemy gathering through his sources of intelligence.
Secondly, he managed to k'eep the despatch secret so that none
of the enemy's agents at Medina could warn the Banu Sa'd.
Thirdly, the Banu Sa'd seem to have been aware of the importance
of espionage during the warfare because the event under
1. Name of a well between Khaybar and Fadak. I. Sa'd, II,
p.90jWhile Xhaybar is at a distance of 8 burds from
Medina. I. Sa'd, II, p.106; Qazwini, Athar al-Billd
(Beirut, n.d.), p. 92 but according to Hifiz Wahba_, Khaybar
is 60 miles from Medina to the north, o£. cit., p.24 and
Dabbagh says that Khaybar is 189 kilometres from Medina
in the north west direction, o£. cit. , p.127.
2. Wlqidi, II. pp.562-3; I. Sa'd, II, pp.89-90; Tabari, II,
p.642.
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discussion shows that they had sent a spy in order to get timely
warning of their enemy's activities. Fourthly, the Prophet's
companions knew the importance of procuring information through
captured enemy tribesmen and then buying his services by the
promises of his safety. Lastly, the enemy's shepherds performed
the duties of yvarner (nadhir) and saved the main body of their
tribe from destruction.
In Shawwal 6 A.H. the Prophet sent out Kurz b. Jabir with
twenty horsemen to chase some Bedouin who had come to visit him
and then had treacherously carried away his herd grazing at
Dhu'1-Jadr.^^^ Kurz and his party went out but could not find
any traces of the robbers and became worried about the situation.
Then all of a sudden they saw a woman passing that way carrying
a shoulder of a slaughtered camel. The party captured the
woman and asked her where she had procured that meat. She said
that she had passed some people who had slaughtered a camel and
they had given it to her. Kurz and his companions became
suspicious of those people and asked her where she had met them.
When she informed them of the meeting place the party went there
(2)
and captured all the robbers.
This expedition is important because it succeeded with
the help of an informant and because the vehicle of intelligence
was a traveller who happened to be a woman. The party seemed
to be aware of the importance of procuring information through
1. Six miles from Medina in the vicinity of Quba. I. Sa'd,
II, p.93; Samhudi, II, p. 279.
2. Waqidx, II, pp.568-9.
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travellers and then making use of it.
Al-Hudaybiyya
(1)
The expedition of al-Hudaybiyya which resulted in a peace
treaty between the Prophet and the Meccans was undertaken in
(2)
Dhu'l-Qa'da 6 A.H. It is stated that the Prophet set out
towards Mecca for the lesser pilgrimage accompanied by some
1,600 men dressed in pilgrim garb and some sacrificial victims.^
Prom Dhu'1-Hulayfa the Prophet sent out 3usr b. Sufyan
of the Banu Ka'b of the Banu Khuza'a to Mecca on a spying
mission. When the Prophet reached 'Usfan, Busr came back to
report to him what he had found out at Mecca. A part of this
(4)
report has been mentioned earlier . In addition to that^he
1. A settlement nine miles north of Mecca. P.K. Hitti,
Makers of Arab History (London, 1969), p.17.
2. I. Hisham, II, p.210; I. Sa'd, II, p.95.
3. I. Hisham, II, p.210; I. Sa'd, II, p.95. In the course
of planning this journey the Prophet might have thought
that when the Quraysh came to know of his journey they
would find themselves in a difficult situation. If they
decided not to let him enter Mecca for the pilgrimage it
would be counted as a very great moral offence on their
part. On the other hand, his entry into Mecca at the head
of a large force could be interpreted as a loss of prestige
for the Quraysh. In both cases, he was going to win.
4. See above, pp.31-2.
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told the Prophet that if any one of the spies,posted by the
Quraysh on the hills from Baldah to Wazr^noticed any activity
on his, the Prophet's, part, the spy would pass that information
on to the next one behind him and ultimately it would reach the
Quraysh at Baldah in no time and the Quraysh would then be in
a position to take immediate action.
The Prophet had, perhaps, under-estimated the morale of
the Quraysh after their failure to storm Medina the previous
year. He was, perhaps, of the opinion that the mere presence
of 1,600 soldiers in his cavalcade would force the Meccans to
open the doors of their city for him. But Busr's report that
the Meccan cavalry had been posted on his route and that a
large number of their soldiers had gathered outside Mecca to
resist his entrance into the city showed him the real picture.
In this new situation, if he returned to Medina it would have
been a shameful retreat and a sign of acceptance of the
supremacy of the Quraysh. On the other hand, if at this stage
of his career he had met face to face with the Quraysh on their
doorstep without adequate arms and so far away from his strong-
(21
hold, Medina, he would have been inevitably crushed.
1. Waqidi, II, pp.579-80; MaqrizI, p.278.
2. As many of the Bedouin Arabs from the Banu Bakr, the Banu
Muzayna ana the Banu Juhayna held back when the Prophet
invited them to join the expedition saying that he would
never come back because he was going to meet such a power¬
ful enemy in such a weak position. Waqidi, II, p.574.
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But the Prophet extricated himself from this difficult
situation because of the comprehensive report of Busr which
included the names of the places where Xhalid and the Meccan
spies had been posted. The Prophet decided to avoid them and
by a little known route he reached al-Hudaybiyya,^1^ on the
verge of the sacred territory encircling Mecca, where he
encamped in a position which meant a threat to Mecca. Hence
he paralysed the Meccan cavalry, headed by Xhalid, and jammed
their espionage system and changed their aggression into defence.
Their cavalry returned to Mecca to defend the city and they
(2)
began to send deputations to ascertain his real intentions.
Here is not the place to discuss what happened during the
negotiations leading to the treaty of al-Hudaybiyya which proved
"to be so fruitful for the Prophet that al-Qur'an mentions it
(3)
as a 'clear victory'. Suffice it to say that this discussion
has demonstrated that the Prophet managed to conclude this
treaty because of his superior information service. Although
the Meccans had procured information on the Prophet's projected
route through their agents at Medina and then had adopted a
comprehensive system for communicating the information about
the activities of the Prophet by posting their spies on hill-
1. I. Hisham, II, p.211; Waqidi, II, pp.583-4; I. Sa'd, II,
pp.95-6; Tabarl, II, pp.623-4; Maqrlzl, pp.282-3.
2. Waqidi, II, pp.594, 599; Tabari, II, pp.626-9; I. Hishara,
II, pp.212-3; Maqrlzi, pp.277-8.
3. Al-Qur'an, XLVIII:1 ( )
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tops and adopting a secret language, it was the Prophet's
espionage system which carried the day. First of all, it
furnished the Prophet with the news that the Quraysh had heard
about his projected journey. Secondly, it penetrated deep into
the Meccan ranks and procured information about the places
where the spies and cavalry had been posted which enabled the
Prophet to dodge them and reach al-Hudaybiyya safely, thus
bringing the Quraysh to the negotiating table.
Conquest of Khaybar
The treaty of al-Hudaybiyya relieved the Prophet of the
danger of further attacks on Medina by the Quraysh. Until this
treaty most of his energy was being wasted against the Quraysh
and their Bedouin allies but now he became capable of dealing
with other enemies more effectively. The part played by the
Jews of Khaybar in the battle of the trench^^ was enough for
them to become the first target of the Prophet for an all-out
(2)
attack.
1. See above, pp.155-6.
2. Actually the Prophet had opened his account with the Jews
of Khaybar long before this time. He had secretly
assassinated one of their leaders named Abu Rafi' Ibn
al-Huqayq by his secret agents in 4 A.H. when he, the
Prophet, came to know about his hostile activities towards
him. I. Hisham, II, pp.190-1; Malik b. Anas, Muwatta, ed.
A.A. 1Armush (Beirut, 1400 A.H.), p.296; Waqidl, I, pp.391
Sahnun, on. cit., III, p.3; Ibn Habib, Kitab al-Kuhabbar,
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When the Prophet started his preparation for an attack on
Khaybar, the Jews of Medina sent word to their brethren at
Khaybar of the coming storm through a man of the Banu Fazara
of the Banu Ghatafan who had come to Medina to sell his
commercial articles.^1^ The Khaybarites, therefore, started
their preparations to repel the attack and Kinana b. Abi
' 1-Huqayq, one of their leaders, went to the Banu Ghatafan and
m •
(Hyderabad Deccan, 1361 A.H.), p.282; Usui, VIII, p.228;
al-Khafaji, Nasim al-Riyad (Cairo, 1325-7 A.H.), IV, p.371.
In 6 A.H. the Prophet came to know through Kharija b.
Husayl of the Banu Ashji' that a leader of the Jews of
Khaybar named Usayr b. Zarim was trying to raise an army
with the help of the Banu Ghatafan in order to attack
Medina. To ascertain the news the Prophet had sent
'Abdallah b. Rawaha with other spies to Khaybar. When they
reported back that the news was true, the Prophet, then,
again sent Ibn Rawaha with 30 riders with an invitation,
as is stated, to Usayr asking him to visit Medina to make
an agreement with the Prophet and, as a result, he, Usayr,
would be appointed as chief of Khaybar by the Prophet.
The plan, however, failed because the riders on their way
back to Medina became suspicious of treachery from Usayr,
who was accompanying them to Medina, and killed him along
with his 30 companions. 'Urwa, pp.195-6; I. Hisham, II,
p.400; Waqidx, II, pp.566-8; I. Sa'd, II, p.92.
1. Waqidx, II, pp.641-2.
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The Prophet set out for Khaybar in al-Muharram 7 A.H.
(3)
or a month later in Safar and sent Ubad b. Bashr with some
other riders in advance. These riders came across a man who
belonged to the Banu Ashj4 whom they questioned about his
activities. He told them that he was searching for his lost
camels. Then they asked him if he knew something about the
activities of the Jews of Khaybar. He told them that Kinana
and Hawdha b. Qays had brought the Banu Ghatafan to their help
on the promise of a year's date crops of Khaybar. In this
way they had collected 10,000 soldiers in their forts with a
large amount of arms and food. 'Ubad whipped the man and said
that he seemed to be a spy of the Jews and threatened to kill
him if he did not speak the truth. The man then told him that
the Jews of Medina had informed the Jews of Khaybar about the
Prophet's intentions and about' the shortage of arms and horses
at his disposal. He further said that Kinana had sent him
towards them, the Muslim force, advising him to meet them,
as a stranger, and to spread rumours about the strength of the
Jews to frighten them and then to try to return to Khaybar
with information about them. 'Ubad, then, brought this man to
1. Waqidi, II, p.642; Maqrizi, p.310. According to another
reportjall the crops of one year were promised. Waqidx,
II, p.640.
2. I. Hisham, II, p.223; Tabarl, III, p.9.
3. Waqidi, II, p.634. According to Jones this event took place
between Dhu'l-Hijja 6 A.H. and al-Muharram 7 A.H. "Chronology",
P.279.
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the Prophet whereupon 'Umar suggested killing him but the Prophet
spared his life because 'Ubad had assured him of his safety,
but put him under guard.
Although the Jews had been apprised of the Prophet's
intentions and had made necessary arrangements to repulse a
possible attack, they were unaware of the time chosen by the
Prophet for the attack. To obtain such information they had
sent out a spy but he was captured. This counter-intelligence
operation of the Prophet kept the Jews unaware of his march
and he reached K'naybar unexpectedly.
Soon after his arrival at Khaybar the Prophet tried to buy
off the Banu Ghatafan who were 4,000 strong. He sent Sa'd b.
Mu'adh to meet 'Uyayna, who was in a Jewish fort, and offered
him a year's crops of Khaybar for his retirement but 'Uyayna
(2)
refused to accept this offer. Then a rumour, most probably
at the Prophet's instigation, was spread that the settlements
- (3)
of the Banu Ghatafan were under attack. The propagation of
this false news, which is, after all, an important aspect of
intelligence work, forced the Banu Ghatafan to return to their
(4)
territory to defend their own households and to leave the
1. Waqidx, II, pp.640-1.
2. Ibid. , ii, pp.650-1 .
3. Ibid., II, pp.650-2.
4. Ibid♦. II, pp.650-2. Tabari says that the Banu Ghatafan
• •
were not with the Jews in their forts but were on their
way to Khaybar from their territory to help the Jews when
the above rumour was spread among them and they, therefore,
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Jews alone to face the Prophet's army.
Khaybar was an oasis which consisted of many fortSjSUch
as al-Zubayr, Sa'b b. Mu'adh, Nl'im, Nizar, Qamus, Watih and
Sulalim. The forts were built on the hill tops and were
provided with a constant supply of water. According to the
Jews, this oasis was invincible. The desertion of the Banu
Ghatafan was a serious blow to their defence but still the Jews
were strong enough to withstand a long siege. Luckily the
Prophet found some traitors from the Jews who offered their
assistance on the promise of safety for themselves and for
their families. One such Jew was Simak who was captured by
'Umar when the latter was on duty to guard the Muslim camp at
night. 'Umar ordered his companions to kill the Jew but the
latter requested an audience with their Prophet. 'Umar took
him to the Prophet where Simak said that the Jews of the fort
of Natat were shifting to another fort deserting their own,
where they had large quantities of arms and equipment including
a catapult buried in the ground. In the morning, the Prophet
attacked that fort and conquered it because of its inadequate
defences. Then he excavated the place mentioned by Simak and
returned to save their own household. Ill, p.9. Tabarx
also records another view according to which the Jews
were in their forts and the Banu Ghatafan were in their
territory and the Prophet stationed his force between the
two to keep them apart from each other. Ill, p.9.
1. Waqidi, II, pp.637, 647, 648, 666.
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found the arras and equipment. The catapult was brought
immediately into use and heavy stones were thrown by it onto the
walls of a neighbouring fort named Nizlr. This bombardment
shattered the defences of the fort and the Prophet soon
, .. (1)
conquered it.
Another such traitor was Ghazzal. He was brought to the
Prophet by his guards when the Prophet was struggling to storm
the fort of al-Zubayr. Ghazzal advised the Prophet to cut off
the water supply of the besieged Jews to force them to surrender
and told him how to do it. The Prophet acted upon his advice
and the Jews could no longer stay in their fort because of
thirst and came out to fight the Prophet. They soon were
(2)
defeated and the Prophet conquered their fort.
Here is not the place to give the details of the battles
leading to the conquest of the oasis of Khaybar. Suffice it
to say that although the Jews of Khaybar had received information
about the Prophet's intentions through their brethren at
Medina and had tried to terrify the advancing Muslim force by
publishing overwhelming estimates of their numbers, the Prophet's
army won the battle because of its superior information service.
The Prophet's army managed to capture an enemy spy and instead
of becoming terrified by his account made him a tongue against
his own employers, which is a part of counter-intelligence work.
Then the Prophet succeeded in forcing the Banu Ghatafan to mind
1. Waqidi, II, pp.646-8; Isaba, II, p.77; C. Brockelmann, History
of the Islamic Peoples, trans. Joel Carmichael (London,
1949), p.28.
2. Waqidi, II, pp.666-7.
- 178 -
their own business, leaving the Jews alone by spreading a false
rumour, which is yet another facet of espionage. Then he
managed to penetrate the Jewish ranks and found some traitors
who made his task easy. The use of such men is again a part
of espionage work.
Prom Khaybar to Mecca
In Sha'ban 7 A.H. the Prophet sent an exoedition under the
(1>
command of 'Umar b. al-Khattab to Turaba against the Banu
• 0
Hawazin. The news of this despatch is said to have reached
them beforehand and, therefore, they dispersed. 'Umar returned
(2)
to Medina without fighting.
This expedition is remarkable because an enemy so far
from Medina procured information about a despatch against them
beforehand, which shows what an effective information service
(3)
they had.
1. Pour nights' journey from Mecca on the road to San'a'.
I. Sa'd, II, p.117; Maqrlzi, p.333.
2. Waqidi, II, p.722; I. Sa'd, II, p.117; Tabari, III, p.22.
3. It may be interesting to note that the Banu Hawazin,
against whom the present expedition was directed, had
procured information about the activities of the Prophet
which resulted in the conquest of Mecca, while the Meccans
were completely unaware of what was going on at Medina
in spite of the fact that one of their spies had been
captured by the Prophet's army, as will be discussed later
on. See below, pp.193-4, 203.
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In the same month the Prophet sent another expedition
composed of 30 soldiers under the command of Bashir b. Sa'd
to Fadak against the Banu Murra. While qn their way they met
some shepherds and asked them about the whereabouts of the Banu
Murra. The shepherds told them that the Banu Murra were in
their valleys. The party then attacked one of the enemy groups,
plundered their animals and went on their way home. It was
not very late when the main body of the Banu Murra came to
know of this raid. They pursued the raiders, took them on
their way home and killed all of them except Bashir, who was
injured and left for dead.^^
This expedition, although unsuccessful, from the Muslim
point of view, contains elements of espionage. Firstly, the
raiding party made use of the shepherds, whom they had met on
their way, as a source of information. Secondly, as Waqidi
does not tell us what happened to these shepherds, whether
they were set free or were taken prisoners, it may be assumed
that the party let them go and that they perhaps belonged to
some enemy tribe. They, therefore, worked as warners and
informed the main body of the Banu Murra who then pursued the
raiders and succeeded in killing them. According to this
assumption, the raiding party met its fate because of their
inexperience in intelligence work.
The Prophet then sent Ghalib b. 'Abdallah with 100 soldiers
to punish the Banu Murra. When Ghalib came near to them he
sent out spies in search of news. One of the spies, 'Ulba
1. WaqidI, II, p.723; I. Sa'd, II, pp.118-9.
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b. Zayd, came back and told his leader that he had seen a
gathering of the enemy nearby. Ghalib fell upon this gathering
suddenly and captured a large amount of booty.^
Ghalib, as presented in the above story, seems to have
been a wise and careful man, as he did not lose his temper
because of the punitive nature of his expedition but sought
help from espionage to carry out his mission in the best
possible way. He consequently succeeded in his mission.
When Bashlr b. Sa'd recovered from his injuries the
Prophet sent him in Shawwal 7 A.H. with 300 soldiers to
(2)
Janab. The reason attributed to this expedition is said to
have been the intelligence report of Husayl b. Nuwayra of the
Banu Ashja'. It is stated that Husayl came to Medina and told
the Prophet that he had seen a gathering of the Banu Ghatafan
at Janab with aggressive designs against Medina. The Prophet
despatched an expedition and sent him, Husayl, as a guide with
it. 'When the party reached Salah, in the oasis of Khaybar,
Husayl was sent to spy out the location of the enemy. After
a short time Husayl came back with the news that he had seen
a herd belonging to the enemy nearby. The party, then, marched
forward and captured the herd. When they again reached Salah
•
.on their homeward journey they came across an enemy spy whom
they put to death. When they resumed their journey they saw a
gathering of the Banu Ghatafan headed by 'Uyayna who was taken
1. Waqidi, II, pp.723-4.
2. Between Medina and Payd in the territory of the Banu
Fazara of the Banu Ghatafan. SamhudI, II, p.282.
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by surprise, perhaps because his spy, presumably the one who
was killed by the raiding party, had not reported to him about
the presence of his enemies, the raiding party, nearby. The
gathering, therefore, dispersed after a short fight and the
(1)
raiders returned to Medina safe and sound.
Bashlr b. Sa'd during this expedition seems to have been
a different person from the one who was sent out against the
Banu Murra. He seems to have learned much from the previous
expedition and therefore in the present one he did not hesitate
to kill the enemy spy and thus not only took 'Uyayna by surprise
but also saved himself and his party from the fate which he had
experienced before.
In Dhu 'l-Hijja 7 A.H. the Prophet sent Ibn Abi'l-'Awja'
of the Banu Sulaym, one of his companions, towards the Banu
(2)
Sulaym with 50 soldiers. As mentioned earlier there was a
spy of the Banu Sulaym among the party who deserted it as
soon as it left Medina and took the news of the advancing
party to his tribe. The purpose of this despatch is said to
have been to invite the Banu Sulaym to accept Islam. When the
party reached its destination Ibn Abi'1-'Awja' invited his
kinsmen to accept the religion which he himself had accepted
but they refused to do so and attacked the Muslim party. The
Muslims fought back but all of them except their leader were
killed at the hand of the Banu Sulaym.
1. Waqidx, II, pp.727-8; Tabarl, III, p.23; Maqrizi, dd.335-6.
2. See above, p.136 f.n.1.
3. Waqidl, II, p.741; I. Sa'd, II, p.123.
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Regardless of its mission this expedition is remarkable
because it contains evidence, as mentioned earlier, on one
of the sources of information of the Bedouin tribes who were
hostile towards Muhammad, namely that they, or some of them,
had posted their spies at Medina most probably in the guise of
converts to Muhammad's religion (as otherwise the above
mentioned spy had no chance of being enlisted in the party and
if the party was sent out as religious instructors then the
spy must have been well versed in Islamic teachings and in
Muhammad's good books).
In Safar 8 A.H. the Prophet sent an expedition under the
- — — (2) —
command of Ghalib b. 'Abdallah to Kadid against the Banu
Mulawwah of the Banu Layth. When the party reached .Qudayd they
came across a man named Harith b. Malik who told them, when
asked, that he was going to Medina to become a Muslim. The
party arrested him saying that if he was speaking the truth
it would not do him any harm but in the opposite case, namely
that he was an enemy spy, they would save themselves from his
intrigues. Then the party reached Kadid in the evening and
sent out Jundub b. Mukayth as a scout. The activities of this
(3)
scout have been mentioned earlier and on the basis of the
information brought by him the party attacked the enemy and
1. See above, p.105 f.n.2.
2. The name of a valley on the road to Payd from Medina.
Samhudi, II, p.365.
3• See above, p.24.
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captured some of them along with their herds.
As to the intelligence aspects of this expedition it may be
mentioned that Ghalib proved himself an experienced person
in intelligence work. He did not take any chances when a
traveller told him that he was going to Medina to become his
fellow Muslim. Instead of showing any courtesy which is quite
natural in such circumstances, he arrested him without
hesitation_,for fear that he might be an enemy spy. Then Ghalib
sent out a spy who proved himself up to the mark and did not
even move when the enemy shot at him two arrows, one by one,
because he knew that the success of his party's mission lay
in his attitude. When, after receiving two arrows, he did not
move_, the enemy became sure that the arrows had hit an object
without life and went his way satisfied with the situation.
Jundub, then, managed to reach his party and conveyed his
intelligence to his leader who made use of it in the best
possible manner.
In Rabi' al-Awwal 8 A.H. the Prophet sent Ka'b b. 'Umayr
with a party of 14 men over the border into Syria. It is not
mentioned against whom they were sent. The only thing mentioned
is that an enemy spy noticed them and took the news to the
enemy who fell upon the party when it was at Chit Atlih in
• •
Syria and killed all of them except one who survived to tell
(2)
the tale.
1. I. Hisham, II, pp.394-5; WlqidI, II, pp.750-1; I. Sa'd,
II, pp.124-5; Tabarl, III, pp.27-8; Maqrlzi, pp.342-3.
2. Wlqidl, II, pp.752-3.
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As Muir suggests, the object of this expedition seems to
have been to obtain information about the activities of the
people of that area^ ^ perhaps because the party was too small
to make any kind of raid into such a distant area. However,
this expedition indicates that the people who lived so far
away from Medina were interested in and kept their eyes on the
(2)
activities of the Prophet through their spies.
1. 0£ cit. , p.393. The Prophet seems to have been in the
habit of sending small parties such as this and the one
which met its fate at al-Raji* (see pp. 146-8) to keep him¬
self aware of the situation in different enemy quarters.
The exact number of such expeditions is unknown because
the sources seem to record such activities only when
something went wrong.
2. Although the identity of the person who took the news of
this despatch to the people of the Syrian border is not
specifically mentioned in the context of this event an
assumption may be made in this regard. Waqidx states that
in 10 A.H. the Prophet came to know through traders who
were called saqita that an enemy gathering with hostile
designs against Medina had taken place on the Syrian border
and the Prophet,therefore, started his preparation for an
expedition which is known as the expedition of Tabuk.
Waqidi also states that these traders used to circulate
the news about the activities of the people who lived on
the Syrian border among the Medinans because they used to
travel between Medina and Syria in connection with their
- 185 -
In Jumada '1-Ula 8 A.H. the Prophet sent a force 3,000
strong under the command of Zayd b. Haritha to the Syrian border.
The reason assigned to this expedition is said to have been the
murder of Muhammad's messenger, Harith b. 'Umayr at Mu'ta when
• •
he was on his way to Busra. It is stated that the news of
this despatch travelled more quickly than the expedition itself
and the enemy, apprised of the advancing Muslim force, gathered
under the command of Shurahbll b. *Amr of the Banu Azd for an
- (2)
encounter. When Zayd reached Ma'an, in the Syrian
territory but some distance away from Mu'ta, he was informed
of the enemy's preparations and the reported strength of the
enemy was so great that it seemed impossible to win a battle
(3)
against them.
Zayd discussed the situation with his comrades. It was
suggested that they should write a letter to the Prophet
requesting him for advice or reinforcements. Until then, they
business activities. Waqidi, III, pp.989-90. The reverse
is also possible, namely that these traders, some of whom
might have been the spies of the enemy, used to carry the
news of the activities of the Medinans to the Syrian people.
1. Waqidi, II, p.755; Ibn 'Asakir, Tlrlkh Madlna Dimasha
(Damascus, 1951-4), VII, p.389.
2. 5 days journey from Damascus on the road to Mecca. BakrI,
IV, p.1172.
3. 'Urwa, p.205; I. Hisham, II, p.251; Waqidi, II, p.760;
I. Sa'd, II, pp.128-9; Tabarl, III, pp.36-7.
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should not risk a battle with such a superior force. In the
light of the intelligence report it was the only suitable way
to avoid destruction. However, 'Abdallah b. Rawaha, third in
command, urged an immediate advance. His words 'victory or
martyrdom' overcame all the arguments and the Muslim force
advanced towards Mu'ta.^^
The sources have not recorded what exactly happened at
Mu'ta during the battle except that 8 or 12 Muslims including
three successive commanders of the Muslim force were killed
and the situation became so bad that Khalid, the fourth
commander, could hardly draw off the Muslim force to a safe
(2)
retreat. However, it does not require great intellectual
effort to conclude that this disaster was the result of over¬
looking the information brought by the intelligence service of
the Prophet.
'Amr b. al-'As proved himself wiser than the commanders
of the previous raid when he found himself in a similar
situation. He was sent out towards the Syrian border against
- - (1")
the Banu Quda'a and the Banu Bali with 300 soldiers,
because the Prophet had come to know of a gathering of these
1. I. Hisham, II, pp.251-2; Waqidi, II, p.760; I. Sa'd, II,
p.129; Tabarl, III, pp.37-8; Ibn 'Asakir, o£. cit. , VII,
pp.388-9, 394.
2. I. Hisham, II, p.254; Waqidi, II, pp.763-4; I. Sa'd, II,
p.129; Xanz. X, p.242.
3. The date for this expedition is not given by the sources
but as 'Amr was the commander of this expedition and he
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tribes with aggressive designs against Medina. When he
(2)
reached a watering-place called Dhat al-Salasil in the
country of Judham he came to know of a large gathering of the
enemy against which he found himself unable to win a battle.
'Amr b. al-'As acted like a professional commander. He stopped
m
the march, prohibited his soldiers from lighting fires at night
lest the enemy should know his whereabouts and sent Rafi' b.
Mukayth as a messenger to the Prophet informing him of this
gathering and asking him for reinforcements. The Prophet
acted as advised and sent Abu 'Ubayda with 200 soldiers to help
'Amr. On the arrival of Abu 'Ubayda, *Amr marched forward and
reached the place where the gathering was reported but found
it deserted. He, then, continued his march until he reached
the far end of the territory of the Banu Ball and the Banu
'Udhra and completely dispersed the threatening mobs.
As to the intelligence aspects of this expedition, it may
be mentioned that firstly the intelligence service of the
Prophet managed to get wind of a gathering which had taken place
converted to Islam in Safar 8 A.H. (WaqidI, II, p.745),
it must_, therefore^, have taken place after that.
1 . The source of information might have been the earlier
mentioned traders.
2. The name of a watering place in the territory of the Banu
Judham at 10 days' distance from Medina. SamhudI, II,
P.323.
3. 'Urwa, p.207; WaqidI, II, pp.770-1; I. Sa'd, II, p.131;
MaarizI, pp.352-3.
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in a territory so far from Medina. Secondly, it warned the
commander of the expedition when he was at Dhat al-Salasil
of the large numbers of the enemy. Thirdly, it may be assumed
that the enemy managed to get the news that the raiding party
had requested reinforcements and also, perhaps, the despatch
of Abu 'Ubayda's party from Medina. This assumption is based
on the fact that their reported strength had frightened 'Amr j
therefore there was no reason why they should disperse
instead of fighting a weak enemy and their decision to disperse
shows that they had come to know about the reinforcements.
Finally, it hardly needs stressing that 'Amr's success was
due to the fact that he did not ignore the intelligence reports
Otherwise, he might have met the same fate as that of the
commanders of Mu'ta.
Conquest of Mecca
In the treaty of al-Hudaybiyya the neighbouring tribes
were given the freedom of being the allies of either side.
The Banu Bakr b. *Abd Manat declared their alliance for the
(2) - — -
Quraysh. The Banu Bakr were at odds with the Banu Khuza'a
who had killed one Bakrite and the feud had remained unresolved
1. I. Hisham, II, p.216; Waqidi, II, p . 611 ; Futuh. p.49;
Tabari, II, p.635.
2. I. Hisham, II, p. 216; Waqidi, II, p . 612; Tabari, II, p.635
Kanz, X, p.339.
3. I. Hisham, II, p.259; Tabari, III, p.43.
- 189 -
— — ( 1 )
The Banu Xhuza'a declared their alliance for the Prophet.
Twenty two months after the treaty was signed the Banu Bakr
attacked the Banu Khuza'a'to take revenge. Some members of the
Quraysh were also involved in this attack. After some losses
'Amr b. Salim and Budayl b. Warqa' of the Banu Khuza'a managed
to take the news to Medina and pleaded for assistance. The
Prophet promised to help and advised the Banu Khuza'a to scatter
(2)
themselves in their valleys.
When the Meccans realised the consequences of helping the
Banu Bakr in their attack on Muhammad's allies, the Banu
Khuza'a, they sent Abu Sufyan to Medina to look for a compromise.
It is stated that when Abu Sufyan was on his way to Medina he
met Budayl b. Warqa' who was coming back from Medina after
pleading to Muhammad to help against the Banu Bakr and their
allies, the Quraysh. When Abu Sufyan asked Budayl about his
activities the latter told him that he had been visiting his
tribal settlements on the coast and denied having visited Medina.
When Budayl went away Abu Sufyan visited the place where Budayl
and his companions had halted. He found some camel dung there
and broke it into pieces. He found that these contained date
stones from which he concluded that Budayl was certainly coming
from Medina.
Then Abu Sufyin resumed his journey and reached Medina.
1. I. Hisham, II, p.216; Waqidi, II, p.612; Putuh, p.49;
Tabari, II, p.635; Kanz, X, p.339.
2. I. Hisham, II, pp.260-2; Waqidi, II, pp.783-4, 788-9, 791;
I. Sa'd, II, p.134; Futuh. pp.49-50; Kanz, X, p.322.
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He went to see his daughter Umm Habiba, one of the wives of the
Prophet. Umm Habxba drew away the rug on which he was about to
seat himself saying that it was the Prophet's rug and no impure
idolator should sit upon it. After this humiliation he
approached Abu Bakr, 'Umar, 'Uthman, Fatima, 'All and Sa'd b.
'Ubada one by one with the request to recommend his case to the
Prophet. No one of them paid heed to his request except 'All
who advised him to call aloud that he, Abu Sufyan, took all
the parties under his protection. 'All further told him that
although such an announcement was useless for him it was the
only way left for him. Abu Sufyan acted upon 'Ali's advice and
returned to Mecca empty handed having no satisfactory word from
the Prophet.
According to the above account of his visit to Medina j
Abu Sufyan met his daughter, had an audience with the Prophet
and had brief talks with Abu Bakr, 'Umar, 'Uthman, Fatima, 'All
and Sa''d b. 'Ubada. It is not mentioned where he stayed the
(2)
night and under whose protection he was at Medina. It does
1. I. Hisham, II, pp. 26 2-3; ■ Abu Yusuf, Kitab al-Khara.i (Bulaq,
1302 A.H.), p.13; WaqidI, II, pp.785-6, 792-5; Futuh. p.50;
Tabari, III, pp. 46-7; Razi, ojd. cit. , VIII, p. 539;
Abu'l-Fida, o£. cit. , I, p.143; I. Khaldun, 11(2), p.42;
Xanz, X, pp.339-40; Shibli Nu'manl, al-Flruq. trans.
Z.A. Khan and M. Saleem as: 'Umar the Great (Lahore, 1955-7),
I, P.73.
2. He was an envoy who apparently did not need the protection
of any Medinan to perform his duties but relations between
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not seem far-fetched to conclude that according to this account
he performed the above mentioned job during the day and set out
to Mecca some time later in the same day.
Abu Sufyan was wise enough to conclude from his meeting
with Budayl, his degrading reception at Medina and the insulting
behaviour of the Medinans,that an attack on Mecca had been
decided on by the Prophet. He had a chance to prepare the
ffieccans and Ahabish to defend the city against the Prophet's
attack but there is no trace of such efforts on the part of
Abu Sufyan in the early Islamic historical accounts which
suggest that Abu Sufyan had decided on something other than
fighting. Waqidi has preserved a hint of the real situation.
He records that Abu Sufyan was detained at Medina and his absence
from Mecca was so long that the Meccans accused him of becoming
a follower of Muhammad who had kept his conversion secret.
Mecca and Medina were far from good in this respect.
During the expedition of al-Hudaybiyya the Prophet's envoy
Khirash b. Umayya was maltreated at Mecca and the safety
of his life was threatened by 'ikrima. Then the Prophet
decided to send 'Umar as his envoy who refused to go to
Mecca because of lack of protection. Ultimately, 'Uthmln
was sent out and he managed to enter Mecca only when Aban
b. Sa'id took him under his protection. Waqidi, II, pp.
601-2. With such a background it was unwise on the part
of Abu Sufyan to enter Medina or stay there for a long
time without adequate protection.
1. Waqidi, II, p.795.
- 192 -
This quotation leads us to make one of two assumptions.
Firstly, Abu Sufyan was actually detained at Medina. In this
case there must have been some terms on which he was released.
Alternatively, he remained busy in negotiations with the
Prophet for such a long time that the Meccans thought that he
was detained and when he returned to Mecca his attitude was .
such that the people thought that he had secretly gone over to
Islam. In either case the traditional account of his visit to
Medina seems a fabrication of our historians 'to avoid making
his role (in the submission of Mecca) appear-more glorious
than that of al-'Abbas' as Watt has suggested^1 \ which will be
discussed later on.
However, the Prophet,after the visit of Abu Sufyan to
Medina, started his preparations for a grand attack on Mecca
and summoned his allies from the Bedouin tribes but kept his
destination secret, even from his closest companions, as long
(2)
as possible. He sealed off all the roads to Mecca and put
'Umar in charge of this blockade.An attempt was made to
(4)
inform the Meccans by Hatib but, as mentioned earlier,
the woman who was carrying the letter to Mecca was intercepted.
In the meantime^the Prophet sent Abu Qatada with some
(5)
other soldiers to Batn Adam to mislead the possible enemy
1. Watt, Medina, p.64.
2. I. Hisham, II, p.264; Waqidi, II, pp.796, 802-3.
3. Abu Yusuf, op. cit. , p.131; Waqidi, II, pp.787, 796.
4. See above, pp.78-9.
5. At a distance of 3 burcb from Medina. I. Sa'd, II, p.133.
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(1)
agents in Medina about his real destination. This step of
the Prophet proved to be very successful^as until the last
stages of his journey to Mecca the majority of his companions
did not know whether he was going to attack Mecca or the Banu
(2) -
Hawazin. Moreover, it is stated that the Banu Hawazin had
procured information about his march from Medina, in spite of
the blockade of the roads to Mecca, but they could not know his
real intention and thought that he was, perhaps, heading towards
(3)them.VJ;
On the 10th of Ramadan 8 A.H. the Prophet left Medina and
(4) <
set out for Mecca with 10,000 soldiers. Prom Araj he sent
some cavalrymen in advance who captured a spy of the Banu
Hawazin and brought him to the Prophet who put him under guard
(5)
after investigation. Then the Prophet resumed his journey
1 . I. Sa'd, II, p.133.
2. Waqidi, II, p.802; Tabari, III, p.51.
3. Tabarl, III, p.70.
4. I. Hisham, II, p.265; Waqidi, II, p.801.
5. Waqidi, II, pp.804-6; Maqrizi, p.366. The captors of the
spy told the Prophet that he was playing hide and seek
with them until they captured him. Then, when they asked
him who he was, he said that he belonged to the Banu Ghifar.
They asked him to which section of the Banu Ghifar he
belonged but his answer was not satisfactory. Then they
asked him where his family was but his answer again was
unsatisfactory. Therefore they became suspicious of him
and threatened to kill him. After being threatened he said
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- (1)
and reached Marr al-Zahran where he pitched his camp keeping
(2)
the Quraysh completely unaware of the situation.
It is stated that the Meccans were expecting an attack
upon them from the Medinans but that they were unaware of what
was going on in the city of their enemies. In this state of
curiosity they sent out Abu Sufyan along with Hakim b. Hizam
and Budayl b. Warqa' on a spying mission in order to get some
information about the enemy. This was the time when the Prophet
that he belonged to the Banu Hawazin and had been sent out
towards Medina on a spying mission. Upon this confession,
as the captors said to the Prophet, they had brought the
spy to him. The Prophet asked the spy where the Banu
Hawazin were. He said that he had left them at Baq'a
(according to SamhudI, II, p.264, this place is 24 miles
from Medina, therefore something was obviously wrong) where
they had gathered in large numbers and had invited the Banu
Thaqif to join them and they had accepted the invitation.
The Prophet, then, asked him who the leader of the gathering
was. The spy told the Prophet that Malik b. 'Awf was the
commander of their forces. He further said that he passed
through Mecca and found the Meccans angry with Abu Sufyan
because of the failure of his mission at Medina and they
were afraid of the consequences.
1. A place at a distance of 16 or 16 miles from Mecca. Bakrl,
IV, p.1212.
2. 'Urwa, p.209; I. Hisham, II, p.265; VYaqidI, II, p.814.
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was at Marr al-Zahran on his way to Mecca and al-'Abbas, who
had recently joined the Prophet's army, was searching for someone
outside the Muslim camp through whom he could send a message to
the Meccans to surrender their city in order to avoid bloodshed.
Al-'Abbas met Abu Sufyan quite accidentally and persuaded him
to surrender and took him to the Prophet under his protection.
On the way^'Umar saw Abu Sufyan and drew his sword to kill the
enemy of God but al-'Abbas saved him and hurried to the Prophet's
tent. The Prophet told his uncle to take Abu Sufyan to his
tent and to present him the following day. In the morning he
was presented to the Prophet who asked him, "Have you not yet
discovered that there is no God but one." Abu Sufyan replied,
"If there had been any he would have helped me." Then the
Prophet asked him, "Has not the time come to acknowledge that
I am the Prophet of God." "There is still some doubt in my
mind about this matter" replied Abu Sufyan. Al-'Abbas urged
him to acknowledge the prophethood of Muhammad otherwise his
life would be in danger. Abu Sufyanjfinding no alternative
accepted Islam and managed to save his life. Then the Prophet,
on the suggestion of al-'Abbas, granted him-the privilege that
at the time of the attack on Mecca "Whoever enters the house
of Abu Sufyan shall be secure". Then Abu Sufyan saw the march
past of the Prophet's forces and went to Mecca where he
advised the Meccans to surrender because Muhammad had come to
them with a force that none could withstand. His wife Kind
seized his moustaches and advised the Meccans to kill him but
- 196 -
(1)
they dispersed to their houses and the mosque.
The above account of Abu Sufyan's visit to Marra al-Zahran
seems baseless because of the following reasons.
1. One of the companions of Abu Sufyan is said to have been
Budayl b. Warqa', a leader of the Banu Khuza'a, who had taken
the news of the misfortune of his tribe caused by the Quraysh
(2)
to Muhammad with a request for help, being his ally. It is
unlikely that Budayl was spying along with Abu Sufyan for the
Meccans against an army who had come to answer his pleas against
Abu Sufyan's tribe.
2. 'Umar has been described as very keen to kill Abu Sufyan
1. I. Hisham, II, pp. 265-8; WaqidI, II, pp.814-8; Tabarl, III,
pp.52-4; Aghani, VI, p.352; I. Xhaldun, 11(2), p.43;
Maqrizi, pp.368-72; S. Nu'manI, ££. cit. , I, pp.73-4;
Abu Zahra, _o£. cit. , II, p . 1196 . Al-Baladhurl's version
of this event is slightly different. He says that the
Quraysh had asked Abu Sufyan to return (to Medina for
further negotiations after the failure of his previous
mission). When he got near to Marr al-Zahran he saw the
fires and tents and wondered at the phenomenon. Then all
of a sudden he was surrounded by the prophet's horsemen
who captured him and took him to the Prophet where 'Umar
wanted to execute him but al-'A.bbas saved his life.
Putuh , pp . 50-1.
2. See above, p.189.
-197-
because fate had brought him alone to the Muslim camp but it
was al-'Abbas who managed to keep 'Umar away from Abu Sufyan.
If it is true, then the question naturally arises why 'Umar
did not try to kill Abu Sufyan when the latter had visited
Medina a few weeks earlier without the protection of al-'Abbas.
3. When Abu Sufyan was presented to the Prophet, al-'Abbas
is said to have urged him to accept the prophethood of Muhammad
to save his life. If the situation was suchthen where was
the promised protection of a respectable Hashimite, al-'Abbas?
Moreover, the question arises as to whether the Prophet was ready
to violate the protection of his uncle^whereas he had honoured,
at an earlier stage, the protection of his daughter, Zaynal,
to her husband Abu'l-'As b. al-Rabx'.^"'
In the light of the above discussion nothing seems
certain concerning the visit of Abu Sufyan to Marr al-Zahran
(2)
as well as his visit to Medina as discussed earlier and the
matter, thus, is open for making assumptions. It may be
suggested that Abu Sufyan submitted to Muhammad while he was
still at. Medina or at some later stage before the submission
of Mecca took place. The Prophet seems to have taken him into
his confidence about his projected plan of attack on Mecca.
After his return to Mecca Abu Sufyan seems to have been working
to prepare his fellow citizens for submission which made them
realise that he secretly had gone over to Islam. But as there
was no hope of winning a battle against Muhammad in a situation
when Abu Sufyan was advocating submission, therefore the Meccans
1. Vvlqidi, II, p. 553; I. Sa'd, II, p. 87.
2. See above, pp.191-2.
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decided to open the doors of their city to avoid useless blood¬
shed. This assumption is not altogether baseless because some
sources record that the Meccans had advised Abu Sufyan to go to
(1)
the Prophet and seek protection for them. According to this
assumption Abu Sufyan was aware of the timetable of the Prophet's
march,therefore he, along with Budayl and Hakim, went to seeJ •
the Prophet at Marr al-Zahran and reported the latest situation^
as ''Urwa states that Budayl and Hakim informed the Prophet about
(2)
the situation at Mecca. That is why the Prophet's march
from Marr al-Zahran onwards is presented as a victory parade.
According to this assumption the Prophet appears to have fought
a psychological war against Abu Sufyan and the Meccans which
is a part of intelligence work. As Fitzgibbon, while discussing
different kinds of intelligence activities, writes,
"'Psychological warfare' is a messy phrase,
of many ingredients. Its basic purpose
is to persuade the enemy, soldiers,
civilians and even governments, first
that they should not win or even fight
a war, and when this is impossible, as
is almost always the case that they
can not win the war, that its continuation
is a mere waste of life and treasure, and
that therefore immediate surrender is
desirable."
^^
Here is not the place to give an account of the Prophet's
victory parade from Marr al-Zahran onwards and his entry into
1. I. Sa'd, II, p. 135; Maqrizi, p.368.
2.. 'Urwa, p. 210.
3. C. Pitzgibbon, Secret Intelligence in the Twentieth
Century (London, 1976), p.50.
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Mecca. Suffice it to say that the Prophet's success in buying
off Abu Sufyan to his side which is a part of espionage work
and his counter-intelligence activities which had denied the
Meccans an access to the information about his activities
until he reached Marr al-Zahran had left no choice for the
Meccans other than to open the doors of their city for the
Prophet.^1^
1. Three years earlier, when the allied forces had besieged
Medina with 10-,000 soldiers, as it is reported, the
Meccans share was 4,000 which included themselves and
their closest allies, Ahlblsh. Waqidi, II, p.443;
I. Sa'd, II, p.66. Three years had passed since then and
a considerable number of them had gone over to Islam,
including some of their best soldiers such as Khalid b.
al-Walld and *Amr b. al-'As. With the present force which
may be estimated at around 3,000 it was impossible to
defend the city against a force of 10,000 without any
previous preparations. The Prophet had defended Medina
with 3,000 soldiers against a 10,000 strong enemy but he
had dug a trench around the city which had taken 6 days
to make. In the present situation there was not even a
single day left for such an effort. To look to their allies
was also useless because their main allies, the Banu
Ghatafan and the Banu Sulaym, who had contributed 2,500
soldiers to the alliance which had besieged Medina (Waqidi,
II, p.443; I. Sa'd, II, p.66) were now in the Prophet's
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Battle of Hunayn
As mentioned earlier, the Prophet had come to know through
the agency of a captured spy, of a gathering of the 3anu
Hawazin and the 3anu Thaaif with aggressive designs against him
(1 )
while he was on his way to Mecca. Therefore, soon after the
conquest of Mecca the Prophet turned towards them. He sent
'Abdallah b. Abi Hadrad to them and directed him to enter their
camp in order to learn all about them. He managed to do this
and stayed with those tribes until he learnt that they had
decided to fight the Prophet and until he found out the strategy
which they were going to adopt in the battle with the Prophet.
Then he, 'Abdallah, came back and told the Prophet what he had
(2)
seen and heard in the enemy camp.
army (WaqidI, II, pp.799, 803, 812; I. Sa'd, II, pp.134-5;
Tabari, III, pp.51-2) and the Jews of Khaybar, another
possible source of help were now among the Prophet's subjects.
Besides these groups, if they had any other allies it was
impossible to approach them and then to bring them to Mecca
for help in less than 24 hours' time because the Prophet
was knocking at their door.
1. See above,pp. 193-4. Another source of information about the
activities of the Banu Hawazin, Anas b. Abi Marthad, has
been mentioned earlier, although the present author could
not find anywhere what role he played in informing the Prophet
about the gathering and. the intentions of the 3anu Hawazin.
2. 'Urwa, p.214; I. Hisham, II, p.290; Wlqidi, II, p.893;
I. Sa'd, II, p.150; Tabari, III, pp.72-3; I. Khaldun, 11(2),
p.46; Kaarizi, p. 404.
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The Prophet reached Hunayn^ on the 10th of Shawwal 8 A.H.
(2)
at the head of an army 12,000 strong. Two thousand Meccans
had joined with his original force of ten thousand men to fight
- - - (3) -
the Banu Hawazin and the Banu Thaqif. Malik b. ' Awf, the
enemy commander, sent three spies to the Prophet's camp and
directed them to disperse in the camp in order to obtain
detailed information about the strength and the plans of
Muhammad's force. They returned unsuccessful with their joints
dislocated, perhaps by being beaten by the Prophet's guards.
(4)
Malik, then, sent another spy but this too met the same fate.
One more enemy spy is reported to have entered the Muslim camp
(5)
but he was captured and detained by the Prophet.
It is stated that Malik had posted his cavalry and archers
in the side valleys and upon hilltops surrounding the narrow
(6)
passage through which the Muslim force had to pass. When
the Prophet's army started its onward march, its vanguard was
1. A place between Mecca and al-Ta'if at a distance of some
10 miles from Mecca. BakrI, II, p.471.
2. I. Hisham, II, p.290; Waqidi, III, p.889; Tabari, III,
p.73; Tabari, Taf., X, p.62.
3. I. Hisham, II, p.290; Wiqidl, III, p.889; Tabarl, III,
p.73; Tabari, Taf., X, p.62.
4. I. Hisham, II, p. 290, Waqidi, III, pp. 892-3; Tabarl, III,
• 7
p.72; Kami1. II, p.200; Maqrlzi, p.404.
5. Waqidi, III, p.892.
6. I. Hisham, II, p.292; Waqidi, III, pp.895, 897; Tabarl,
III, p.74.
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taken by surprise and it scattered in panic as it was attacked
from hidden posts. This action of the panic-stricken vanguard
affected the whole army and the Prophet was left to face the
enemy with a very small body of his companions. He and his
uncle al-'Abbas, then, shouted at the tops of their voices to
call the fleeing Muslims back. It is stated that when they
listened to their call the Muslims returned to fight. This
turned the tide and the enemy flew away leaving 24,000 camels,
40,000 sheep and goats and 6,000 prisoners as booty for the
(2)
Muslims. The Prophet, then, went forward in pursuit of
the Banu Thaqif who had entered their city al-Ta'if. The
Prophet besieged the city but after some fruitless efforts to
— (3)
storm it he raised the siege and returned to al-Ji'rana to
(4)
distribute the booty among his soldiers.
Here are a few remarks on the intelligence aspects of
this battle which was fought between, perhaps, the largest
1. I. Hisham, II, p.293; Waqidi, III, pp.897-900; Musnad,
III, p.209; al-Jahiz, al-3ayan wa' I-Tabyln, ed.
H. al-Sandubi (Cairo, 1932), I, p.115; Muslim, III, p.156 ;
Tabari, III, p.75; Tabari, Taf. , X, p.63; al-3aydawi,
Anwlr al-TanzIl, (Cairo, 1330 A.H.), HI, p.64; Maqrxzl,
pp.406-7; Khafaji, Nasim al-Riyad (Cairo, 1325-7), II,
pp.45-9.
2. Waqidi, III, p.943.
3. 10 miles from Mecca. Waqidi, III, p.939.
4. I. Hisham, II, p.317; Waqidi, III, pp.922-37.
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armies the Arabs had seen so far, 12,000 on one side and
approximately its double on the other. The Banu Hawazin
seem to have been well aware of the importance of intelligence
because at least 7 of their spies, a party of 3 sent by
Malik, then another one sent by him, one more reported to be
detained in the Prophet's camp, one that was captured by the
Prophet's cavalrymen when he was on his way to Mecca and the
one unmentioned spy who originally took the news to his tribe
of the Prophet's march from Medina, meet the eyes of the reader
during this event. Most of these spies proved themselves up
to the mark because in spite of the torture which had dis¬
located their joints they did not reveal the strategy which
their commander was going to adopt in the battle. If one
examines this event along with the expedition sent to Turaba
one finds that the Banu Hawlzin had a good information service
according to the standards of seventh century Arabia.
On the other hand, the Prophet was also aware of military
intelligence but at that moment he seems to have become over¬
confident because of the 'unprecedently large force under his
(2)
command. This rendered him careless. The sources, mentioned
(3)
earlier, record only one spy, 'Abdallah, sent out by him
who could not find out the war plan of the enemy and 'Umar is
1. WlqidI, III, p.893.
2. I. Hisham, II, p.293; Waqidi, III, p.890; Abu Da'ud, op.
cit. , III, p.14; Tabari, Taf. , X, p.61; al-Baydawi, op.
cit. , III, p.64.
3- See above, p.200 f.n.2.
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even reported to have told the Prophet that 'Abdallah was telling
(1 )
lies. However, the Prophet paid the price of his carelessness
later during the battle.
One new development in the intelligence work, however, has
been reported in the accounts of this battle. We have seen on
a number of occasions that the Prophet or his commanders
captured the enemy spies and either put them under guard or
killed them after interrogation but the present event is the
first occasion when the enemy spies were set free and sent back
to their camp after being tortured. This was done, perhaps,
because of two reasons. Firstly, because the Prophet imagined
that the appearance of the spies in the enemy camp with their
joints dislocated would frighten the enemy. Secondly, the
Prophet hoped that these spies would tell the enemy about the
large numbers of the Muslim force. By this step the Prophet
wanted to frighten and demoralise the enemy^which is a part of
intelligence work. Malik, the enemy commander, hov/ever, seems
to have understood the reasons mentioned above because he put
(2)
his spies under guard to save his army from the effects
which the Prophet had foreseen.
1. I. Hisham, II, p.290; WlqidI, III, p.893;■Tabarl, III, p.73.
As the news of the gathering of the Banu Hawazin was already
known to the Prophet and the purpose of sending this spy
was to spy out their plan and 'Abdallah's report, as
discussed earlier, did not include the strategy which the
Banu Hawazin followed later in the battle, therefore 'Umar
seems to be right in refuting 'Abdallah b. Abl Hadrad.
2. Wlqidi, III, p.892; Maqrxzl, p.404.
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Prom Hunayn Until the Prophet's Death
In Safar 9 A.H. the Prophet sent Qutba b. /Amir with 20
• •
riders to a clan of the Banu Khath'am near Tabala.^1^ The
party travelled by night concealing their arms. When they
- (2)
reached Batn Masha they came across a traveller. When they
• •
questioned him he pretended to be dumb and started to utter
loud noises to alert those people in the area of his whereabouts
The party killed him and, then, at night sent out one of their
number as a spy to locate the enemy. The spy came back after
a short while and told them that he had seen a herd belonging
to the enemy nearby. The party then crawled forward for fear
of the guards of the herd until they safely reached the vicinity
of the enemy gathering and their herd without being noticed.
Then they fell suddenly upon the enemy while they were asleep
(4)
and succeeded in capturing a large amount of booty.
This expedition is remarkable for its intelligence aspects.
Firstly, the party travelled by night concealing their arms as
a counter intelligence measure so that nobody could find out
1. .A place near al-Ta'if on the road to Yemen from Mecca.
Bakri, I, p.301.
2. The name of a place in Sarif. Bakri, IV, p.1224, while
Sarif is 6 or 7 or 9 or 12 miles from Mecca on the road to
Marr al-Zahran. Bakri, III, p.735.
L,^. Waqidi , II, p. 755; . J^^OI. Sa'd
II, p. 162; MaqrizI, p. 440. ( 3 ^-11 ^
4. Waqidi, II, pp.754-5; III, p.981; Maqrizi, p.440.
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the nature of their mission. Secondly, the captured traveller
pretended to be dumb and in this way practically refused to say
anything about himself but at the same time he tried to act as
a warner by uttering loud noises. He may have been really dumb
but his noise revealed his mission and the Muslim party put him
to death to safeguard their own secrets because if they had let
him go he would surely have taken the news of the party to the
enemy and if they had kept him under guard there was no
guarantee that he would not shout again. Thirdly, the party
sent a spy who came back after completing his mission success¬
fully. Lastly, the party managed to surprise the enemy by
adopting a method, crawling, as a counter intelligence measure
which has never been mentioned so far in the accounts of the
expeditions undertaken during the Prophet's career at Medina.
In Rabi' al-Akhlr 9 A.H. the Prophet sent 'All with 150
soldiers to the territory of the Banu Tayy to destroy their
idol called Puis. It is stated that 'Adi b. Hatim, a leader
• •
of the Banu Tayy, had his spy at Medina who reported to him
about the forthcoming attack. 'Adi, therefore, left his
territory and fled to Syria. 'All, however, travelled under
the guidance of Hurayth of the Banu Asad on the road to Payd.
When the party reached a place which was a night's distance
from the enemy camp, as it seems that only 'Adi had fled to
Syria and the rest of his tribe was still in their territory,
Hurayth advised 'All to stop the march during the day and to
proceed on at night so that in the early morning they would
take the enemy by surprise and if someone ran away it would be
easier to chase him in the daylight. 'Ali accepted his advice
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and stopped the march. Then he sent three of his soldiers to
reconnoitre the territory. These soldiers brought a slave with
them on their return and told 'All that when they came across
him and asked about his activities he told them that he was
pursuing his desire fatlubu bughyati\^1^ When 'All forced
him to speak the truth he said that he was a slave of a man of
the Banu Tayy and was sent out to inform them beforehand if he
noticed Muhammad's force. He further said that when he saw
them, the Muslim party, for the first time he thought of going
back to his tribe to inform them but then decided to remain in
the vicinity until he could know their strength to give his
tribe a comprehensive report but was captured in the pursuit
of this goal. 'All, then, asked him about the whereabouts of
his tribe and he said that they were at a night's distance.
'All, then, marched forward along with his party and took
the slave with him to lead the way. They travelled all night
but could not reach the enemy 'who was reported to be at a
night's distance'. The slave, then told the Muslim party that
he had made a mistake and had left the right path behind. Then
he took the party a mile or so back and again said that he had
made a mistake. 'All, naturally, became suspicious of him and
threatened to kill him. The threat worked and the slave then
took the Muslim party to the enemy. The party, then, attacked
the enemy and captured a large amount of booty. Then 'All,
along with his party, reached the sanctuary of the idol, Puis,
1. -
, . jj,|Wlqidi, III, p.985.
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and destroyed it.^
This is another noteworthy expedition because of its
intelligence aspects. Firstly, it provides evidence of the
fact that the Banu 'Tayy, a tribe living very far from Medina,
had posted a spy at Medina, presumably in the guise of a
Muslim, to get information about the Prophet's activities
against them. Secondly, this spy was so efficient that he
managed to convey the news of the despatch before the Muslim
party reached their territory. Thirdly, the Banu Tayy sent a
warner to patrol the outskirts of their territory in order to
get an early warning of the advancing party so that they could
prepare for a battle if stronger than the raiding party or get
themselves scattered if weaker than the raiders. Fourthly,
the raiding party took precautions as counter intelligence when
it decided not to travel during the day to keep the enemy
unaware of their presence nearby and then captured an enemy
spy, an action by which they not only came to know the
whereabouts of the enemy camp but also managed to keep the
enemy in the dark about their own presence nearby. Lastly,
the slave proved himself experienced in intelligence work
because he tried his best to mislead the Muslim force and took
them in a wrong direction in the hope that either the raiders
would think that the Banu Tayy had changed their camping place
or that his tribe might conclude from his failure to report
back that the Muslim party was nearby who had captured their
spy and therefore, as he might have hoped, would get themselves
1. Waqidx, III, pp.984-8.
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scattered.
The last expedition led by the Prophet was his raid on
Tabuk^ in Rajab 9 A.H. The reason assigned to this expedition
was the news from Syria brought by the earlier mentioned traders
that the Byzantine government had mobilized a great army to
attack Medina and that the Syrian Arab tribes, Lakhm, Judhlm
and Ghassan, had also rallied under their banner. The Prophet,
after energetic preparations, reached Tabuk with 30,000 soldiers
but- there was nobody to fight with and the news of the enemy
gathering proved to be a rumour. Then after a short stay at
_ (2)
Tabuk the Prophet returned to Medina.
If one examines the three expeditions directed against or
sent into the Byzantine territory, Syria, namely, the
expedition which was led by Ka'b b. 'Umayr, the expedition
(4)
to Mu'ta and the present expedition, Tabuk, one finds that
the Byzantine espionage system was superior and more effective
than that of the Prophet. As in the cases of the previous two
expeditions the Byzantine espionage system managed to procure
information about the advancing Muslim parties^while on the
other hand the Prophet's intelligence service could not take
effective steps to surprise the enemy.
The expedition of Tabuk is a fine example of the superiority
1. 12 stations from Medina. Samhudi, II, p.269.
2. I. Hisham, II, pp.331-42; WaqidI, III, pp.989-91; I. Sa'd,
II, pp.65-7; Tabari, III, pp.100-101; I. Jawzi, p.707.
3. See above, p.183.
4. See above, pp.185-6.
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of the Byzantine intelligence service as it spread a false
rumour about the plans of the Byzantine government to attack
Medina, which is a part of espionage work, and created a panic
in the Prophet's city. The sources abound with the details of
the Prophet's preparations and his problems in raising enough
force to meet the threat. The Byzantine government must have
been exulting in the miseries of the Prophet created by their
intelligence service. The Muslim intelligence service, on the
other hand, could not find out the real situation until the
Prophet himself reached Tabuk and discovered that the news with
which he was furnished was a false rumour.
The last expedition ordered by the Prophet to be under¬
taken was the expedition of Usama b. Zayd in Safar 11 A.H.
towards Mu'ta to take revenge for the killing of the latter's
father. The expedition, however, was not undertaken during
the lifetime of the Prophet because a couple of weeks later the
Prophet died. The advice he gave to Usama is,however, worth
mentioning because it was the essence of his ten years'
experience of warfare. He is said to have advised Usama,
(1)
"Take with you guides and send spies in advance".
As the above advice was given to the commander of the last
expedition ordered by the Prophet during the last days of the
Prophet's life therefore here is the place to say that the
Prophet managed to start his career at Medina with the help of
xL» L« I, ■, J I fjui , Si ! _
1. Waqidl, III, p. 1 117;
Maqrxzx, p.53S; j <J j-i-*-'' j3/I xL»_ j . ga'g^ jj f
P.190. J-L-'
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espionage^1^ and ended his career, at Medina, stressing the
need of espionage.
Internal front
On the internal front there were the Muhajirun, the Ansar,
the Munafiqun and the Jews with whom the Prophet had to deal.
As for the first two groupSjthey were his followers and although
some of them indulged in unworthy activities, as mentioned
(2)
earlier, the majority of them stood by him through thick
and thin. Therefore^, the main source of worry for the Prophet
were the Munafiqun and the Jews who had adopted a hostile
attitude towards him.
The Munafiqun had no separate quarters or compact settle¬
ments which could provide them with a secure base for their
activities against the Prophet. Therefore their activities
remained limited to criticising the new faith, spying on the
Prophet and encouraging the Jews in their activities against
the Prophet. The Prophet dealt with them very patiently and
generally he tried to avoid the use of force against them for
fear that it might provoke their relatives among the Ansar.
Another reason for avoiding the use of force against them was
the Prophet's fear that people would think that he treated his
companions harshly, as the Munafiqun, after all, were counted
among his companions, and it would end the influx of newcomers
to his ranks.
1. See the section which deals with the hijra.
2. See above, pp.78-85.
- 212 -
As for the Jews of Medina they were a different sort of
opponent for the Prophet. The Prophet,therefore,adopted a
different policy towards them. Their numbers ran into thousands
and they had compact settlements in the oasis of Medina which
provided them with a concrete base to execute their plans against
the Prophet. Generally they did not try to hide their hostile
activities towards him but whenever they tried to do so the
espionage system of the Prophet got wind of it and the Prophet
responded with full force.
As the activities of the Munafiqun and the'Jews of Medina
against the Prophet are inter-related therefore it seems
appropriate to mention them together in what is generally
accepted to be a chronological order.
During the period preceding the battle of Badr the internal
front seems quiet and calm and the parties seem to have been
weighing one another up for their future behaviour towards
each other.^1^
When the battle of Badr was over the Munafiqun spread the
news of the Prophet's defeat and his killing along with his
close companions. This action of the Munafiqun 'was a sort of
propaganda war to demoralise the family members of those Muslims
who had gone to Badr. WaqidI states that the Jews of Medina
1. A letter from some of the Meccan leaders may be mentioned
which was sent to Ibn Ubayy and his party asking them to
expel the Prophet from Medina. Usui, VIII, pp.218-9; M.
Kamidullah, Watha' iq (Beirut, 1969), pp.50-1. It is not
mentioned,however,what action Ibn Ubayy took when he
received this letter.
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were also taking part in such propaganda^1 ^ which is after all
a part of espionage work. Usama b. Zayd reported to the
(2)
authorities but the Prophet did not take any step against
them because, as the Prophet might have thought, his, the Prophe
presence at Medina along with a number of prisoners taken at
Badr seemed enough to refute the claims of adversaries.
A few weeks after the battle of Badr^Abu Sufyan made a
raid on the outskirts of Medina, as mentioned earlier,and
Sallam b. Mishkam of the Banu al-Nadlr furnished him with
secret information about the situation at Medina. Afterwards
Abu Sufyan is said to have composed verses about this event and
(4)
made his secret meeting with Sallam known to all. As the
poets of those times were the journalists of the day the poems
were the newspapers. The Prophet picked up this information
(5)
which is a part of espionage work but did not take immediate
steps against Sallam or the Banu al-Nadir and waited for a
suitable moment.
1. Waqidi, I, p.115.
2. Ibid., p.115.
3. See above, p.137.
4. I. Hi sham, II, p. 55; V/aqidl, I, p. 182.
5. See R.S. Cline, Secrets, Spies and Scholars (Washington,
1976), p.7, who writes that,
"Intelligence on foreign affairs includes
such additional categories as press reports,
foreign radio broadcast, foreign publications
and - in the Government - reports from our
Foreign Service officers and military attaches."
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Ka'b. b. Ashraf, a Jewish leader and a poet, went to Mecca
after the battle of Badr where he recited his poems to incite
the Quraysh to take revenge for their kinsmen slain at Badr.^^
The Prophet again picked up information from the journals of
the day and when Ka'b returned to Medina he sent his secret
agents to assassinate Ka'b who performed their duty success¬
fully.^2'*
It is stated that the Banu al-Nadir co-operated with the
Meccans when the latter came to fight with the Prophet in the
battle of Uhud and helped the latter, providing them with
(3)
secret information about the Muslims.
1. 'Urwa, p.162; I. Hisham, II, pp.58-9; Waqidi, I, p.185;
I. Sa'd, II, p.32; Tabarx, II, p.488.
2. 'Urwa, p.162; I. Hisham, II, pp.60-2; Waqidi, I, pp.187-90;
I. Sa'd, II, pp.32-3; Muslim, III, pp.172-3; Tabarl, II,
pp.490-1; al-Razx, Mafatlh al-C-hayb (Cairo, 1307 A.H.),
VIII, p.125; Usui, VIII, pp.225-7; al-Suyuti, o£. cit. . I,
pp.527-8. Kister, however, suggests another reason for
the bitterness of relations between the Prophet and Ka'b
which resulted in the assassination of the latter. He says
that the Prophet wanted to establish a market on a piece
of land which belonged to Ka'b but the latter tried to
prevent him from doing so. "The Market of the Prophet",
JESHO
T VIII (1965), p.274. Kister further says that,
"Ka'b considered the establishment of the
new market as competition to the existing




Later on when the Prophet visited their quarters to discuss
certain matters they are said to have formed a plot to assass¬
inate the Prophet. The latter, however, came to know; of this
plot and left the premises.^^^
This plot is said to have been the reason for his forcing
them into exile. To the present author the act of Sallam b.
(2)
Mishkam, mentioned earlier, and the information on the
Prophet's activities during the battle of Uhud seem more
appropriate reasons for the decision to exile them because the
Prophet had, probably, come to the conclusion that as long as
the 3anu al-Nadir were there at Medina they would serve as a
source of secret information to the Meccans on his activities.
When the Prophet left for Uhud, Ibn Ubayy stayed behind
with one-third of the Prophet's original force and the
battle resulted in the victory of the Meccans but the latter
did not storm Medina. One of the reasons why the Meccans did
not press home their advantage in Medina was, as 'Amr b. al-'As
(4)
is reported to have said, that they had heard that Ibn Ubayy
was in Medina with one-third of the Muslim force. This
statement leads us. to make an assumption, namely, that the
1. 'Urwa, pp.164-5; I. Hisham, II, p.142; I. Sa'd, II, p.57;
Futuh, p.31; al-Suyuti, ojo. cit. , I, p. 525; Maqrlzl, p.178.
2. See above, p.137.
3. I. Hisham, II, p.67.
4. V/aqidi, I, p.299; J. C-ould, "A Study of Two Rivalries in
the Umma (1-11 A.H.)-", unpublished Ph.D. Thesis (University
of Edinburgh, 1975-6), p.62.
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Prophet had spread the news that Ibn Ubayy was at Medina with
his consent to serve as a reserve and to defend the city in
case of danger. Such propaganda is a part of espionage work.
During the expedition of the Banu al-Mustaliq the activit
of Ibn Ubayy came to the notice of the Prophet through Zayd
b. Arqam as mentioned earlier.^ ^ It is stated that 'Umar
advised the Prophet to send 'Ubad b. Bashr to kill Ibn Ubayy
but the Prophet refused to accept this advice saying that
people would say that Muhammad was killing his own companions.
During the siege of Medina the Banu Qurayza had secretly
joined the ranks of the allied forces and the Prophet had
come to know about this fact through his intelligence service,
(3)
as mentioned earlier. When the allied forces left for home
the Prophet laid a siege on the Banu Qurayza and forced them
to surrender. It is stated that on Sa'd's decree the Prophet
put all their fighting men to death and sold their women and
(4)
children into slavery.
1. See above , p.98.
2. I. Hisham, II, pp.199-200; WlqidI, II, p.418.
3. See above, p.156.
4. 'Urwa, p.188; I. Hisham, II, pp.170-1; WaqidI, II, p.497,
509-10; 512-3; I. Sa'd, II, pp.77-8; al-Darimx, Sunan
(Beirut, 1398 A.H.), II, p.238; Futuh, p.36; Tabarx, II,
pp.587-8; Tabarx, Taf. , XXI, p.89; Mishkat. II, pp.389-90
Maqrlzx, pp.246-7; Amir Ali, The Spirit of Islam (London,
1965), p.82; Watt, "The Condemnation of the Jews of Banu
Quraysh". MW. XLII (1952), p.171. Amxr 'All maintains
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The execution of the Banu Qurayza seems to have marked the
end of the Jewish influence at Medina because the Jews who still
remained there could no longer pose any threat to Muhammad's
growing influence but the Munafiqun were still there busy with
their usual activities. When the Prophet started preparations
for the expedition to Tabuk a number of the Munafiqun decided
to stay behind and persuaded others who wanted to accompany
the Prophet to do so too.^1^ One such Munafiq was Julas b.
Suwayd. His activities were reported to the Prophet by his
own step son 'Umayr b. Sa'Id. The Prophet summoned Julas and
asked for an explanation. He denied having taken part in such
activities and later apologized and is said to have become a
(2)
good Muslim.
'When the Prophet was on his way back to Medina from Tabuk
a party of the Munafiqun who were among the Prophet's
cavalcade plotted to assassinate him and chose a narrow path
over which the Prophet had to pass at night to execute their
that the numbers of the Jews who were executed were
between 200 and 250. 'Arafat, however, rejects the story
of the mass execution of the Banu Qurayza and seems to
hold the opinion that only a few of them, their leaders
and the guilty ones, were put to death. "New Light on
the Story of Banu Qurayza and the Jews of Medina",
• '
JRAS (1976), pp.100-107.
1. I. Hisham, II, p.337.
2. Wiqidi, III, pp.992-3, 995, 1003, 1005.
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plan. The Prophet was informed of this plot and advised 'Ammar
b. Yasir and Hudhayfa b. al-Yaman to escort him through that
narrow path. When the plotters tried to carry out the attack
they were intercepted by the guards and dispersed in the dark.
In the morning the Prophet told Usayd b. Hudayr about this
incident. The latter advised him to locate such persons and
get them executed by their own relatives. The Prophet did not
agree with him and said that the people would say that the
Prophet had killed his own companions after having their
assistance in the battle against his enemies.^1^
Although the name of the informant is not recorded, there
can be no doubt that it was the intelligence service of the
Prophet who got wind of this plan and gave him a timely
warning and the Prophet eventually managed to save his life by
taking appropriate steps.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have discussed the Prophet's activities
in the field of espionage in detail. Our analysis leads us
to conclude that espionage played a major role in the success
of the Prophet against so many odds. It has been mentioned
that he managed to find and reach a comparatively secure place
to accomplish his mission with the help of Mus'ab b. 'Umayr
and 'Abdallah b. Abi 3akr, his spies at Medina and Mecca
respectively. 'Then he succeeded in blocking the caravan route
of the Quraysh to Syria by attacking their caravans on the basis
1. 7/aqidI, III, pp.1042-4.
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of information received through his spies. He won the battle
of Eadr mainly by the help of his intelligence activities when
he came to know the presence of the enemy nearby and blocked up
all the wells except the one around which he stationed his own
force. He managed to save his city from a grand attack of the
joint forces of the Meccans, the Bedouin Arab tribes and the
Jews by the help of espionage when he came to know their march
beforehand, dug a trench around his city and then forestalled
the hostile moves of the Banu Qurayza and saved himself from
being boxed in. Then he broke up the enemy gathering by sowing
the seeds of disaffection among different sections of the enemy
through his secret agent Nu'aym b. Mas'ud. The treaty of al-
Hudaybiyya, through which the Prophet was recognised as an equal
to the Quraysh rather than a runaway, could be concluded only
because of the successful espionage activities of Busr b. Sufyan.
Then the conquest of Mecca was due, mainly,to the psychological
victory over Abu Sufyan and the counter intelligence activities
of the Prophet because he had blocked all the roads to Mecca and
thus had denied the Meccans a chance of getting early warning of
his proposed attack.
He overpowered the Bedouin Arab tribes because his information
service managed to forestall many-of their hostile moves and he
succeeded in breaking up their gatherings without suffering any
loss such as in the cases of the Banu Maharib, the Banu Lihyan,
• •
the Banu al-Mustaliq, the Banu Sa'd, the Banu Ghatafan and the
• • •
Banu Tayy.
He kept the Jews of Medina and of Khaybar under close watch
through his spies and consequently succeeded in achieving his
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goal by destroying their power of resistance.
The Munafiqun were a constant headache for the Prophet from
within his community but he managed to induce their own brethren
from the Ansar to spy against them. Consequently, whenever any
one of the Munafiqun was reported to be taking part in subversive
activities the Prophet carefully countered their measures and
managed to avoid any possible loss as in the cases of 'Abdallah
b. Ubayy during the expedition against the Banu al-Mustaliq and
the ones who had plotted to assassinate him during the expedition
to Tabuk.
He also kept the Muhl,jirun and the Ansar, who were his
followers, under close watch through his information service in
spite of their faithfulness towards him because after all they
were human beings.
So far the activities of the Prophet, and his commanders,
in the field of espionage during his Medinan career have been
discussed in what is generally accepted to be a chronological
order. By this discussion it has become obvious that the Prophet
made use at one time or another of virtually every mode of
intelligence which was available to him in 7th century Arabia.
To summarise this discussion^his activities may be mentioned
under the following headings but inevitably there is some over¬
lap between certain types of spies.
1. Agents in place
The spies or secret agents posted on a long term basis by
the Prophet in or around the enemy territory like Mus'ab,al-
'Abbas, Husayl b. Nuwayra, the Banu Khuza'a and the iron-smith
may be termed 'agents in place*.
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2. Penetration agents
The spies who were sent to the enemy, reached their
destination, fulfilled their mission and managed to get back.
People such as Talha, Sa'xd, 'AdI, Basbas, Anas, Munis, Hubab,
Madhkur, Burayda, Zubayr, Khawwlt, Hudhayfa, Shuja'. Busr, 'Ulba',
Husayl, and Ibn Abx Hadrad may be termed 'penetration agents'.
3. Missionaries
The spies or secret agents sent out to work in the enemy
or neutral tribes in the guise of preachers of the new faith
such as Mus'ab and the people of al-Rajx4 may be called
missionaries.
4. Ambassadors
The people sent to the enemy whose duties included those
of negotiators and spies such as Sa'd b. Mu'adh, Sa'd b. Ubada,
Usayd b. Hudayr and 'Uthman may be placed under this heading.
5. Relatives
The non-Muslims who had some kind of relationship with
someone in the Prophet's ranks and proved to be a source of
information about the enemy like al-'Abbas (before his conversion
to Islam) and Walxd b. Zuhayr and also the companions of the
Prophet who spied On their relatives like 'Umayr b. Sa'xd may
be mentioned as relatives.
6. Traders
The people who had to travel to and fro in connection with
their trading activities sometimes proved to be a source of
information for the Prophet about his enemies. The traders
termed saqita and the one who informed the Prophet about a
gathering of the Banu Tha'laba and the Banu Anmar at Dhat al-Riqa'
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may be mentioned under this heading.
7. Casual travellers
They were an important source of information and Yasar,
Jabbar and the men who brought the news of the activities of
the Banu al-Mustaliq to Medina may be placed under this heading.
• •
8. Traitors
Such persons were a very important source of secret
information about the enemy. Simak and Ghazzal are examples
of this sort of men during the Prophet's career at Medina.
9. Tongues
The water carriers of the Quraysh and the spies of the
Banu al-Mustaliq, the Banu Sa'd, the Banu Hawazin and the Jews
• • •
of Khaybar when captured and tortured by the companions of the
Prophet, revealed their own secrets.
10. Women
There is no evidence that the Prophet employed women for
intelligence but they were a tool of the apparatus of the
intelligence in his days. For example, Kurz b. Jabir found a
clue to the robbers through a woman, Hatib had tried to send
• •
his letter to Mecca through a woman and 'Adx and Basbas got
wind of the caravan of Abu Sufyan through wom-en.
11 . Codes
There is not much evidence about the use of codes in
the intelligence work during this period. Only the negotiators
sent to the Banu Qurayza used codified form to convey their
report to the Prophet when they returned to him.
12. Safeguarding Secrets
An important part of espionage work is courier-intelligence
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which is to safeguard one's own secrets. The Prophet once gave
sealed orders to an expedition leader with the order not to read
them until two days later and once sent directions to a commander
when he was on his way. This was to prevent the enemy agents
at Medina from knowing the purpose of the expeditions. On some
occasions the Prophet or his commanders set out in a direction
other than the one in which their target lay. On a number of
occasions they captured the enemy spies and thus denied the
enemy access to information about their activities.
13. Feeding the enemy with false information
On at least three occasions, after the defeat at Uhud,
during the siege of Medina and during the campaign of Khaybar,
the Prophet or his companions spread false news among the enemy
to demoralize them and consequently achieved their goals.
In this way the man who had started his career at Medina
as a refugee achieved a unique success in bringing nearly all
the Arabs under his banner in a space of a mere ten years and
established a state which soon after his death expanded to
include a large part of the then known world.
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